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In the last twelve months, “clean technology” hit prime time in the political arena. Nearly every campaign, every meet-ing of international leaders, and every town hall has lauded 
clean and green technology as the solution to the job crisis, the 
credit crisis, the climate crisis, and every other conceivable 
modern ill. Through cleaner, greener technologies we can make 
our air clearer, our planet cooler, and our lives more prosperous. 
Like any vague promise, these discussions of clean technology 
have not only fostered hope and brought out the skeptics and 
cynics, but are also beginning to fuel real debate as to the future 
of this emerging sector. 
In this issue our staff set out to explore the current discourse 
in the clean technology field, beyond political rhetoric and cam-
paign policy speeches. What we learned is both distressing and 
heartening. It seems that the world has barely taken a step down 
the path to cleaner technological solutions, and we have a great 
distance to travel before the panacea of clean technology can 
generate the types of benefits we seek. However, as this issue 
details, the debate is moving forward and countries around the 
world—from the United States to India—are testing innovative 
approaches on how to further global cleantech development and 
trade.
Our contributors from all over the planet examine the dis-
tance that we have traveled through proposed and promulgated 
policies, legislation, and regulations. And more importantly, 
they examine the road ahead and the major obstacles that we 
will need to break down, bypass, and overcome. An added fea-
ture of this issue of Sustainable Development Law & Policy is 
an introduction that strives to incorporate a perspective often 
overlooked in cleantech debates: the human perspective. The 
editors and staff of SDLP feel that throughout both high-level 
policy discussions and local implementation, we must remember 
the founding tenets of sustainable development by continuing 
to make the linkages between its environmental, economic, and 
social dimensions. In the context of cleantech and global warm-
ing, this most certainly includes a discussion of human rights. 
From there, articles cover the international trade and intellectual 
property regimes that keep clean technology from being freely 
disseminated. They scrutinize the current and speculate on the 
future positions of major international players, like China, India, 
the United States, the World Bank, and the WTO. And they con-
sider how we’re going to pay for it all. 
We hope you enjoy this compilation of articles, which we 
feel provides an excellent overview of a few of the most press-
ing issues in the clean technology debate. As this debate intensi-
fies in the coming months, we hope this issue of SDLP will help 
push the discourse beyond rhetoric and towards action. 
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perSpective: technology tranSfer 
anD human rightS: Joining up the DotS
by Stephen Humphreys*
“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the 
right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and 
its applications.”—International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, Art. 15(1)(b) 
The transfer of technology is one of the core mechanisms at the heart of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) and a key vehicle for channeling 
the “equity” demands in that treaty. The UNFCCC recognizes (i) 
that in order to adapt to climate change and continue to develop 
sustainably, poor countries will need technological assistance, 
and (ii) that there is an obligation on richer countries—as their 
contribution to the cause of climate change is greater and they 
also have greater technological capacity—to provide that assis-
tance. The treaty further makes developing country participation 
in the climate regime dependent upon “effective” technology 
transfer from industrial countries. Yet so far, for a variety of rea-
sons, structured technology transfer has not taken place. Despite 
its centrality, and despite enormous attention in UN negotiating 
rooms over the years, the subject is infected by obscurity and 
jargon, it has received little public airing and often seems mar-
ginalized or disconnected from other, better known areas of the 
climate debate. There is no inherent reason that this should be 
the case, in particular given the central importance of technol-
ogy transfers to surmounting climate change equitably. It is in 
that light that many of the articles in this issue of Sustainable 
Development Law & Policy focus on the global transfer of clean 
technologies and the mechanisms that strive to enable that trade. 
However, there is yet another important dimension of both tech-
nology transfer and the climate debate: the human perspective. 
The human rIghTs DImensIons oF  
Technology TransFer
Since the Bali Conference of the Parties in 2007, it has been 
clear that technology transfer will remain critical to any global 
deal on climate change, and so there is no room for continuing 
political deadlock. The resulting impetus has engendered new 
angles on climate-related technologies, among them increased 
attention to the human dimensions—sometimes articulated as 
the human rights implications—of this and other areas of cli-
mate change activity. More than most topics in the climate 
change arena, actions and decisions on technology transfer will 
have significant and specific human rights implications. These 
are of two main kinds, one immediate, the second longer term. 
First, technological solutions will be required to ensure 
that the expected human rights consequences of climate change 
impacts are avoided or minimized. In short, technological 
* Stephen Humphreys holds a PhD in law from the University of Cambridge and 
is Research Director at the International Council on Human Rights Policy, where 
he is leading research into the human rights implications of climate change and 
related technology policies.
solutions are necessary for adaptation, especially where climate 
change threatens basic subsistence—health, food, water, and 
shelter, for example, all of which are recognized rights under 
international law. Expected threats include droughts, water sali-
nation and sea-level rise; livelihoods will be at risk as crops, fish-
eries, livestock, and even land will deplete or vanish. In order to 
head off the most dire consequences of these outcomes—forced 
mass migration and conflict—solutions will need to be found and 
mobilized quickly. In every case, such solutions will rely in part 
on the availability of appropriate technologies to meet the new 
conditions of life under a changed climate. These include water 
treatment technologies for desalination and irrigation, for exam-
ple, or agricultural solutions to adapt to changing or reduced crop 
cycles. Protection from hotter temperatures through building 
materials or techniques, from higher sea-levels through protec-
tive walls or other measures, and from increased vector diseases, 
like malaria, through increased access to quality medicines and 
healthcare systems to distribute cures and provide care. 
However, investment in these technologies is beyond the 
resources of many of the countries that will be worst hit. Finding 
a means to make them available at low or no cost is therefore 
critical to climate change adaptation if appalling human rights 
consequences are to be avoided. Bringing a human rights ana-
lytic to bear on the expected impacts of climate change can help 
direct attention to where the worst harms are foreseeable, which 
in turn can orient responses towards the most useful and urgent 
solutions. Since these solutions will involve—and are likely to 
some extent to hinge upon—technological know-how, a human 
rights angle can usefully be fed early on into both technology 
development and technology delivery agendas. Where these 
agendas are not yet being set in the climate change debate, atten-
tion to the human rights consequence will concentrate minds. 
Where agendas are being drawn up, looking ahead to human 
rights needs can provide useful orientation. In both cases, a 
human rights lens may lead policymakers to recognize the need 
for an intensive, coordinated, technically, and, in some cases, 
legally creative response to climate change in keeping with the 
requirements of the UNFCCC. 
Second, long term development, upon which the protection 
of human rights ultimately depends, will come under immense 
stress due to climate change mitigation policies.  For developed 
and developing countries alike—but especially for the latter 
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where, in many cases, basic human rights still remain unful-
filled—further development will increasingly rely upon access 
to efficient, clean, and renewable technologies. Indeed, it will in 
many cases require restructuring of entire economies. Securing 
human rights over the long term in the face of climate change 
requires the transfer of technologies for energy generation and 
distribution and for adequate transport, among other things. 
This is not a controversial demand, but once again little 
attention has been directed to the human rights consequences 
that will result from a failure to plan well in advance. For exam-
ple, if technology transfer is slow or not forthcoming, individu-
als in many countries will inevitably be reliant on carbon-based 
energy supplies for their immediate developmental needs. A 
human rights sensitive approach to technology will be attentive 
to the possibility that access to carbon-intensive technologies 
may be more, rather than less, needed in some poorer coun-
tries, at least in the mid-term. The long-term fulfillment of basic 
human rights—to food, water, property, health, and shelter, and 
even culture and livelihoods—will depend, in many countries, 
on a measured, structured, and informed conversion from carbon 
to clean fuels. Awareness of these realities provides an appropri-
ate basis for testing and fleshing out promises of future techno-
logical progress—which currently remain vague—against hard 
needs that already exist and will only worsen over time.
In each of the above areas, a human rights optic can bring 
essential nuance to policy. It can help ensure equitable access 
to new technologies in recipient countries through sensitivity 
to the possibility of inequalities of access and participation that 
mutually reinforce privilege and vulnerability. And it can help 
determine which of a possible range of technological solutions 
to choose in a given context, by focusing on the core necessity to 
maintain basic threshold levels of rights fulfillment for the great-
est number over costly experimentation that may suit only a few. 
FragmenTaTIon oF InTernaTIonal law?
Among the many obstacles cited for the delay in implement-
ing effective technology transfer, intellectual property rights are 
often assumed to be the primary problem. International protection 
of intellectual property is thought to pose an initial hurdle to gov-
ernments attempting to make transfer effective using public policy 
tools. Treaty agreements, notably (but not only) the WTO-gov-
erned Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (“TRIPS”) ensure that the protections of private ownership 
in a given technology are adequately reflected in the price of that 
technology. Although TRIPS does not appear to be relevant to all 
or even most of the technologies needed for climate change adap-
tation, this complaint deserves attention if only because it has had 
a chilling effect on technology transfer negotiations. 
TRIPS is not the only international legal instrument rele-
vant to climate change or to technology transfer. Climate change 
technology transfer takes place within the context of a broad 
web of relevant treaty laws and customary practices, and is rel-
evant to an unusually wide range of areas of science, law, and 
policy. In addition to intellectual property law, other areas of 
the international trade regime are clearly relevant, including the 
safeguards of private property rights (the rights of investors or 
technological proprietors) found in free trade agreements and 
in Bilateral Investment Treaties. The latter frequently include 
clauses specifically prohibiting host governments from actions 
to further technology transfer. Where these treaties also include 
“most favored nation” provisions, as most do, an international 
regime effectively takes shape universalizing this prohibition.
To these must also be added international human rights law, 
which is presumptively relevant whenever policy options have 
human rights implications. Here, the principal instrument is 
likely to be the International Covenant on Social, Economic and 
Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”). The 159 states that are party to the 
ICESCR have undertaken to “progressively realize” the social 
and economic rights (such as to food, water, health, education, 
and housing) of those within their territories. Under conditions 
of climate change, states’ obligations towards their own popula-
tions in these areas are arguably reinforced at the international 
level, where arrangements between states effectively facilitate or 
impede the capacity to fulfil these rights. In this regard, a rarely 
cited provision of the ICESCR acquires renewed importance in 
the context of climate change. ICESCR Article 15(1)(b) guaran-
tees “the right of everyone . . . to enjoy the benefits of scientific 
progress and its applications.”
To conclude, technology transfer is a necessary and central 
plank of any global climate change solution, but it often appears 
stuck in jargon and entrenched positions engendered over years of 
difficult negotiations. So ironically, whereas everyone acknowl-
edges the critical importance of technology transfer, progress 
has been slow or absent, and the subject has become unwieldy. 
Approaching it from a human rights perspective may help over-
come the impasse, by allowing all parties to refocus on basic 
human imperatives and to set historical and ideological differ-
ences aside in the interests of dealing pragmatically with questions 
of real urgency. Locating human rights entry points and priorities 
can reorient the debate: what technologies are needed where and 
how urgently? Useful future research agendas may include: 
	 • Predicting human rights threats in specific localities; 
	 • Assessing the best and most efficient technology solutions 
already in existence to meet them; 
 • Framing technological research agendas for clean and effi-
cient solutions for the most pressing urgencies; 
 • Assessing existing channels and barriers for international 
cooperation; 
 • Seeking policy solutions for an international regulatory 
framework; 
 • Assessing likely blockages and solutions at the national 
level; and ultimately, 
 • What sort of research and policy framework is needed to 
ensure that the right technologies reach the right communi-
ties in the most timely manner in order to prevent human 
rights harms? 
These are among the urgent human rights questions faced 
by climate change negotiators as they seek any technology-based 
solution for the future and will continue to be extremely relevant 
to any discussion of clean technology transfer.
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an introDuction to thiS iSSue:  
climate change anD technology tranSfer
 by Dalindyebo Shabalala*
The Earth continues to experience record-breaking tempera-tures caused by increased concentrations of carbon diox-ide and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The 
impacts of this unprecedented warming include increased floods 
and drought, rising sea levels, the spread of deadly diseases such 
as malaria and dengue fever, and increasing numbers of violent 
storms. These impacts threaten to be more severe and imminent 
than previously believed. An urgent, global response is essential. 
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, however, have failed to live 
up to their promise, especially in respect to technology transfer. This 
failure has pushed countries to move towards a new post-Kyoto 
framework with a focus on ensuring the effective and broad-based 
transfer of environmentally sound climate-related technologies. 
Transfer of technology is a key pillar of any international 
response to global climate change. The UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
protocol were built on a basic political bargain. On one side, under 
the first commitment period, industrialized countries would take 
primary responsibility for emissions reductions. They would dem-
onstrate carbon-free development, while transferring technology 
that would enable developing countries to make progress in reach-
ing increasing carbon efficiency. Thus, carbon leakage, i.e. the 
shifting of polluting carbon-inefficient industries from industrial-
ized to developing countries, would be avoided. The success of 
the first phase would enable developing countries to take on their 
own emissions reduction obligations in the second phase.
Industrialized countries, however, have largely failed to pro-
vide measurable, reportable, verifiable, and effective transfer of 
environmentally sound climate-related technologies. This failure 
was a primary bone of contention during the Bali Conference in 
December 2007, and it laid behind the refusal of developing coun-
tries to agree to take on specific emissions reduction obligations in 
the post-Kyoto period. The Bali Action Plan identifies technology 
transfer as a key element leading up to 2012 and beyond. How-
ever, there are several other challenges underlying the failure to 
provide transfer of technology, in addition to the lack of political 
will from the industrialized countries. These challenges include:
	 • A lack of criteria and support for conducting needs assess-
ments and identifying priority technologies for transfer; 
	 • A need to properly address the role of Intellectual Property 
(“IP”) with respect to mitigation and adaptation technologies 
and to proactively address ways that the IP system can be used 
or altered to serve the needs of addressing climate change; 
	 • What lessons and best practices to learn from existing tech-
nology transfer mechanisms such as that of the Montreal 
Protocol and existing platforms and mechanisms existing 
mechanisms for technology transfer in other multilateral 
environmental agreements;
	 • A lack of institutional mechanisms at the national, bilateral 
and multilateral level responsible for implementing transfer 
of environmentally sound technologies;
	 • Insufficient programs to enhance absorptive capacity of technolo-
gies appropriate to the level of development of each country; and
	 • A lack of financial resources and financing mechanisms 
properly targeted at all stages of the technology transfer 
process, including capacity building.
The fundamental failure in achieving technology transfer 
has been a lack of responsible institutions and mechanisms. 
The papers in this volume provide a broad overview of the 
range of issues that need to be considered if there is to be a real 
and sustainable solution to climate change that aims at transforming 
production and consumption patterns in both developed and devel-
oping countries. The role of outside research in producing informa-
tion on what has gone on before, what is happening on the ground in 
countries such as China, and how approaches to technology, includ-
ing the role of private investment, should be framed has become 
increasingly important to a workable outcome in Copenhagen. 
A workable institutional mechanism for measuring, report-
ing, and verifying the effective delivery of technology transfer 
is crucial to reaching and successfully implementing any post-
Kyoto agreement. Some of the elements covered in the articles 
in this volume point to the real need for work to be done to: 
	 • Develop methods and criteria for technology identification 
and prioritization;
	 • Identify how modes of technology transfer might be imple-
mented in a multilateral context; 
	 • Outline the institutional mechanisms that will be needed at 
the national level and at the multilateral level to enable all the 
points in the technology transfer chain from economic actors 
in one country to economic actors in another country; 
	 • Identify appropriate financing and funding mechanisms; and
	 • Ensure compliance and monitoring, reporting and verifying 
of technology transfer obligations
There is a lot of work to be done and not much time in which 
to do it. I look forward to further research that will contribute to 
achieving an effective and equitable multilateral agreement that will 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, address the very real negative 
human rights impacts of climate change on vulnerable populations, 
and ensure a carbon efficient development path for all countries.
* Dalindyebo Shabalala is the Director of the Center for International Environ-
mental Law’s IP and Sustainable Development Project in Geneva, Switzerland.  He 
focuses on issues at the intersection of Intellectual Property and Human Health, 
Biodiversity and Food Security, as well as addressing systematic reform of the 
international intellectual property system.
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china’S cleantech lanDScape: 
the renewable energy technology paraDox 
by Federico Caprotti*
InTroDucTIon: chIna’s renewable  
energy Technology paraDox1
Cleantech is playing an increasingly important role as a sector of investment on the international scale, attract-ing $8.4 billion in the North American, European, 
Chinese, and Indian markets in 2008.2 This represents a thirty-
eight percent increase on the $6.1 billion invested in cleantech 
in 2007 in the same markets.3 
Within cleantech, arguably the 
most important area, or sub-sec-
tor, of investment is renewable 
energy technologies and genera-
tion systems, which account for 
over thirty percent of cleantech 
investment flows.4 However, 
the role of renewable energy 
technologies at the national 
scale is also increasing in impor-
tance. This article focuses on 
China, where the development 
of renewable energy sources is 
crucial to energy security and 
to providing alternatives to the 
carbon economy, which is cur-
rently generating many environ-
mental externalities. Renewable 
energy technology development 
and manufacturing also provide 
clear opportunities for the Chi-
nese central government to promote a domestic technology man-
ufacturing base, and to achieve China’s 2020 energy generation 
targets, as will be shown below. Therefore, renewable energy 
technology will play an increasingly important role in China’s 
energy landscape. At the present time, renewable energy is both 
a current generation reality and a future technology opportu-
nity: by 2005, renewable energy provided eight percent of the 
country’s total energy consumption and sixteen percent of its 
total electricity output.5 This is expected to more than double 
by 2020.6
At the same time, research reveals that the Chinese renew-
able energy technology market presents a paradox: a market of 
opportunity based on a need for the development of generating 
capacity from renewable sources, coupled with the existence 
of policy, fiscal, and technological obstacles which hamper the 
potential of China’s cleantech market in renewable energies. 
China is depicted as a leading cleantech market in the short to 
medium term, especially in renewable energy technology, proj-
ect infrastructure, and manufacturing.
However, many researchers have also highlighted the prob-
lems which seemingly go hand in hand with China’s status as a 
predominant emergent renewables market in the short term, and 
as a projected market leader in the next five to ten years. These 
issues are not only restricted to the renewables business; they 
extend across the wider political and cultural context, bringing to 
light the importance of a network 
approach to renewable energy 
technology development, manu-
facturing, and deployment. In 
short, China’s renewable energy 
market presents an opportunity 
with clear challenges. The fol-
lowing provides an analysis of 
the main obstacles facing and 
currently affecting the renew-
able energy market in China.
obsTacles: polIcy, Tax, 
anD long-Term markeT 
DevelopmenT
Energy landscapes can be 
uneven landscapes. This can 
be due to a variety of factors. 
However, above all, the exis-
tence of obstacles to the devel-
opment of cleantech landscapes 
in a national context can mostly be related to policy, fiscal, and 
economic issues which can be deeply local. At the same time, 
global economic influences—both at the firm level and at the 
level of international economic policies—intersect with national 
regulatory and technology landscapes to constitute a complex 
environment in which clean energy technologies develop. Chi-
na’s cleantech landscape, and specifically its renewable energy 
market, is an example of the interplay of these forces. The fol-
lowing highlights some of the main issues facing the renewable 
energy market in the country today, focusing on energy pricing 
* Federico Caprotti is an assistant professor at University College London, 
Department of Geography. His research focuses on a comparative analysis of 
decision-making in cleantech investment; he is currently engaged in a British 
Academy-funded project on cleantech investments in wind power technology in 
China and the United States. The author is available by email at the following 
address: fkaprotz1@yahoo.co.uk.
Changes in import duties 
need to be stable in 
order to truly promote 
technology transfer into 
China; fiscal policy 
stability aids foreign 
technology businesses’ 
long-range strategy  
and planning.
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policy, technology transfer, private investment, and the need 
for emphasis on energy conservation as well as monitoring and 
evaluation.
pricing policy ShortfallS
China’s 2006 Renewable Energy Law attempts, among 
other things, to set pricing standards for energy generated from 
renewable energy sources.7 The law’s broad aims are to increase 
the capacity generated from 
renewables in the country, and 
are part of a wider national strat-
egy aimed at increasing power 
supply as well as diversifying 
the generating base, as a result 
of rising demand and a need 
for energy security.8 The law’s 
renewable energy pricing mech-
anisms are based on “feed-in” 
tariff models of the kind applied 
to European energy markets;9 
however, the link between pric-
ing at source and grid distribution in China is proving problem-
atic.10 This is largely because utility companies have, in many 
cases, little incentive to connect a renewable energy project, such 
as a wind farm, to the grid. Once such projects are connected, 
utilities are required to purchase power generated by the proj-
ects; the price for renewables-generated power is higher than for 
coal-generated power, generally due to government-mandated 
subsidies and tariff levels (which are aimed at generating proj-
ect revenue as well as paying off interest and loan principals 
required to build renewables projects in the first place).11 There-
fore, the current renewable energy landscape—especially in the 
case of wind power—features a backlog of completed projects 
which are not actually connected to the grid.12 
technology tranSfer: uncertainty over import 
tariffS 
Uncertainty also exists over the stability of China’s current 
import duties on renewable energy technology and associated 
machine components. This uncertainty is an especially important 
factor in hampering already established technologies like wind 
turbines. For example, ninety-seven percent of large-scale (non-
micro) wind turbines currently installed in China are imported 
(this includes components).13 The Chinese government’s import 
duty strategy for wind technology has varied widely since the 
dawn of large-scale wind generation in 1986, alternatively 
imposing high and virtually non-existent taxes (see Figure 1). 
For example, from 1990 to 1995, import duties were largely 
non-existent as the central government attempted to stimulate 
partnerships and technology transfer to develop a wind power 
base for the country.14 By 1996, the government’s strategic 
focus had shifted to the development of a domestic, national, 
and localized wind turbine manufacturing market. In order to 
stimulate domestic manufacturers, the government levied duties 
on foreign wind technology imports. The imposition of duties 
was reversed again in 1998, and 
a robust domestic manufactur-
ing market is indeed develop-
ing: between 2003 and 2005, 
local wind turbine production 
rose from $26 to $104 million.15 
However, during the same 
period, the share of imported 
turbine technology rose from 
$35.9 to $211.9 million.16 
Uncertainty remains over 
the instability of import duties 
and other taxes on foreign technology imports: for example, in 
April 2008, the central government changed the import context 
again by refunding value added tax (“VAT”) on imported tur-
bine components; this tax refund was backdated to the start of 
2008.17 While this specific measure is aimed at easing the cost of 
importing wind technology to China, it also inhibits the devel-
opment of domestic wind turbine manufacturing by providing 
incentives for importing essential components. Furthermore, 
changes in import duties need to be stable in order to truly pro-
mote technology transfer into China; fiscal policy stability aids 
foreign technology businesses’ long-range strategy and plan-
ning. For example, the VAT rebate measure was accompanied 
by the cancellation of China’s tariff-free policy for foreign tur-
bine units with a capacity of less than 2.5 megawatts (“MW”). 
Although this is in keeping with the central aim of building wind 
farms with a generating capacity of not less than 100 MW,18 the 
resulting shifting import duty and tax landscape is not conducive 
to transparent cost pricing for importers, domestic manufactur-
ers and, indeed, wind project developers.
private inveStment ShortfallS
At present, wind power technology and project develop-
ment in China could be improved by enabling more investment 
from private sources (see discussion of development needs 
above). Government subsidies and preferential loan systems 
exist, but uncertainty over power prices hinders the inflow of 
capital focused on renewable energy projects. In this respect, the 
Figure 1: Timeline of shifting import duties and taxes on foreign technology imports.
Uncertainty over power 
prices hinders the inflow 
of capital focused on 
renewable energy projects.
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Chinese renewable energy technology market is markedly dif-
ferent from other, more established renewables markets such as 
in European countries or the United States: 
[P]rivate investment has become the predominant force 
in wind farm construction in other countries. For exam-
ple, around ninety-five percent of investment in wind 
farms was contributed by the private sector in India . . . ;  
However, unless a new investment mechanism with 
incentive policies and regulations is established [in 
China], and more financial channels are opened up, it 
[will] be difficult to realize the target of wind energy 
development.19
a Decline in energy conServation inveStment 
From the point of view of sustainability discourse and policy, 
national and regional efforts to promote sustainability in China 
cannot be seen as separate from efforts to improve energy con-
servation capabilities. China is currently adding the equivalent 
of a 2,000 MW coal-fired power plant to its generating capacity 
every week, and has been doing so since around 2000.20 This 
represents a large annual rise in the amount of fossil-fuel gener-
ated power, and a resultant rise in environmental externalities. 
In 2004, for example, the amount of energy capacity added to 
China’s generation system was roughly equivalent to the amount 
of energy generated in the whole of Spain or California.21 At the 
same time generating capacity has increased on the mainland, 
there has been an increased focus 
on renewable energy sources, 
especially hydroelectric, wind, 
and lately, solar power. How-
ever, this double trend—large 
incremental rises in generation 
capacity based on fossil fuels, 
and a rising interest in renewable 
energy sources—has been paral-
leled by a decrease in investment 
in energy conservation projects. 
This has led to the paradoxical 
situation that, from 1980 to 2000, 
China benefited from an energy 
supply surplus; since 2000, even 
with the added capacity, China 
has suffered from increasing 
energy shortages. Indeed, Jiang 
Lin, a China energy researcher at 
the Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory in Berkeley, California, has recently argued that 
“support and policy commitments to energy conservation in 
China have weakened considerably during China’s transition to 
a more market-based economy.”22
monitoring, evaluation, anD uSer perSpectiveS
A wider issue, applicable across all renewable energy mar-
kets, is the need for consistent, transparent, and precise moni-
toring and evaluation of renewable energy projects after they 
have been commissioned and progressed past the project stage. 
In particular, recent research has pointed to the need to include 
user perspectives both in terms of the efficacy of new energy 
technologies, and their wider socio-cultural acceptability within 
particular contexts.23 The adoption of effective monitoring and 
evaluation (“M&E”) programs can in turn be seen as a solution 
to the lack of connections from renewables projects to the grid. 
This is because effective M&E programs can be constructed 
around a set of key indicators—
such as the number of projects 
connected to the grid, or a series 
of connections over a specific 
time span—which clearly track 
progress. However, underlying 
grid connection issues, such as 
electricity pricing and subsidies 
as well as incentives for utilities 
to connect renewable genera-
tion capacity to the grid, have to 
be resolved before M&E can be 
effectively applied.
obsTacles or 
challenges?
These factors constitute a 
very real threat not to the devel-
opment of China’s renewable 
energy landscape, but to its 
progress. It would, in fact, be unrealistic to forecast a stalling of 
the Chinese renewables market, especially after the passing of 
the 2006 Renewable Energy Law and considering the number 
of projects still in the pipeline. Furthermore, the current proj-
ect pipeline may provide a temporal buffer—a year at most—
in terms of project development, which could help offset the 
negative effects of the current credit crisis and oil price declines 
on the renewable energy spectrum, from research and develop-
China features several 
leading solar power 
and photovoltaic 
manufacturing and project 
companies, active in the 
domestic as well as in  
the international  
cleantech field.  
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ment (“R&D”) expenditure to project development and grid 
connections.
The main risks posed by the obstacles identified above lie, 
instead, in the friction which could be exerted on the Chinese 
renewables technology market. This friction can be expressed in 
terms of slower growth in what is a dynamic and fast-developing 
market; erratic policy inter-
ventions, ineffective pricing 
mechanisms, and other factors 
can be seen as draining the Chi-
nese market of potential energy 
just after the achievement of its 
take-off phase.24 If China is to 
achieve its 2020 target of fifteen 
percent of national energy gener-
ation from renewables,25 as laid 
out in its latest (2006-10) Five 
Year Plan, then these obstacles 
represent serious challenges to 
be faced before the end of the 
decade. This is especially rele-
vant in the case of those already 
established projects, apart from 
hydroelectric power, which are 
expected to lead the renewables 
generation tables: wind power, 
for example, is expected to account for three percent of national 
generation capacity by 2020.26 However, the identified obstacles 
should be considered challenges, not market conditions that will 
negatively affect the Chinese market in the long run. Indeed, 
apart from these obstacles, the Chinese renewable energy mar-
ket is exhibiting signs of vitality, innovation, and opportunity. 
This article concludes by focusing, briefly, on these avenues of 
future renewables development.
conclusIon: InnovaTIon anD opporTunITy
As argued above, the main obstacles facing the Chinese 
renewable energy market are challenges to be faced in the 
realms of policy, pricing, and technology development incen-
tives and subsidies. In terms of sustainability, China needs to be 
able to apply innovative policies to energy conservation and an 
amelioration of the lived environment, especially in urban areas. 
Landmark projects, such as those at Dongtan eco-city, mask the 
fact that conservation and emissions reductions are priorities 
which are secondary to continued growth. This focus on growth, 
in turn, leads to a continued focus on a carbon-fueled economy. 
However, there are some areas in which China’s renewables 
market is exhibiting clear signs of innovation and leadership, as 
opposed to reaction to market conditions.
One of these areas is renewable energy technology exports. 
China is traditionally described as a net importer of renewable 
energy technology, technical know-how, and project develop-
ment capabilities. This is especially the case where established 
technologies—developed mostly outside China—are concerned. 
In the case of wind power, mentioned above, China imports the 
great majority of its turbine technology as well as components.27 
However, by 2008, it had become an increasingly important 
exporter and manufacturer of other renewable energy generation 
technologies. Solar power is a case in point. China features sev-
eral leading solar power and photovoltaic (“PV”) manufacturing 
and project companies, active in the domestic as well as in the 
international cleantech fields. For 
example, Suntech Power Hold-
ings (“Suntech”), a leading solar 
power player, has been involved 
in co-developing and investing in 
several large overseas projects, 
such as Elecnor, a thirty-five 
MW solar power plant in Spain, 
and Alamosa solar plant in the 
U.S. state of Colorado, an eight 
MW project.28 Furthermore, 
Chinese solar companies have 
been engaged in opening up new 
markets for their solar exper-
tise, as seen in the construction 
of Katsrin solar power plant in 
the Golan Heights, Israel.29 The 
fifty kilowatt farm is the largest 
in the country to date, and was 
constructed by Israeli solar firm 
Solarit Doral, in conjunction with Suntech.30 It is where renew-
able energy technologies are currently in the take-off stage—
such as PV technologies—that Chinese renewables companies 
can be best positioned to compete and gain advantage over 
non-Chinese rival firms. Government investment in R&D must 
be rationalized and increased, however, if niche technology 
developments are to be effectively researched, marketed, and 
manufactured.31
Secondly, China’s focus on large-scale renewable energy 
generation projects provides a clear opportunity for the pooling 
of large-scale project expertise; this will be increasingly relevant 
internationally, as the focus on renewables shifts to projects with 
larger generating capacities. China’s aim of generating thirty 
gigawatts of installed wind power capacity by 2020, powering 
between thirteen and thirty million homes at full capacity, neces-
sitates large-scale, highly-organized project development.32 
By 2020, the Chinese renewable energy project landscape is 
increasingly going to feature large-scale projects, generating 
more than 1,000 MW in capacity per project, connected to the 
grid.33 The lion’s share of these projects’ generation capacity is 
likely to come from hydroelectric power and wind farms, with 
wind farms accounting for a majority of projects, at least in num-
ber.34 Furthermore, offshore wind farms featuring large-scale 
wind turbines are going to be an increasingly important feature 
of coastal renewable energy generation: in November 2006, 
China’s first offshore wind facility, with a capacity of 1.5 MW, 
was installed by China National Offshore Corporation using tur-
bines manufactured by Xinjiang Goldwind. By 2009, work was 
China’s cleantech  
market, especially 
in renewable energy 
generation technologies,  
is set to continue its  
take-off phase and  
gain altitude and 
international traction.
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underway on large-scale offshore wind farms, including the 102 
MW Shanghai East Ocean Offshore Wind Farm.35 
The points made in this article show that, in the case of 
renewable energy technologies within the Chinese cleantech 
market, China stands at a paradoxical waypoint. On the one 
hand, the Chinese context and market represent clear invest-
ment, development, and generation opportunities. On the other 
hand, the policy and fiscal obstacles identified in the article rep-
resent clear problems which will slow down development and 
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aquaponicS & lanDfill methane uSe: 
theSe fetiD miaSmata Smell like profitable conServation
by Blake M. Mensing*
* Blake M. Mensing is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University Wash-
ington College of Law and an M.A. candidate, December 2010, at American Uni-
versity School of International Service.
On the surface, aquaponics
1 (a portmanteau word of 
aquaculture and hydroponics)2 and the use of landfill 
methane for energy3 have very little in common. How-
ever, both utilize waste to power another system while reducing 
the net amount of waste generated.4 Reciprocating or symbiotic 
technologies are a beneficial alternative to traditional technolo-
gies because they reduce waste and mimic the closed ecological 
systems that have garnered the attention of some of the world’s 
greatest scientific minds and some of the world’s youngest.5 
This article outlines the basic 
processes involved in aquapon-
ics and landfill methane utili-
zation and then proposes that 
more synergistic systems should 
be developed and then imple-
mented on a larger scale to mini-
mize total human waste output.
Aquaponics combines fish 
farming and soilless vegetable 
production to help to eliminate 
some of the major shortcomings 
of each process.6 The result of this conglomeration is that the only 
input required is fish food.7 Water conservation is a particularly 
desirable benefit of combining hydroponics and aquaculture.8 
The fish produce an effluent rich in plant nutrients, but toxic to 
the fish in high quantities, so the water is filtered by the roots of 
the plants and then pumped back to the tanks.9 Leafy vegetables 
and spice plants seem to be able to utilize the nitrogen-rich tank 
water most efficiently and the crop helps to augment the profits 
of a fish farmer by producing another saleable good and reducing 
the costs of filtering the tank water.10 Another possible benefit of 
aquaponics is that the harvested fish relieve some of the strain on 
the world’s fishstock.11 When properly monitored, both the fish 
stock and the hydroponic vegetable crop thrive.12
Methane is widely recognized as one of the six major green-
house gases that are accumulating in the Earth’s upper atmo-
sphere and are contributing to the steady uptick in global average 
mean temperatures.13 In the United States, landfills accounted for 
twenty-three percent of total methane emissions in 2006.14 The 
impact of methane is more than twenty-five times greater than 
carbon dioxide, though fortunately its atmospheric concentration 
is much lower.15 One method of reducing methane emissions is 
to capture and convert the gaseous effluvium from landfills into 
usable fuel for electricity generation.16 As the garbage in a land-
fill breaks down, many different gases are released.17 The gas-
eous mixture is made of approximately fifty percent methane, 
Endnotes: Aquaponics & Landfill Methane Use continued on page 59
which can be separated from the remaining gases and used for the 
generation of electricity.18 The capture and use of methane from 
landfills not only reduces the total amount of biomethane gener-
ated, but also prevents the release of some carbon dioxide that 
would be produced through traditional coal-fired power plants.19 
Aquaponics is a sustainable practice because the waste of 
one system is used to fuel another symbiotic system and the only 
input is the fish food.20 As long as the fish food used is produced 
in a sustainable manner, then the pitfalls associated with tradi-
tional aquaculture are more eas-
ily avoided.21 Similarly, landfill 
methane capture for energy pro-
duction is an efficient utilization 
of a gas that would otherwise 
be emitted into the atmosphere 
without being put to use.22 
Aquaponic farms could and 
should be placed near landfills 
to have their electricity needs 
met from the methane generated 
during landfill decomposition, 
further reducing total wastes by minimizing the costs of trans-
mitting electricity. In order to further the progress towards sus-
tainable development, scientists and engineers need to train their 
eyes on systems that use wastes so as to reduce the net impact of 
human consumption on the environment. The philosophy behind 
both aquaponics and landfill methane capture is based on reduc-
ing the net wastes generated by humans through the utilization 
of system outputs. When profit maximization and waste reduc-
tion collide, both business and the environment benefit. 
While neither system is perfect, their underlying founda-
tions are a step in the right direction. Human production pro-
cesses should be evaluated in light of the success of aquaponics 
and landfill methane capture because it is likely that the exami-
nation will uncover other wastes that have been overlooked as 
possible inputs. In the instances where a pair of systems could 
form a symbiotic relationship, humanity should take advantage 
of that symbiosis to help to reduce our enormous ecological 
footprint. If clean technology can include a profitable use for 
fish excrement and the gas gathered from festering garbage, then 
the scientific and business communities surely have many more 
ecologically sound profit avenues to explore.  
When profit maximization 
and waste reduction 
collide, both business and 
the environment benefit.
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“Delay is no longer an option. Denial is no longer an 
acceptable response. The stakes are too high. The consequences, 
too serious.”2
—President Barack Obama
InTroDucTIon
All legislative proposals for a U.S. greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions cap-and-trade system released to date have recognized the need to safeguard the com-
petitiveness of U.S. firms that may be required to bear emissions 
compliance burdens heavier than those borne by their foreign 
competitors. These legislative proposals have included “com-
petitiveness measures” to ensure 
that emissions caps imposed 
on U.S. industries do not erode 
their competitiveness vis-à-vis 
imports from jurisdictions with 
no or lesser GHG emissions 
restrictions. The problem of 
“carbon leakage”—the incen-
tive created by declining domes-
tic emissions caps to move 
emissions-intensive production 
abroad—is particularly acute for 
manufacturing industries. Many 
such industries compete directly 
with imports, and most would 
not be able to pass on to their customers the increased costs 
of compliance or the acquisition of more efficient production 
technology. A properly designed U.S. climate change system 
should therefore legally safeguard the competitiveness of U.S. 
manufacturing industries, while also minimizing the incentive to 
move emissions-intensive production abroad.
Competitiveness measures can take a variety of forms. For 
instance, a “border adjustment” measure can impose costs on 
relevant goods at the time they are imported into the United 
States, assessed on the basis of either differences in the GHG 
emission restrictions in the country of origin as compared to 
the United States, or the emissions-intensity of the production 
process for the imported goods. Other forms of competitiveness 
measures include the free distribution of emissions allowances 
to industries particularly sensitive to foreign competition, the 
exemption of certain industries altogether from domestic emis-
sions caps, the imposition of carbon taxes, and restrictions on 
borDer aDJuStment meaSureS in propoSeD 
u.S. climate change legiSlation – 
“a new chapter in america’S leaDerShip on climate change?”1
by Stephen Kho, Bernd G. Janzen & Holly M. Smith*
* Stephen Kho is Senior Counsel at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, and 
formerly Associate General Counsel and acting Chief Counsel on China Enforce-
ment at the Office of U.S. Trade Representative, as well as Legal Advisor at the 
U.S. Mission to the WTO. Bernd G. Janzen is Counsel at Akin Gump, and for-
merly Attorney-Advisor with the Office of the Chief Counsel for Import Admin-
istration at the U.S. Department of Commerce. Holly M. Smith is an Associate 
with Akin Gump, and formerly with the Office of the Deputy General Counsel 
(International Affairs) at the U.S. Department of Defense, as well as with the 
Asian Affairs Directorate in the National Security Council, Executive Office of the 
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certain production methods or incentives to adopt cleaner pro-
duction methods.
This article will focus on the use and consequences of a bor-
der adjustment measure, given that it is the competitiveness mea-
sure that is most consistently proposed in U.S. legislation, and 
that seemingly has the most significant exposure to challenges 
under the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) agreements. This 
article will first provide some background on the broader climate 
change discussion in the United States. It will then discuss the 
reasons for including competitiveness measures in U.S. climate 
change legislation, the border adjustment measures included 
in recent U.S. legislative proposals, and the viability of border 
adjustment measures under the 
WTO agreements. The article 
will conclude with a new pro-
posal for an alternative to the 
border adjustment measures 
proposed to date.
backgrounD
The year 2009 promises to 
be an exciting year for propo-
nents of strong action to combat 
GHG emissions in the United 
States and internationally. Over 
the past few years, broad politi-
cal support for such legislation 
has grown domestically, while international efforts have con-
tinued to progress, in large part without the participation of the 
United States. Given the recent inauguration of Barack Obama 
as President, and the goals of the international community to 
conclude a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol in Copen-
hagen in December of this year, real action is expected to be 
taken in 2009 to limit carbon emissions both in the United States 
and around the world. 
Domestic competitiveness 
measures can ensure 
the equal distribution of 
costs in the absence of an 
international agreement 
limiting emissions.
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President Obama has made numerous statements to date 
expressing his commitment to addressing climate change. In 
spite of the uncertainty and turmoil caused by the ongoing finan-
cial crisis, he appears to be strongly committed to his original 
proposals. Specifically, President Obama has called for the 
implementation of an “economy-wide cap-and-trade program” 
that will aim to reduce GHG emissions eighty percent by 2050.3 
President Obama’s plan is distinguished by his calls for the auc-
tion of all emissions credits, unlike other plans, under which a 
portion of credits would be provided at no cost to vulnerable 
industries as a form of transition assistance. His plan differs fur-
ther due to his policy of using a portion of the proceeds from 
such emissions credit auctions (approximately $15 billion a 
year) for investment in the “development of clean energy and 
energy-efficiency improvements, including clean vehicles.”4
Importantly, President Obama has also pledged to “re-
engage”5 the international community through the UN Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”). Since early 
2007, international efforts to combat climate change have been 
focused on developing a successor agreement to the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, which remains in effect until 2012. Rounds of negotia-
tions have been held, both to address the future commitments of 
nations that have already been bound by emissions caps, as well 
as to reach developing nations and countries such as the United 
States that are not bound by the Kyoto Protocol. An important 
breakthrough came at the negotiations in Bali in December 2007, 
where it was decided that developing countries would not neces-
sarily be excluded from future climate change control regimes.6 
Other rounds of negotiations have taken place since, leading 
ultimately to the negotiation of a final agreement in Copenhagen 
at the 15th meeting of all Framework Convention parties in late 
2009 that will replace the Kyoto Protocol. 
Given the state of the economy, and previous difficulties 
in passing legislation to establish a cap-and-trade system, there 
are significant doubts over whether meaningful legislation curb-
ing GHG emissions will be passed in the United States in 2009. 
Yet the concurrence of the Obama presidency, the pressure to 
have emissions limits in place domestically before concluding 
an international agreement on emissions caps in Copenhagen,7 
and the increased presence of Democrats in the U.S. Congress, 
all indicate that the passage of climate change legislation is far 
more likely now than at any time in the past.
Currently, Senator Barbara Boxer, Chairman of the Senate 
Environment and Public Works Committee, and Representatives 
Henry Waxman and Ed Markey, Chairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives Energy and Commerce Committee and the Energy 
and Environment Subcommittee respectively, are leading Con-
gressional efforts to develop legislation addressing climate 
change. On March 31, 2009, Representatives Waxman and Mar-
key issued a discussion draft of their climate change legislation 
entitled the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 
(the “Waxman-Markey draft”). While a draft has yet to come 
out of the Senate, on February 3, 2009, Senator Boxer and other 
committee members set out six basic principles for legislation 
on global warming.8 It is likely that the draft produced in the 
Senate will rely heavily on the Boxer-Lieberman-Warner sub-
stitute amendment (the “Boxer Amendment”) to the Lieberman-
Warner Climate Security Act of 2008 (“S.3036”), which was 
originally introduced on May 21, 2008.9 Although the Boxer 
Amendment has never been debated and considered in Con-
gress to a significant extent,10 it represents the most advanced 
and comprehensive legislative effort on the Senate side to date 
addressing climate change. 
Generally, both the Waxman-Markey draft and the Boxer 
Amendment propose the establishment of a cap-and-trade sys-
tem to limit emissions domestically, along with a number of 
measures providing incentives for reduced emissions, and, in 
the case of the Waxman-Markey draft, the development of clean 
energy sources, clean technologies, and increased energy effi-
ciency. Importantly, both bills provide for competitiveness mea-
sures in the form of a “border adjustment” requiring “covered 
goods” imported into the United States to be accompanied by 
purchases of emissions allowances.11
raTIonale For IncluDIng  
compeTITIveness provIsIons
While commentators have expressed concern over the inclu-
sion of certain competitiveness provisions in climate change leg-
islation,12 there are a number of reasons why such provisions are 
useful and should be included in any proposed legislation.
First, competitiveness measures can provide an even play-
ing field for U.S. manufacturers and producers to compete in the 
domestic market against importers of goods from countries that 
lack emissions caps. Manufacturers in countries such as China 
and India, which are heavy polluters but currently are not sub-
ject to domestic or international limits on their emissions, would 
enjoy a significant production cost advantage over their counter-
parts in the United States under a U.S. cap-and-trade regime if 
no measures were taken to require these manufacturers to com-
pensate for the emissions they created when producing products 
for import into the U.S. market. In particular, energy-intensive 
industries, such as cement, glass, paper, chemicals, fertilizer, 
and metals manufacturers, would be adversely affected by U.S. 
Smokestack of a coal-fired power plant in New York.
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declining emissions caps and their inability to compete with for-
eign producers who are not subject to such caps.13
The perceived need for protection of domestic manufactur-
ers is so strong that is it highly unlikely that any climate change 
legislation could pass the U.S. Congress without competitive-
ness measures. One reason given for the U.S. refusal to adopt the 
Kyoto Protocol was the fact that it did not impose binding com-
mitments on developing countries, which even then was per-
ceived as a threat to the competitiveness of U.S. industries. Given 
the uncertainty over whether developing countries will commit 
to emissions limits in the successor agreement to the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, U.S. legislation will need to include competitiveness mea-
sures to compensate for non-participation by developing nations 
in future international climate change agreements.14
In fact, in a white paper produced by the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives Committee on Energy and Commerce and its Sub-
committee on Energy and Air 
Quality (the “White Paper”), the 
drafters emphasized the need 
for competitiveness measures 
by linking them to the need 
to engage developing coun-
tries.15 They reasoned that, in 
the absence of an international 
agreement binding developing 
nations, domestic legislation 
needed to be structured in a way 
that would encourage devel-
oping nations to adopt similar 
limitations on GHG emissions 
domestically, and that such 
“encouragement” could include 
border adjustment measures, 
performance standards, and car-
bon market design conditions.16
The above emphasizes a 
second reason for competitive-
ness measures: they can also serve to encourage foreign countries 
to adopt their own domestic climate change measures. Foreign 
countries can be encouraged to adopt emissions limits by pro-
viding them with both positive and negative incentives to do 
so through U.S. legislation. Border adjustment measures could 
encourage the adoption of emissions limits in foreign countries 
in response to foreign manufacturers having to raise manufac-
turing costs by purchasing emissions credits. Alternatively, U.S. 
legislation could create positive incentives for foreign countries 
to adopt emissions caps by providing them with greater access to 
the U.S. emissions credit trading market, which is expected to be 
vast and lucrative for those able to sell credits on it.17
Third, the imposition of competitiveness measures can pre-
vent “carbon leakage,” a situation where the benefits of reduc-
ing U.S. emissions would be “offset by increased emissions 
elsewhere by foreign competitors that are thriving as a result of 
higher costs in the United States.”18 They could also be used as 
export adjustments, i.e., by providing emissions credits for free 
to U.S. manufacturers to allow them to compete equally in third-
country markets with foreign competitors who are not subject to 
emissions caps.19
Finally, competitiveness measures would ensure that other 
countries share the cost of reducing GHG emissions on a world-
wide basis, even if they are unwilling to adopt required limits 
on emissions themselves. Given that the ill effects of climate 
change are shared globally, the costs and burdens of eliminating 
emissions should also be shared globally. Domestic competi-
tiveness measures can ensure the equal distribution of costs in 
the absence of an international agreement limiting emissions.20
exIsTIng borDer aDjusTmenT proposals
While a number of border adjustment proposals in draft leg-
islation have been tabled to date, the Boxer Amendment repre-
sents the most comprehensive legislative effort to date. Although 
Senator Boxer currently is draft-
ing new legislation, it is likely 
that her new proposals will 
reflect the proposals made in 
the original Boxer Amendment. 
While the Waxman-Markey 
draft and Representative Chris 
Van Hollen’s Cap and Dividend 
Act of 2009 represent efforts 
currently under consideration in 
the 111th Congress, neither is as 
specific as the Boxer Amend-
ment on the border adjustment 
measures. 
The border adjustment pro-
posal in the Boxer Amendment 
essentially requires that, begin-
ning from January 1, 2014, “cov-
ered goods”21 from countries 
that have not taken “comparable 
action”22 to the actions taken in 
the United States to limit GHG emissions, must be accompanied 
by an appropriate number of emissions allowances in order to be 
imported into the United States. 
Specifically, this proposal would be executed by first, 
establishing a bi-partisan “International Climate Change Com-
mission” (the “Commission”) consisting of six commissioners 
appointed by the President in coordination with the Senate.23 The 
Commission’s key role would be to determine annually which 
countries have or have not taken comparable action to combat 
greenhouse gas emissions and to publish those determinations. 
Countries that are found to have taken comparable action, or 
that meet certain exemptions,24 are placed on an “excluded” list 
by the Commission.25 Importers of covered goods from these 
countries would not be required to submit emissions allowances 
under these regulations. All other countries would be placed on 
the “covered” list, and covered goods would have to be accom-
panied by emissions allowances when imported into the United 
States.26 The Commission would have enforcement powers 
Carbon leakage is a  
real concern in light of  
the possibility of a 
post-Kyoto Protocol 
international climate 
change agreement without 
equivalent obligations 
undertaken by all heavy 
GHG emitters. 
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to penalize companies importing goods without the required 
emissions credits.27 Such penalties could include payment of a 
penalty and even a prohibition on importing the goods in contro-
versy for up to five years.28
Under the Boxer Amendment, emissions allowances 
needed to accompany covered goods would come from a special 
reserve of allowances established by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (“EPA” or “Administrator”), which would also be 
responsible for establishing the pricing methodology29 for these 
allowances. The Administrator additionally would be respon-
sible for establishing a method for determining the number of 
allowances necessary for covered goods entirely manufactured 
and processed in one covered country, using a general formula30 
for calculating the number of allowances required “on a per unit 
basis for each category of covered goods that are entered into 
the United States from that foreign country during each com-
pliance year.”31 The Administrator would further be responsible 
for establishing the methodology for determining the number of 
allowances to be applied to covered goods manufactured or pro-
cessed in multiple foreign countries.32 
Finally, while most emissions allowances would come 
from the special reserve mentioned above, the Boxer Amend-
ment also allows U.S. importers to submit allowances issued by 
foreign cap-and-trade programs that are deemed to constitute 
“comparable action.”33 U.S. importers may also use credits from 
international offset projects authorized by the Administrator in 
lieu of international reserve allowances.34 These international 
offsets would be authorized as part of Title XIII Subtitle B of the 
Boxer Amendment, which describes international partnership 
programs such as the reduction of deforestation.35
The border adjustment measure of the Waxman-Markey 
draft differs from the Boxer Amendment in significant ways. 
The principal difference is that while the Boxer Amendment 
mandates that the border adjustment become effective from 
2014, the Waxman-Markey draft gives the President the dis-
cretion to impose a border adjustment, after making a deter-
mination that compliance with the U.S. cap-and-trade system 
continues to cause significant reductions in domestic production 
or domestic jobs, or an increase in greenhouse gas emissions by 
foreign manufacturing facilities manufacturing covered goods 
in jurisdictions without “commensurate” GHG regulations.36 
This determination is expected to be made no later than June 
30, 2017, as part of a reporting process by the President with 
the EPA.37 If the President decides to impose a border adjust-
ment, he must issue regulations no later than 24 months after the 
determination.38 From that point on, covered goods may only be 
imported into the United States with the appropriate number of 
allowances.39
The Waxman-Markey draft vaguely describes the parame-
ters for the border adjustment program, with the result that there 
are only a few points of comparison with the Boxer Amendment 
provisions. One similarity is that both drafts specify exemptions 
permitted for least-developed countries and countries emitting 
less than 0.5% of total global GHG emissions (i.e., a de minimis 
rule).40 The differences, however, are numerous. For instance, 
the border adjustment in the Waxman-Markey draft clearly states 
its intent of addressing “competitive imbalance” as a result of 
“direct and indirect” costs of complying with both the U.S. cap-
and-trade system and systems of other countries.41 Moreover, 
the definition of “covered goods” in the Waxman-Markey draft 
for purposes of the border adjustment measure does not broadly 
include imports of “manufactured items for consumption,” but 
only those designated as “primary products.”42 
Another principal difference in the Waxman-Markey draft, 
which also has significant bearing on this discussion, is that—in 
order to avoid the problem of carbon leakage43 while preserving 
the global competitiveness of industries affected by the carbon 
caps—the draft utilizes another competitiveness measure in the 
first instance to distribute “rebates” (essentially free credits) to 
the “owners and operators of entities in eligible industry sec-
tors,” beginning in 2012.44 Under this primary competitive-
ness mechanism, eligible industries would first be determined 
depending on whether they have an energy intensity or green-
house gas intensity of at least five percent, and a trade intensity 
of at least fifteen percent, as calculated by the EPA Administra-
tor according to methods described in the draft text.45 According 
to the draft, the number of rebates given to each eligible entity 
would equal “the sum of the covered entity’s direct compliance 
factor and the covered entity’s indirect carbon factor.”46 The 
draft further mandates an annual review of the rebate program, 
and allows for the EPA, beginning in 2021, to eliminate rebates 
if the Administrator determines that “more than 70 percent of 
the global output from a sector . . . is manufactured in countries 
subject to commensurate greenhouse gas regulation.”47
Importantly, the Waxman-Markey draft, unlike a number of 
earlier proposals, particularly emphasizes the need for the adop-
tion of clean technologies, clean energy sources, and energy effi-
ciency. For example, the draft proposes the adoption of a “smart 
grid” to improve energy efficiency; the adoption of technologies 
such as carbon capture and sequestration to reduce emissions in 
the air; and the provision of U.S. assistance to the developing 
world to encourage them to adopt clean technologies.48
The Cap and Dividend Act of 200949 is the most recent leg-
islation to be introduced imposing a border adjustment measure. 
The measure differs radically from the Boxer Amendment and 
Waxman-Markey draft provisions, in that it requires the impo-
sition of “carbon equivalency fees” on all imports of “carbon-
intensive goods.”50 The carbon equivalency fee would equal the 
dollar value amounts domestic producers have to pay to acquire 
carbon permits for the production of their goods, and any carbon 
equivalency fees paid by importers for carbon-intensive goods 
used in the production of their final manufactured items.51 This 
carbon equivalency fee would in turn be paid out to domestic 
producers of carbon intensive goods, to make up for the costs 
they incur.52 This provision will be terminated in the event that 
an international agreement is reached requiring carbon-emitting 
countries to adopt similar measures, or when carbon-emitting 
countries unilaterally adopt equivalent measures to those of the 
United States.53
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Prior and subsequent to the Boxer Amendment last year, 
both the Senate and the House of Representatives had introduced 
a number of bills containing border adjustment measures, which 
differed more or less substantially from the Boxer Amendment. 
S.3036, which the Boxer Amendment replaced, for example, 
contained significant differences in the timing of implementa-
tion, structure of oversight and implementation bodies, and the 
definition of certain terms.54 
Two pieces of legislation proposed in the House of Represen-
tatives also included border adjustment measures: H.R.6186, the 
Investing in Climate Action and Protection Act (“H.R.6186”),55 
introduced by Representative Markey, and H.R.6316, the Cli-
mate, Market, Auction, Trust & Trade Emissions Reduction 
System Act of 2008 (“H.R.6316”),56 introduced by Representa-
tive Lloyd Doggett.
The terms of the border adjustment measures under 
H.R.6186 are very similar to, if more simplistic than, S.3036. If 
H.R.6186 is the House’s counterpart to S.3036, then H.R.6316 
serves as the House’s counterpart to the Boxer Amendment. 
Much of the terms and structure of H.R.6316 replicates the pro-
posals in the Boxer Amendment. The fact that H.R.6316 was 
the latest piece of climate change legislation introduced into the 
House, and that it so closely echoes the direction and details of 
the Boxer Amendment, again reinforces the notion that these 
pieces of legislation will likely form the basis of some of the 
future legislative efforts to regulate GHG emissions, particularly 
on the Senate side.57 
are The exIsTIng borDer aDjusTmenT 
proposals consIsTenT wITh worlD TraDe 
organIzaTIon rules?
This section provides a brief overview of WTO rules that 
could be implicated by the border adjustment proposals described 
in the previous section, and discusses whether the proposals 
would survive scrutiny under those rules. Because the proposals 
for U.S. legislation are incomplete and likely to be substantially 
revised prior to passage, it is difficult to reach definitive conclu-
sions about the outcome of any future WTO challenge. How-
ever, notwithstanding this uncertainty, it is already quite clear 
which WTO rules would be implicated in such a challenge, and 
these rules provide an important roadmap for legislators hoping 
to “appeal-proof” a final bill.
At least three distinct WTO agreements could come into 
play in a challenge to U.S. border adjustment measures. The 
first is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).58 
The relevant GATT provisions can be divided into two groups—
first, the fundamental trade principles that WTO Members must 
uphold, and second, defenses that may be asserted to justify a 
breach. Thus, a finding of a violation of one or more of the fun-
damental principles may not necessarily lead to termination of a 
challenged measure if a legitimate defense is available.
One fundamental trade principle likely to come into play 
if legislation like the Boxer Amendment enters into force is the 
most-favored nation (“MFN”) clause of GATT Article I. The 
MFN clause at Article I:1 provides, writ large, that if a WTO 
Member gives advantageous treatment to imports of a given 
product from one WTO Member, it must provide the same 
advantageous treatment to imports of the “like product” from 
all the other Members as well. In short, a WTO Member may 
not discriminate by providing better treatment to imports from 
some countries than to imports from other countries. The obli-
gation set forth in Article I:1 is broad, applying “with respect 
to all rules and formalities in connection with imports.” Yet, 
the Boxer Amendment at Section 1316(b)(3) would seem to 
require this very mode of prohibited discrimination by imposing 
the importer allowance requirement on imports from countries 
deemed not to have taken “comparable action” to the United 
States to combat climate change, while relieving imports from 
other countries of this obligation. The MFN clause would thus 
seem to present a significant hurdle under the WTO rules for 
border adjustment mechanisms like the Boxer Amendment that 
treat imports from different countries differently.
Another GATT principle potentially implicated by bor-
der measures is set forth in Article II, pursuant to which WTO 
Members have agreed to “bind,” or fix, their customs duties on 
imports at levels laid out in national schedules of concessions. 
Under Article II:1(b), WTO Members have committed not to 
impose customs duties in excess of their bound levels. Nota-
bly, this obligation extends to “all other duties or charges of any 
kind.” The terms “all” and “of any kind” in this provision appear 
to encompass an importer allowance requirement of the sort pro-
posed by the Boxer Amendment.
The GATT contains another important prohibition on trade-
discriminatory treatment—the national treatment provisions of 
Article III. The general thrust of these provisions is that a WTO 
Member must accord treatment to goods imported from other 
WTO Members that is no worse than the treatment accorded 
to domestically produced “like” goods. Any border adjustment 
measure that imposes higher compliance burdens on imported 
goods than it imposes on domestically produced goods could run 
afoul of this national treatment requirement. Two elements of 
Article III are most likely to come into play in challenges to bor-
der adjustment measures. The first is the requirement of Article 
III:2 that imports shall not be subject to “internal taxes or other 
internal charges” that exceed those applied to the “like” domes-
tic products. The second is the requirement of Article III:4 that 
imports shall be subject to regulatory treatment that is no less 
favorable than that accorded to “like” products of domestic ori-
gin. A considerable body of WTO jurisprudence helps define 
the scope of these obligations—including the perpetually tricky 
question of how to define a “like” product.59 Unlike the vul-
nerability of an importer allowance program under the above-
mentioned GATT provisions, it seems possible for lawmakers 
to craft a program that would impose comparable burdens on 
imported and domestically produced goods alike. However, 
there is no broad guarantee that such an effort would succeed; 
if challenged, compliance with national treatment principles 
may have to be assessed on a product-by-product basis, and 
any incremental increase in the compliance burden imposed on 
importers could render the program vulnerable. 
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Yet another GATT provision that may be implicated by 
border measures is Article XI:1, pursuant to which WTO Mem-
bers may impose “no prohibitions or restrictions [on imports] 
other than duties, taxes, or other charges.” This proscription 
could readily be seen as applying to border measures intended to 
deter carbon leakage such as importer allowance requirements—
particularly if the market price for allowances were to rise to a 
level rendering importation cost-prohibitive.
As noted, a WTO Member may violate one of these funda-
mental principles, but still be able to justify the violation. Doing 
so would require invocation of one or more of the “General 
Exceptions” set forth in GATT Article XX. Two of the enumer-
ated exceptions are generally understood as providing possible 
cover for border adjustment provisions in a GHG emissions cap-
and-trade scheme. The first is sub-article (b), for measures “nec-
essary to protect human, animal or plant life or health,” and the 
second is sub-article (g), for measures “relating to the conserva-
tion of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production 
or consumption.” Both of these exceptions appear sufficiently 
broad for lawmakers to craft border measures to fit within their 
parameters. Further, as a matter of intent, the GATT appears to 
leave room for WTO Members to pursue their own environmen-
tal policies and does not attempt to harmonize national policies.
However, fitting a measure within one of the Article XX 
sub-articles is not the end of the inquiry. Any defense of a mea-
sure under Article XX must also survive the test laid out in the 
chapeau of that Article itself, which provides that the measure 
may not be applied “in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination,” or a “dis-
guised restriction on international trade.” In short, Article XX 
does not shield protectionism masquerading as environmental-
ism. Would border adjustment measures that are, on their face, 
intended to safeguard U.S. industries from foreign competitors 
deemed to have an unfair cost advantage survive scrutiny under 
the Article XX chapeau? Opinions on this question vary, and the 
answer would ultimately depend both on the final wording of 
U.S. legislation as well as how it is implemented.
Further, a considerable body of WTO jurisprudence now 
exists on the Article XX chapeau, and provides some consider-
ations likely to be applied in any challenge to U.S. border adjust-
ment measures. For example, in the recent Brazil-Tyres case, 
the WTO Appellate Body struck down a Brazilian import ban 
on retreaded tires that exempted imports from MERCOSUR60 
countries. In a key passage in its holding, the Appellate Body 
reasoned that the trade discrimination (i.e., imports were gen-
erally prohibited, but not if originating in MERCOSUR coun-
tries) at issue was not “rationally related” to the environmental 
objective of the import ban.61 Another consideration likely to 
arise in any challenge to final U.S. border adjustment measures 
stems from the much-cited U.S.-Shrimp case, in which the WTO 
Appellate Body explained that the legitimacy of an environmen-
tal measure with a trade-discriminatory impact may be shown 
through earnest attempts by the importing country to negotiate 
an international agreement that would ensure equal treatment of 
all affected trading partners. Under this test, a “serious, good 
faith effort” to discuss a global climate change mitigation regime 
may be sufficient.62
A second WTO agreement that may be invoked to challenge 
U.S. border adjustment measures in cap-and-trade legislation is 
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agree-
ment”). The TBT Agreement guides the application of technical 
regulations and standards in order to avoid unnecessary obstruc-
tions to trade. Technical regulations are defined in Annex 1 of 
the TBT Agreement as “document[s] which [lay] down product 
characteristics or their related processes and production meth-
ods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with 
which compliance is mandatory.”63 This definition may extend 
to requirements dealing with packaging, labeling, and marking. 
In the context of border adjustment measures, if the measures 
require that products be produced in accordance with certain 
emissions control criteria in order to be imported freely into the 
United States, for instance, this could trigger a TBT Agreement 
challenge. Although none of the current proposals contain crite-
ria that could be defined as a “technical regulation” for purposes 
of the TBT Agreement, the alternative proposal described at 
the end of this paper—as well as other proposals by commenta-
tors64—could trigger a challenge under these provisions.
There are four possible ways in which a challenge may 
be raised against border adjustment measures under the TBT 
Agreement. First, like the MFN and national treatment clauses 
described in the GATT discussion above, TBT Agreement Arti-
cle 2.1 requires that technical regulations must apply “no less 
favorably” to “like products” of WTO Members than to “like 
products” of national origin or of other countries.65
Second, under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, technical 
regulations must not be drafted or applied in a way that creates 
an “unnecessary obstacle to trade,” or more specifically, must 
not be “more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legiti-
mate objective.”66 However, under Article 2.2, legitimate objec-
tives may include protection of the environment. Therefore, if 
the U.S. Government were able to prove adequately that its tech-
nical regulations were designed to fulfill the objective of protect-
ing the environment, and did not do so in an overly-restrictive 
manner, then the technical regulations could survive a challenge 
under this provision.
Third, the TBT Agreement mandates under Article 2.4 
that, where international standards exist, they must be used as 
a standard for WTO Members’ technical regulations.67 In this 
case, no such global standards exist, but if new standards were 
adopted pursuant to the UN climate change negotiations, then 
these would necessarily have to serve as the basis of any tech-
nical regulations adopted in the United States, and if not, U.S. 
regulations could be subject to a challenge under this provision 
of the Agreement.
Finally, TBT Article 12 requires that WTO Members take 
into account developing countries in applying technical regula-
tions, particularly to ensure that such technical regulations do 
not impose unnecessary obstacles to trade with these develop-
ing countries.68 Although most border adjustment measures 
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proposed so far specifically exempt countries designated by the 
UN as “least developed” countries, any legislation imposing 
technical regulations should take this requirement into account 
as well.69
The third WTO agreement that may come into play in a chal-
lenge to a U.S. competitiveness provision more generally is the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM 
Agreement”).70 Exposure to claims under the SCM Agreement 
could arise in several ways. One possibility, applicable to a 
competitiveness measure that allocates emissions allowances to 
some domestic manufacturing industries (but not others) at no 
charge, would be a claim that the provision of free allowances 
under such circumstances constitutes an actionable subsidy.71 
Such a claim could be premised on a definition of “subsidy,” at 
Article 1.1(a)(ii), which covers government decisions to forego 
revenue that is otherwise due.72 However, for such a claim to 
succeed, the alleged subsidy would also have to be “specific” for 
purposes of Article 2—i.e., limited by law or in fact to certain 
enterprises or industries. Further, a complaining WTO Member 
could only prevail in such a case by demonstrating, under Arti-
cle 5, that the alleged subsidy is causing “adverse effects” to its 
interests.73 The obstacles to success in such a challenge would 
be relatively high.
While not directly related to the adoption of competitive-
ness measures, a second way in which the SCM Agreement 
might be implicated in relation to a national cap-and-trade pro-
gram is through the government’s use of proceeds from the 
sale of emissions permits. As noted earlier, President Obama’s 
climate change agenda calls for substantial government invest-
ment in a range of clean energy technologies. It seems feasible 
that such expenditures might be challenged by foreign govern-
ments seeking to nurture competing industries as impermissible 
or actionable subsidies under the SCM Agreement. Notably, the 
SCM Agreement at its inception contained provisions insulating 
certain “green box” subsidies described in Article 8.2(c) from 
challenge.74 However, these exceptions were of limited dura-
tion, and expired in 2000 when the WTO Members could not 
agree on their continuation.75 The expiration of these provisions 
injects further uncertainty into the WTO risk analysis for any 
national cap-and-trade system designed to promote clean energy 
technologies.
Finally, the prospect of a WTO challenge to any competi-
tiveness provisions that might ultimately be adopted raises liti-
gation risk questions entirely apart from the application of the 
above-mentioned rules. One of the worst-case scenarios would 
be the imposition of different types of competitiveness provi-
sions by different jurisdictions, spawning multiple and overlap-
ping WTO challenges. The Director-General of the WTO, Pascal 
Lamy, has referred to such a scenario as a “spaghetti bowl,” and 
described the institutional problems it could raise for the WTO.76 
In this scenario, the WTO’s dispute settlement process may well 
be overwhelmed, both by the magnitude and complexity of the 
legal issues as well as the unprecedented trade values affected 
by the challenged measures. Further, regardless of the results of 
any WTO challenge to climate competitiveness measures, the 
imposition of the measures themselves may poison the ongoing 
UN negotiations towards a new global accord and invite retalia-
tory action.
These fears, even if speculative, point to the need for an 
international climate change agreement in which all countries—
developed and developing—accept responsibility for reducing 
worldwide GHG emissions. Indeed, this is the only viable solu-
tion to the climate change problem, and the only “exit strategy” 
for countries that have or will unilaterally implement cap-and-
trade systems domestically. Even if competitiveness measures 
pass WTO muster, they are only temporary measures until 
a global solution on climate change is achieved. In the mean-
time, domestic political reality in the United States (and in other 
advanced economies) dictates that no domestic GHG cap-and-
trade scheme can achieve adequate political support if it does 
not ensure the competitiveness of domestic manufacturing 
industries in light of the developing countries’ current stance on 
prioritizing “development” over carbon reduction. Thus, design-
ing competitiveness measures—and specifically border adjust-
ment measures—to maximize their chances of surviving a WTO 
challenge, to the extent permitted by domestic political reality, 
remains the task at hand.
mInImIzIng The rIsk ThaT a borDer aDjusTmenT 
measure wIll run aFoul oF wTo rules
The preceding sections show that robust border adjustment 
measures are a sine qua non of any final U.S. cap-and-trade sys-
tem that may be enacted, but also that any such measure could 
be subjected to a dizzying array of claims under WTO rules. 
How, then, might the risk of reversal in WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings be reduced?
As noted in the previous section, one of the key design chal-
lenges for border adjustment measures from a WTO risk reduc-
tion perspective is how to avoid overt—and unlawful—trade 
discrimination. One way to avoid at least the surface appearance 
of discriminatory treatment would be to design a measure so that 
it does not apply at the border at all, but at the point of consump-
tion within the U.S. economy, for all emissions-intensive goods 
deemed to be vulnerable to carbon leakage.
Ideally, such a mechanism—which could take the form of 
a requirement to submit certain standardized amounts of GHG 
emissions allowances or offsets per quantity of the products at 
issue77—would apply to all GHG-intensive products, regard-
less of country of manufacture. Refunds or rebates would then 
be provided to suppliers able to certify that the products were 
produced subject to a requirement to submit such allowances 
or offsets (regardless of jurisdiction of submission).78 In other 
words, this adjustment measure would be geared to an objective 
emissions standard that is not, on its face, based on the country 
of manufacture of the product. The difficulty, of course, would 
be in the determination of the amount of allowances or offsets 
required per product, which could raise concerns under the TBT 
Agreement as previously noted.
The appearance of discriminatory treatment could be further 
reduced if suppliers would be permitted to satisfy the standard 
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based on the emissions intensity of the manufacturer of the prod-
uct at issue, as opposed to average emissions intensity for the 
sector in the country of manufacture, as currently envisioned 
under the Waxman-Markey draft. This would have the added 
benefit of encouraging the adoption of more efficient manufac-
turing technologies—regardless of the country in which they are 
deployed.
The above approach, while reducing the chances of being 
found to violate the GATT’s non-discrimination principles and 
border requirements, could also help buttress a defense under 
GATT Article XX. As noted in the previous section, a GATT 
Article XX defense can succeed only where the challenged mea-
sure does not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination or a disguised trade restriction. Succeeding with 
such a defense is more difficult where the measure at issue, on 
its face, distinguishes between products based on their country 
of manufacture. In such cases, the measure would likely have 
at least the appearance of unwarranted trade discrimination—
especially if the ostensible purpose of the provision is to safe-
guard the competitiveness of domestic manufacturing industries. 
However, if the operation of the competitiveness measure can be 
moved from the border to the point of consumption in the U.S. 
economy, as proposed above, and where it operates based on 
an objective standard of manufacturing emissions intensity, it 
should be easier to demonstrate that the measure truly advances 
an environmental goal covered by one of the Article XX excep-
tions, and does not constitute a disguised trade restriction.
conclusIon
It is our hope that this article generates additional thought 
and discussion as part of the U.S. legislative process in 2009 
to craft an effective domestic cap-and-trade system, including 
the ability to successfully safeguard the competitiveness of U.S. 
firms that would likely have to bear heavier emissions compli-
ance burdens than most of their foreign competitors. Carbon 
leakage is a real concern in light of the possibility of a post-
Kyoto Protocol international climate change agreement without 
equivalent obligations undertaken by all heavy GHG emitters. 
An effective and WTO-consistent adjustment measure (whether 
applied at the border or at the point of consumption)—among 
all of the competitiveness measures—appears to stand the best 
chance of encouraging developing countries to meaningfully 
participate in a global solution to a global problem.
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including manufacturing states, in the transition to a clean energy 
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nations in responding and adapting to global warming. In addition 
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In the United States and around the globe, governments are responding to climate change and energy security concerns by shifting their energy policies to facilitate the rapid devel-
opment of renewable energy.1 Today, wind energy is the fast-
est growing renewable technology,2 but in the rush to combat 
climate change, officials have often ignored another brewing 
conflict which looms larger with every turbine erected. It is a 
conflict between two would-be allies, wind developers and wild-
life conservationists, which if left unchecked has the potential to 
derail wind energy development in the United States.3 
The dispute centers around the dark secret of the wind 
industry: the fact that poorly sited turbines can kill large num-
bers of birds and bats.4 As wind farms spread across the coun-
try, many scientists and conservation groups are concerned that 
the cumulative effect will be devastating to already threatened 
bird and bat populations.5 Pressure is growing from conserva-
tion groups to enforce wildlife protection laws that the govern-
ment has only lightly enforced against wind farms so far.6 To 
date, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services (“FWS”), which is 
responsible for protecting bird and bat populations, has refused 
to initiate legal action against wind developers for their illegal 
taking of endangered bird species.7 Three federal statutes under 
the FWS’s jurisdiction—the Endangered Species Act, the Bald 
and Golden Eagle Protection Act, and the Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act—could all be enforced against wind farm developers that 
illegally kill endangered or protected birds and bats.8 However, 
even the threat of such litigation could potentially be enough 
to end wind energy development in the United States by mak-
ing development too costly or too risky for investors.9 Under the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, for example, every knowing illegal 
taking of a migratory bird could lead to a $250,000–$500,000 
fine and up to two years in prison.10 
While conservation groups agree that protecting wildlife 
from the unnecessary danger posed by turbines is a significant 
concern, most agree that climate change poses a greater threat 
to wildlife and their habitat than do wind farms.11 Stopping all 
wind development is not a viable solution to the problem. Fortu-
nately there may be a middle ground. 
Studies show that bird fatalities are extremely varied from 
wind farm to wind farm and even between turbines in the same 
site, with some turbines producing almost no fatalities and oth-
ers killing hundreds.12 The Altamont Pass in California is the 
site of one of the oldest wind farms in the United States and is 
also a migratory bird route and home to North America’s largest 
population of Golden Eagles.13 It is estimated that every year 
4,700 birds are killed by turbines at Altamont Pass, compared 
to less than a hundred at similarly sized wind farms sited with 
avian impacts in mind.14 This provides strong evidence that a 
wind farm’s impact on birds and bird habitats can be greatly 
mitigated through proper siting, design, and management. 
Globally, avian mortality has typically not been part of wind 
farm impact assessments, but in 2003 the Council of Europe for 
the Bern Convention responded to this growing issue with rec-
ommendations and guidelines for including avian impact assess-
ments in wind farm development proposals.15 Since then, wind 
farm planning in the EU has included avian impact assessments 
and a number of wind farms have been rejected due to their 
potential deleterious impact on birds and bird habitat.16 Euro-
pean conservation groups are also creating bird impact maps to 
help planners assess the potential impacts of specific wind proj-
ects on birds and bird habitat.17 
The United States now needs mandatory federal regula-
tions that provide clear wind farm siting guidelines that include 
bird impact assessments. Unfortunately, there are currently no 
mandatory federal guidelines, and few state or local guidelines, 
regulating turbine siting. However, in 2007 the FWS convened 
a Wind Turbine Guidelines Advisory Committee to develop rec-
ommendations regarding minimizing the impacts of wind farm 
development.18 In March 2009 the Committee came back with 
its recommendations which include conducting pre-develop-
ment wildlife impact studies and avoiding locations identified 
as having a high potential risk to birds or bats, establishing non-
disturbance bird and bat buffer zones, and not locating turbines 
between daily roosting, feeding, and nesting sites.19 The Com-
mittee’s recommendations are expected to become the basis of 
new federal turbine siting guidelines.20 Such strategies will help 
reduce the building pressure between wind developers, conser-
vation groups, and officials by giving them a common means 
of collaboration without resorting to legal actions that have the 
potential to significantly impede wind energy development in 
the United States. 
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InTroDucTIon 
In the absence of concerted action, global greenhouse gas emissions are projected to almost double by 2050. Much of this increase will come from industrialization in developing 
countries.1 Due to resource constraints and the conviction that 
developed countries must take responsibility for their historical 
emissions, most developing countries are unlikely to act aggres-
sively to restrain their emissions growth without substantial 
help from the developed world. Accordingly, the Bali Action 
Plan calls for a global deal in which developing countries take 
enhanced “nationally appropriate mitigation actions” supported 
by technology, financing, and capacity building from the devel-
oped world.2 This will require a substantial transfer of resources 
and capacity. The Stern Review estimated the incremental costs 
of necessary low-carbon investments in developing countries to 
be at least $20–30 billion per year.3 So far, however, little assis-
tance has been forthcoming. One of the most important poten-
tial outcomes of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) negotiations at Copenhagen will 
therefore be the creation of a publicly-funded mechanism that 
can provide sufficient concessional resources to help developing 
countries transition to lower carbon growth trajectories. 
A critical issue that the negotiators will have to resolve is 
how to define the mechanism’s funding criteria to ensure that 
its concessional funds are used most effectively. This poses an 
important strategic choice: will the mechanism focus exclusively 
on initiatives that can help catalyze transformational changes in 
existing emissions patterns, or will it also provide support for 
marginal improvements in the efficiency of existing technolo-
gies and practices? While the case for targeting concessional 
public funding towards emerging low-carbon technologies is 
compelling, there undoubtedly will be significant political pres-
sure from developing countries to allow support to also be used 
for incremental improvements in high-emitting sectors.  
The recent decision by the World Bank-administered Clean 
Technology Fund (“CTF”) to authorize support for certain 
coal-fired power plants may provide some insights into how 
the UNFCCC may resolve this issue. The CTF has an explicit 
mandate to finance “transformational action” to help developing 
countries transition to a low-carbon development path.4 Nev-
ertheless, its new financing criteria authorize support for coal 
technologies that may be only slightly more efficient than those 
that are already preferred by the private-sector, and that include 
carbon capture and storage (“CCS”) readiness criteria that have 
little chance of ever resulting in the capture or storage of any 
carbon dioxide (“CO2”). 
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The CTF’s willingness and ability to contravene its man-
date to catalyze transformational change with regard to coal 
does not bode well for Copenhagen. The World Bank is likely 
to have some influence in the structure of a UNFCCC mech-
anism, and has an institutional interest in promoting the CTF 
standards. Regardless of whether the World Bank plays a role in 
the UNFCCC mechanism, the negotiators may look to the CTF 
standards as precedent.  
Moreover, many of the broader political forces that pro-
duced the CTF standards will also be at play in Copenhagen. 
Participating countries have not called the CTF to account for 
its incrementalism because it largely reflects their policy prefer-
ences. Many participating countries are not yet ready to concede 
that the Earth’s dwindling carbon sink capacity can no longer 
support development strategies based on the relentless expan-
sion of fossil fuel consumption. Unless this political dynamic is 
altered at Copenhagen, there is little reason to expect the Parties 
to agree to markedly more ambitious criteria for a new UNFCCC 
mechanism. 
The clean Technology FunD 
The Clean Technology Fund is one of two Climate Invest-
ment Funds (“CIFs”) created by the World Bank and other mul-
tilateral development banks (“MDBs”) to provide an interim 
source of concessional financing while the UNFCCC mecha-
nism is being negotiated.5 The CTF will support public- and 
private-sector investments that contribute to “the demonstra-
tion, deployment and transfer of low-carbon technologies with 
a significant potential for long term greenhouse gas emissions 
savings.”6 Eligible investments include low-carbon power and 
transportation projects, and large-scale energy efficient initia-
tives and other demand management projects.7 
Although the CTF is administered by the World Bank, its 
decision-making process is partly independent of the gover-
nance structure of the Bank and the other MDBs. Every project 
funded by the CTF must be approved by both the board of the 
implementing MDB and a separate Trust Fund Committee of 
the CTF.8 Unlike the weighted voting at the MDBs that heavily 
favors donor governments, votes on the Trust Fund Committee 
are equally apportioned between eight representatives selected 
by the donor countries and eight representatives selected by the 
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recipient countries. The committee also includes a non-voting 
representative from the World Bank, the other participating 
MDBs, and the host country of any investment proposal that is 
under consideration.9 
the ctf’S focuS on tranSformational change 
The stated objective of the CTF is to support “transfor-
mational” actions that represent a “step change” over current 
practice.10 Towards this end, the CTF provides support for low-
carbon technologies that are approaching the point of “market 
take-off,” and that have the potential to significantly reduce 
emissions.11 Two categories of technology are eligible for assis-
tance. As a matter of priority, the CTF focuses on technologies 
that are already available commercially, but need incremental 
assistance to compete with con-
ventional options in the recipi-
ent country.12 It will also finance 
technologies that have been 
proven to be technically viable, 
but have not yet been commer-
cially deployed at scale. The 
CTF will not support technolo-
gies that are still in the research 
stage.13  
In theory, this is a sound 
strategy for targeting public sub-
sidies. Left to their own devices, 
private markets may let impor-
tant new technologies languish 
in the “valley of death” between 
laboratory success and commer-
cial viability.14 Innovations that 
mitigate social costs are par-
ticularly vulnerable to getting 
bogged down at this stage of 
development. Well-targeted public subsidies can provide a criti-
cal push to accelerate their commercial uptake.15 Accordingly, 
the CTF should target its scarce concessional funds at assistance 
that can help accelerate “near market” renewable energy tech-
nologies down the cost and learning curves to the point where 
they are competitive with fossil fuels.16 And to its credit, the CTF 
has recognized that the potential to reduce deployment costs and 
increase learning for future investments should be key consider-
ations in its decision to support a proposed investment.17 
an incrementaliSt approach to coal 
Yet, in practice, the CTF has subverted its strategy of facili-
tating the uptake transformational technologies by authorizing 
support for certain coal-fired power plants. Under its new guide-
lines, the CTF may provide subsidies for coal-fired plants that 
meet specified energy efficiency standards and are considered 
to be “ready” to capture and store carbon.18 This is a conspicu-
ously ill-advised use of scarce concessional financing for climate 
mitigation. Any coal plant financed by the CTF will emit enor-
mous quantities of CO2 for the foreseeable future. Concessional 
funds for bringing transformational technologies to market are 
relatively scarce. Instead of squandering these limited resources 
on incremental efficiency improvements for incumbent technol-
ogies, the CTF should focus on helping zero-emission alterna-
tives, such as base-load solar, become cost competitive. Indeed, 
using concessional public money to subsidize coal—however 
efficient—does nothing to hasten the day when low-carbon 
technologies can reliably out-compete coal and other fossil fuel-
based energy sources.19 
The CTF has compounded this strategic error by adopting 
permissive criteria for efficiency and CCS-readiness. The CTF 
ostensibly precludes the use of its funds to support sub- or super-
critical coal power plants.20 Its financing criteria, however, are 
not adequate to the task. The Criteria for Financing Low-Carbon 
Opportunities in Coal and Gas Power Investments (“Criteria”) 
note that “typical” supercriti-
cal coal-fired power plants with 
emission factors of 0.80 tons 
CO2 per megawatt hour (net) (t 
CO2/MWh (net)) are now “the 
system of choice for new com-
mercial coal-fired plants in many 
countries.”21 Nevertheless, the 
Secretariat has set the proposed 
baseline carbon-intensity thresh-
old for CTF investment at 0.795 
t CO2/MWh (net), a mere 0.005 t 
CO2/MWh (net) below the emis-
sion factor for the current “sys-
tem of choice.”22 In addition to 
being incredibly incrementalist, 
this standard may not be consis-
tent with the commitment not to 
finance super-critical plants. As 
the World Bank’s own private 
sector lending arm has noted, 
super-critical coal plants can achieve even lower emissions 
factors.23 
Worse, the 0.795 t CO2/MWh (net) threshold is only an ini-
tial benchmark; it can be adjusted upward based on specified site- 
and country-specific conditions.24 This flexibility is not clearly 
constrained in the CTF Criteria. The Criteria do not (a) explain 
the circumstances in which these upward adjustments will be 
allowed; (b) propose any guidelines for MDB staff to implement 
them; or (c) establish maximum allowable adjustments. Under 
the Criteria, then, the CTF could presumably finance coal proj-
ects that are substantially more carbon-intensive than the base-
line 0.795 t CO2/MWh (net) would appear to require, or even 
than the super-critical plants that the Trust Fund Committee has 
excluded. 
The Criteria also fail to require the use of control technolo-
gies for capturing other air pollutants, such as flue gas desul-
furizers (“FGD”), selective catalytic reducers (“SCR”), and 
low-nitrogen oxide (“NOx”) burners. These technologies are 
not necessarily required in developing countries, and their use 
reduces the efficiency (and thus increases the CO2 intensity) 
Many participating 
countries are not yet ready 
to concede that the Earth’s 
dwindling carbon sink 
capacity can no longer 
support development 
strategies based on the 
relentless expansion of 
fossil fuel consumption.
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of a coal-fired plant.25 In the absence of specific pollution con-
trol standards, the Criteria may allow (or implicitly encour-
age) operators to meet CO2 emissions standards at the cost of 
increased emissions of other pollutants. This, too, is hardly 
transformational. 
The False promIse oF carbon capTure  
anD sTorage-reaDIness 
Arguably, the CTF could finance coal projects while meet-
ing its strategic objectives by limiting eligibility to CCS dem-
onstration projects that would help drive innovation and force 
down costs. However, the CTF has explicitly eschewed such a 
role. Because CCS technology is currently at the research and 
development stage, it is not eligible for CTF co-financing, even 
on a pilot or demonstration basis.26 Instead, a new coal-fired 
power plant need only be “CCS-ready” to be eligible for CTF 
financing. Under the CTF Cri-
teria, a plant will be considered 
CCS-ready if the project sponsor 
has: 
 a) provided adequate space 
in the design of the facility 
for the equipment needed to 
capture CO2;
 b) identified feasible options 
to transport CO2 to a stor-
age reservoir that is large 
enough to hold the lifetime 
emissions of the plant; and 
 c) conducted an analysis of 
CCS options and the viabil-
ity of plant with CCS operation.27 
Due to cost considerations, capital investment in CCS technol-
ogy is not required.28  
The most likely outcome of this approach is that CTF-
financed coal plants will remain “ready” for CCS indefinitely, 
but will never actually capture or store any CO2. As one wit has 
put it, calling these plants CCS-ready is like calling my drive-
way “Ferrari-ready:” my driveway can certainly accommodate 
a Ferrari, but the chances of one being parked there are van-
ishingly small.29 Although the basic technology is well under-
stood,30 commercial-scale CCS is not expected to be widely 
available for at least 15–20 years.31 In the best-case scenario, 
then, these plants will spew CO2 for the first third to half of their 
operational lifetimes. In reality, however, there is little reason to 
believe that CTF-financed plants will be early adopters of CCS 
technology. Since the CTF does not actually require retrofitting, 
and since CCS is expected to be extremely expensive and reduce 
plant efficiency by as much as a third,32 operators will not ret-
rofit on their own. Only strong regulatory requirements, a steep 
price on carbon, or a robust concessional financing regime will 
have the potential to induce a plant operator to undertake such 
an investment. 
None of these potential drivers of CCS uptake currently 
exists in the developing world, or is likely to be implemented 
in the near to middle term. Few if any developing countries are 
seriously considering carbon emissions regimes that would be 
stringent enough to eventually induce or require plant operators 
to retrofit their facilities with CCS technology. And assuming 
such regulations were to be enacted, there is little reason to be 
confident that they would be well-enforced. Even in countries 
with relatively effective regulatory and enforcement regimes, 
utilities have proven to be remarkably adept at avoiding or 
delaying mandates to upgrade their facilities to improve envi-
ronmental performance.33 
It is also unlikely that any country that might host a CTF-
financed coal project would implement policies to internalize 
the cost of carbon. In the current political environment, such a 
proposal would be a non-starter. But even if that were to change 
over time, the cost of carbon emissions would have to rise sig-
nificantly before it would make economic sense to implement 
CCS technology. A recent study 
by McKinsey estimates the cost 
of emissions reductions through 
CCS to begin at about $75–115 
per ton, and to decline by half 
after 2030 when the technol-
ogy has matured.34 By way of 
comparison, the price of carbon 
emissions under the European 
Trading Scheme is currently 
about €13 per ton (approxi-
mately U.S. $17 per ton).35 
The most likely way that 
CTF-financed projects would 
ever implement CCS technol-
ogy, then, is by accessing further concessional funds to finance 
the retrofit. But even this is highly speculative and, at best, a 
distant prospect. First, CCS is not currently eligible for cred-
its under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism, 
the most important existing conduit for such financing.36 While 
this would likely change if the technology matured, the avail-
ability of carbon credits would not provide sufficient incen-
tives for operators to retrofit until the cost of abating emissions 
through CCS falls below the price of carbon credits. This is not 
expected to occur until at least 2030.37 Second, it is also possible 
that a new UNFCCC financing mechanism could support the 
retrofit CTF-financed projects. But even if concessional funds 
were made available for CCS retrofits, there is little reason to 
believe that CTF-financed projects would be the best candidates 
for these funds. Commercial scale CCS is so embryonic that it 
is too soon to say which of the currently available coal com-
bustion technologies will prove to be the most cost-effective to 
retrofit.38  
conclusIon: a cauTIonary Tale  
For copenhagen 
The best that can be said for the CTF’s willingness to finance 
coal-fired power plants is that, on its own terms, it is not likely 
to have a momentous impact on international efforts to redirect 
Although the basic 
technology is well 
understood, commercial-
scale CCS is not expected 
to be widely available for 
at least 15–20 years.
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developing countries toward lower-carbon development paths. 
To date, donors have pledged relatively small sums of money,39 
some of which may not be disbursed. And at least some of the 
money that eventually reaches the CTF will go to more appropri-
ate technologies. Indeed, the first three loans under consideration 
by the CTF, totaling U.S. $900 million, will support renewable 
energy and urban transport initiatives, not coal.40 In any event, 
the CTF is intended to be a short-term mechanism that will wind 
down its operations once the new UNFCCC financial architec-
ture has been put in place.41 
The critical question raised by the CTF’s embrace of coal, 
then, is what that decision may portend for the criteria to be 
adopted by the UNFCCC financing mechanism that is to be 
created in Copenhagen in December 2009. That mechanism is 
expected to be the primary conduit for developed countries to 
meet their obligations to finance the deployment and diffusion 
of low-carbon technologies in developing countries.  Moreover, 
under the Bali Action Plan, the mitigation efforts that develop-
ing countries will be expected to undertake will be explicitly 
linked to the kinds of financing and support that is provided by 
developed countries.42 As a result, the financing criteria adopted 
by the UNFCCC mechanism will be a key component of the 
effectiveness of the Copenhagen agreements. 
The CTF’s affiliation with the World Bank is likely to 
enhance its relevance in the Copenhagen negotiations. The 
World Bank will continue to be an influential player in Copen-
hagen, and appears to be positioning itself to play a key role in 
the implementation of the UNFCCC mechanism. But even if the 
World Bank is not afforded a direct role in the UNFCCC mecha-
nism, the negotiators may consider the CTF standards to be an 
important precedent for the UNFCCC’s financing criteria. His-
torically, there have been numerous examples of World Bank 
internal environmental and social standards being widely treated 
as international best practice, regardless of their substantive 
shortcomings.43   
Apart from the World Bank’s role, there are other rea-
sons to be concerned that the criteria adopted by a UNFCCC 
mechanism may not be demonstrably better than those of the 
CTF. Some developing countries are skeptical of renewable 
alternatives—particularly those technologies that are not yet 
commonly employed in developed countries. These countries 
would prefer to continue to rely on coal despite its environmen-
tal disadvantages.44 This preference was expressed in the Trust 
Fund Committee’s deliberations over the proposed standards, in 
which influential recipient country representatives endorsed the 
inclusion of coal and questioned the need for CCS-readiness cri-
teria. It has also been expressed by the Parties to the Kyoto Pro-
tocol. At the CoP-11/CMP-1 in Montreal, the Parties instructed 
Annex II countries, and Annex I countries “in a position to do 
so” to give priority to “[c]ooperating in the development, diffu-
sion and transfer of less greenhouse-gas-emitting advanced fos-
sil-fuel technologies, and/or technologies relating to fossil fuels 
that capture and store greenhouse gases, and encouraging their 
wider use . . . .”45 
It remains to be seen whether the same political forces 
that shaped the CTF criteria will define the parameters of the 
UNFCCC mechanism. There is some reason to believe that 
the dynamics may be shifting. The U.S. Congress for example, 
recently refused to fund the CTF out of concern by some mem-
bers over the coal financing criteria.46 And perhaps the leadership 
of the new U.S. administration, or the urgency and heightened 
public scrutiny of the Copenhagen meetings, will create space 
for negotiators to take a more ambitious approach to mitigation 
financing than was evidenced by the CTF. But unless the politi-
cal dynamic is changed, there is little reason to expect that the 
outcomes will be any different.  
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Technological advancement in clean energy has become a key U.S. initiative because of its potential for spurring economic growth and creating energy independence.1 Any 
attempt to encourage the development of clean technology in the 
United States must also foster venture capitalism in the sector.2 
Venture capital plays an important role in the U.S. economy 
by creating jobs and revenue.3 Venture capital firms pool the 
resources of many investors, which include individuals, pen-
sion funds, corporations, charities, and college endowments.4 
The firms then invest the pooled fund into new companies.5 
Venture capital has backed some of the most successful and 
innovative companies in the United States, including Apple, 
Google, Starbucks, and Whole Foods.6 Venture capital is par-
ticularly important to technological innovation for two reasons. 
First, venture capital funds innovative projects that cannot gain 
access to traditional banking funds.7 Second, venture capital 
drives technology forward by financing projects that will not be 
funded by larger companies because of their disruptive nature in 
the marketplace.8 
Encouragingly, venture capital firms have already begun to 
tap into the new market of clean technology.9 Market trends indi-
cate a continual pull away from unsustainable sources of energy 
like petroleum and natural gas, so venture capitalists have begun 
to favor investments in renewable energy.10 The clean technol-
ogy sector has seen an extraordinary boom in investment capital 
in recent years.11 In 2001 venture capital in clean technology 
made up less than one percent of total venture capital invest-
ments.12 By 2008 however, venture capital in clean technology 
made up fifteen percent of the total venture capital invested.13 
Unfortunately, there are signs that the recession has finally 
caught up to venture capital investments in the industry.14 In the 
first quarter of 2009, investments in the clean technology sector 
fell by forty-eight percent from the first quarter of 2008.15 
The government does have the power to indirectly curb the 
effects of the recession on the clean technology venture capital 
market by implementing policies that make investments in the 
sector more attractive.16 On February 17, 2009 Congress enacted 
the Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which includes 
eighty-three billion dollars of clean technology incentives.17 The 
act emphasizes clean technology as a way to drive the economy 
and create jobs.18 It will promote investments in clean technol-
ogy in three key ways: direct grants, tax incentives, and loan 
guarantees.19 The incentives are primarily targeted at “smart 
grid technologies, advanced batteries, fundamental renewable 
energy research and a host of energy efficiency projects.”20 Fur-
ther, because venture companies in clean technology stand to 
benefit from the new influx of funding from the government, it 
is likely that investments of venture capital into these benefited 
companies will also be spurred.21
However, in order for the various new stimulus funds to be 
effective in helping the survival of clean technology companies 
struggling in the recession, the funds must be distributed quickly 
and effectively.22 The ability of the government to meet this 
goal is questionable. For example, one loan guarantee program, 
established in 2005 by the Department of Energy (“DOE”) under 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005, was plagued by a four-year hold 
on disbursement, where none of the available grant money was 
distributed.23 The stimulus bill allotted an additional six billion 
dollars to this same loan grant program.24 The new funds in the 
stimulus need to be distributed much more quickly than they 
have been under the Energy Policy Act of 2005 if they are to 
stand a chance at preventing “a raft of potential bankruptcies or 
crippling retrenchments through 2009” among clean technology 
companies.25
Quick disbursement is all the more essential as other coun-
tries enter the race to develop the best new clean technologies. 
Recently, China announced that it intended to become the world’s 
leader in hybrid and all-electric vehicles.26 This announcement 
comes at the same time as the United States’ first all-electric 
mass-manufactured vehicle is waiting for federal aid from the 
DOE’s loan guarantee program.27 Encouragingly, however, there 
are signs that the inertia in federal government to disburse funds 
is coming to an end. The DOE has gained momentum with the 
arrival of Stephen Chu, the new Secretary of Energy.28 Chu has 
made disbursement of the loan guarantees a priority, and the first 
alternative energy loan was finally awarded.29 If more releases 
of stimulus funds into clean technology follow, there is reason 
to be optimistic that venture capitalism in clean technology will 
recover as the funds put new life into the industry.30 
Endnotes: The Importance of Venture Capitalism to 
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InTroDucTIon
Biomass offers a potentially ideal source of fuel for cleaner power generation and the support of sustainable development in developing countries.1 It is the fourth 
largest source of primary energy in the world and the largest 
source of renewable energy, supplying about ten percent of 
2004 total primary energy supply.2 Biomass could account for 
in excess of thirty percent of the world’s primary energy by the 
year 2050.3 
Biomass power generation technology is mature, yet deploy-
ment of this technology on a wide scale faces significant insti-
tutional barriers related to the 
difficulty associated with sourc-
ing a reliable and affordable sup-
ply of biomass. Biomass power 
production at a large scale also 
poses significant water and food 
security issues if not managed 
properly.
The authors review China 
and India’s laws and policies 
regarding biomass supply in 
order to assess their institu-
tional arrangements for appli-
cation of biomass technology. 
We selected China and India 
for study because they are the 
world’s largest countries in 
terms of population, their econ-
omies and energy demand are rapidly growing, and they have 
large agricultural sectors. Biomass will be increasingly impor-
tant to these countries as they seek to meet energy demand in a 
sustainable manner.
This article examines the advantages of biomass energy for 
developing countries; the barriers posed by difficulty in obtain-
ing an economical, adequate, and reliable supply of biomass; 
and how China and India have prepared for biomass generation 
by addressing these barriers through legislation. It describes pol-
icies and programs developed by China and India to encourage 
expansion and integration of this important technology into the 
existing energy infrastructure. 
aDvanTages oF bIomass For  
DevelopIng counTrIes
In developing countries, biomass typically accounts for 
as much as twenty to thirty percent of energy supply and in a 
overcoming inStitutional barrierS to  
biomaSS power in china anD inDia
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number of countries can reach fifty to ninety percent of total 
energy supply.4 In these countries, biomass is used as the pri-
mary source of energy for home heating and cooking in rural 
areas.5 However, the burning of biomass, which typically occurs 
in enclosed areas, poses threats to human health, and is a pri-
mary cause of respiratory diseases in developing countries.6
Biomass electricity generation can provide household 
energy without the adverse health impacts of using biomass 
directly in homes. Further, biomass power generation can sig-
nificantly reduce sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxides, mercury, 
particulate emissions, and greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions 
compared to coal power plants.7 
Coal currently supplies eighty 
percent of China’s power,8 and 
sixty-nine percent of India’s 
power.9 As is well-known, pol-
lutants from coal power plants 
cause serious health effects, 
such as birth defects, as well as 
cancer and respiratory illness; 
they also pollute land and water 
and poison food supplies.10 
Biomass power generation 
can also help reduce the use of 
chemical fertilizers in agricul-
tural production and promote 
the development of organic 
agriculture. The ash product of 
a biomass power plant can be 
processed into fertilizer for use by farmers. In turn, the greater 
reliance on organic fertilizers can reduce the negative effects of 
chemical fertilizers on soil and ultimately significantly promote 
water conservation.11
For China, estimates for the amount of agricultural biomass 
available range from approximately 250 to 376 million tons per 
year, out of a total of approximately 726 million tons of crop 
residue generation.12 This could supply cooking fuel for over 
half a billion people.13 China’s forests produce additional bio-
Biomass power  
generation can 
significantly reduce sulfur 
dioxide and nitrous oxides, 
mercury, particulate 
emissions, and greenhouse 
gas emissions.
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mass residue of about 24.77 million cubic meters per year using 
sustainable forest management practices.14
For India, biomass has long been the main energy source for 
cooking and heating. India produces approximately 500 million 
tons of biomass per year.15 Biomass has emerged as an increas-
ingly attractive option for power generation due to the growing 
demand for power, recurrent power shortages throughout the 
country, a projected shortage of coal for power generation, and 
the high cost of diesel and other fossil fuels.
Biomass electricity generation plants could potentially help 
farmers by providing supplementary income from their farm 
waste to aide in stabilizing farming communities and land use 
patterns and provide permanent and seasonal employment in 
rural areas. Biomass for electrification should be integrated into 
existing property and cultural patterns without requiring the con-
solidation of small farms into larger operations.
If planned properly, biomass power plants should be able to 
use only waste biomass that would not require additional water or 
displace food crops. Further, biomass plants using waste should 
favor food security by increasing income to rural farmers and 
keeping land in production. However, if the adoption of biomass 
power generation changes indigenous agricultural practices, the 
biomass power plant could potentially require additional water 
resources or require land that otherwise would produce food to 
convert to fuel production. 
barrIers To bIomass as a Fuel For  
power generaTIon
The primary barrier to biomass power generation is the abil-
ity to obtain adequate supply of biomass at an economical price. 
In developing countries, there is typically no organized market 
for biomass fuel.16 As a result, there is no price consistency for 
biomass material. Lack of transportation infrastructure and the 
cost and availability of transportation fuels limit the develop-
ment of regional markets, resulting in fragmented and localized 
biomass markets.17 The seasonal nature of biomass material, 
the variation in quantity, and the low density of such material 
further complicate the development of an organized market for 
biomass.
Crop
Production 
Million Tons 
of main crop
Types of 
Residues
Production of 
main crop to 
residue ratio
Quantity 
of residues 
in Million 
Tons/yr
Typical Uses of Residues
Rice 90 Straw 1.3 117 Used as cattle feed in Southern and Eastern India. 
Generally burnt in the fields in the North.
Husk 0.3 27 Used as a fuel by small industry.
Wheat 80 Straw 1.5 120 Used mainly as cattle feed.
Coarse Cereals 30 Straw and 
Husks
1.8 54 Used as cattle feed and as fuel.
Sugarcane 320 Bagasse 0.3 96 Mainly as a captive fuel by sugar plants,  
partly as raw material for papermaking.
Tops 0.05 16 Used as cattle feed
Trash 0.07 20 Mostly burnt in the fields.
Coconut 14 billion nuts Shell 
Fibre
0.13 kg/nut
0.2 kg/nut
0.2
2.8
Partly as domestic fuel.
Used partly, for making mattresses, carpets, etc.
Pith 0.2 kg/nut 2.8 No productive use. Disposal is a problem.
Cotton 3.5 Stalks 3.0 10.5 Partly as domestic fuel
Gin Waste 0.1 0.35 Used as a fuel for brick making and by small 
industry.
Oilseeds 20 Straws and 
husks
1.1 22
Pulses 14 Straws 1.3 18 Partly as a domestic fuel
Jute/Mesta 2.0 Stalks 2.0 4 Used partly as fuel for processing tobacco  
leaves/domestic fuel
Total 499
Figure 1: India’s Estimated Annual Biomass Production
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India. Note: Based on 2006–2007 production.
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Biomass also faces significant transaction costs resulting 
from the quantities of biomass required to be collected from 
large numbers of farms.18 Contracts with small farmers for a 
guaranteed supply of biomass would not likely be commercially 
practicable or enforceable, given that natural conditions play a 
major factor in biomass production and enforcement costs would 
be prohibitive.
Further, biomass electricity generation competes with many 
other uses of biomass. As noted, in developing countries, bio-
mass is commonly used for home heating and cooking in rural 
areas, and it is burnt by farmers to help fertilize growing fields.19 
Other sources of competition include use by ranchers as a source 
of feed for livestock, use as a source of supply for construction 
materials such as bricks and roofs, and use by the paper industry 
as a source of material for making paper. 
In addition to market barriers to biomass, there are also 
environmental and resource barriers. For example, the availabil-
ity of water for growing crops such as sugarcane or for cooling a 
power plant can limit the introduction of biomass power genera-
tion in certain geographic areas.20 
biomaSS Supply anD coSt impactS on proJect 
financing
Biomass supply requirements for a small-size power plant 
are substantial. The financial performance of a biomass plant is 
highly sensitive to the cost of biomass supply. In order to assess 
the risks associated with fuel supply, we conducted a financial 
analysis based on the retrofit of a coal plant to a biomass-fueled 
combined heat and power plant in China. 
The financial analysis assumes electricity is priced based 
on preferential rates provided pursuant to China’s Renewable 
Energy Law, but that no additional subsidies are considered. The 
project financial analysis further assumes that Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism certified emission reduction certificates are 
sold by the project for 90 renminbi (“RMB”)21 per metric ton 
carbon dioxide for a three-year period.
We calculate that a combined heat and power biomass 
power plant with energy capacity of 24 Megawatts (“MW”) 
requires 270,000 tons of straw (assuming a moisture content of 
twenty-five percent) per year. Such a power plant would require 
three ten-ton truckloads of biomass every hour continuously in 
order to operate at full capacity. 
Based on the average size of farm in China (approximately 
3 mu, or 0.002 square kilometers), we estimate that each farm 
produces 1.2 to 1.8 tons of straw per year, and that the power 
plant will require straw from an average of 180,000 farms. In 
our example, supply must be sourced within a 75 km radius of 
the plant so that transportation costs are acceptable, however the 
cost and risk to the plant increases with distance. A plant opera-
tor would likely require much shorter distances to ensure profit-
ability. Further, in terms of sustainability, we estimate that more 
than half of all transportation related carbon emissions in bio-
mass production can be avoided if the supply is located within 
25 km of the power plant.
In rural China, the average annual income in 2005 was 3,255 
RMB per year. If straw could be sold for 125 RMB per ton, we 
estimate that the average farm supplying 1.5 tons of straw per 
year could increase their annual income by almost 200 RMB/
year, an increase of almost six percent that could be very helpful 
to a low-income household.
The project’s financial performance is highly sensitive to 
the price of straw. For our hypothetical 24 MW project, a 25% 
increase in the price of straw reduces the project’s the internal 
rate of return (“IRR”) on equity from 28.4% to 21.5% and the 
debt service coverage ratio (“DSCR”) from 2.25 to 2.02, assum-
ing a 70% debt-to-equity ratio. In contrast, a one million RMB 
increase in initial costs slightly decreases IRR on equity from 
28.4% to 28.3%, and the DSCR from 2.25 to 2.24.
While our example still shows very good returns, the 
increase in straw price can result in a significant reduction in 
profit, and ultimately cause a marginal project to fail. If the mar-
ket is thin or fragmented, as is typical, the potential for local bio-
mass prices to spike as a result of the introduction of a biomass 
power plant are real and could render the project uneconomic. 
Plant Size
3  
MW
6  
MW
12 
MW
24 
MW
Best Case (assumes Straw Price 130 RMB/Ton)
IRR Equity % 27.8 14.2 23.0 28.4
DSCR 2.19 1.69 2.03 2.25
Initial Cost (RMB 
millions) 114 183 315 547
Straw Price Increases 25%
IRR Equity % 24.3 8.9 17.0 21.5
DSCR 2.07 1.52 1.83 2.02
1 Million RMB Increase in Initial Costs
IRR Equity % 27.5 12.1 22.2 28.3
DSCR 2.15 1.60 2.00 2.24
Effect of each 1 million 
RMB increase on IRR –0.3 –2.1 –0.8 –0.1
Effect of each 1 million 
RMB increase on DSCR –0.4 –0.9 –0.2 –0.1
Figure 2: Financial Analysis of Combined Heat and Power  
Biomass Power Plant in China
Source: Craig Hart, China Biomass Combined Heat & Power  
Multi-Stakeholder Negotiation, Energy + Environment OpenCourse-
Ware, http://eeocw.org/environmental-negotiation/china-biomass-
combined-heat-and-power-multi.
Note: The improvement in financial results for a 3 MW power plant 
results from the use of more efficient technology that is currently only 
available on smaller scales.  
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polIcy anD regulaTory Frameworks  
In chIna anD InDIa
We review China and India’s laws and policies regarding 
biomass supply in order to assess their institutional arrange-
ments for application of biomass technology. 
china
China’s National Development Reform Commission set 
targets for development of renewable energy, including 30 GW 
of biomass renewable energy to be built by 2020.22 In support 
of this goal, the country has developed a series of laws, regula-
tions, and policies with the intention of achieving this substan-
tial increase in biomass use. 
China’s Renewable Energy Law supports various kinds of 
renewable energy, including biomass, through a system of pref-
erential electricity prices that vary on a regional basis.23 The law 
also provides additional payments for electricity generated with 
low sulfur emissions.24 Subsidies for biomass electricity and 
desulfurization abatement equipment terminate after 15 years.25 
The Renewable Energy Law guarantees sale of renewable elec-
tricity to the power grid.26
China also offers various financial incentives for biomass. 
This includes subsidies supporting R&D, low interest loans to 
projects, and grants to rural households for wood-stoves and 
bio-gas systems.27 China also provides tax incentives, including 
reduced customs taxes for imported equipment and an income 
tax holiday for industries whose main inputs are wastes.28 
All land and natural resources in China are owned by the 
state, and leased to land users. China’s property laws and regula-
tions do not, to our knowledge, contain any provisions provid-
ing for biomass to be supplied to power generators. China does, 
however, forbid the direct burning of crop residues within the 
vicinity of roads, and railway and transportation infrastructure.29 
The measure is intended to increase the utilization of crop resi-
dues as fertilizer, materials for industrial use, and straw and stalk 
gasification.
China’s Ministry of Finance issued the Interim Measures for 
Administration of Special Funds for the Development of Renew-
able Energy in May 2006 to fund studies, standards formation, 
resource surveys, production of equipment, and construction of 
projects in remote areas in the field of renewable energy, includ-
ing biomass and biofuels.30 The funds provide both cash appro-
priation and subdidized loans. The Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry of Construction issued the Interim Measures for 
Administration of Special Funds for Using Renewable Energy in 
Construction in September 2006.31 This fund provides financial 
support to renewable energy, including biomass, used in con-
struction of buildings, such as biomass energy to be used for 
heating and cooling systems, hot-water supply, electricity for 
lighting, and cooking.32 
The Ministry of Finance issued the Notice of Interim Mea-
sures of Administration on Subsidy Funds for Using Straw as 
Energy Resource in 2008.33 This “Special Fund for Straw” sup-
ports enterprises that convert crop straw into energy, includ-
ing densification briquetting fuel, straw gasification, and straw 
chIna’s mIcroTurbIne approach To 
bIomass Technology1
The Research Center for Energy and Power of the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences is developing an inno-
vative approach to distributed biomass utilization for 
rural electrification, heating, and cooking by adapting 
the technology to conditions in the biomass market. 
The approach uses local small-scale pyrolysis facilities 
to convert biomass to synthetic gas and active carbon 
(“char”). Pyrolysis is a thermo-chemical process that 
breaks down biomass, waste, or other substances by 
heating it to high temperatures (e.g., 300°C to 500°C 
for various types of biomass), leaving only carbon resi-
due at certain temperatures.2
The synthesis gas produced from the pyroly-
sis process would then be used for home heating and 
cooking (replacing direct burning of biomass), and as 
a fuel source for distributed electric power generation. 
The approach relies on distributed power plants using 
micro-scale gas turbines (approximately 100 KW in 
size) and gas engines. We estimate that a 100 KW gas 
turbine could require less than approximately 1,500 
tons of biomass per year to operate (assuming biomass 
has twenty-five percent moisture content). The much 
smaller biomass supply required for a microturbine 
reduces the risks associated with larger biomass power 
generation facilities. The active carbon produced from 
the pyrolysis process can then be used as a natural fer-
tilizer, replacing chemical fertilizers. In addition to 
increasing agricultural productivity, active carbon also 
increases the soil’s carbon absorption.
1 Source: Interview with Dr. Xiao Yunhan, Professor of the Chi-
nese Academy of Sciences and China’s Ministry of Science & Tech-
nology (Apr. 17, 2009).
2 Pyrolysis is widely used to convert waste into safely disposable 
substances, to produce various chemical products, to crack hydro-
carbons in the refining processes, and to produce biofuels from ani-
mal wastes.
caSe StuDy: china
carbonization. In Chinese law, straw includes paddy rice, wheat, 
corn, legumes, vegetable material that can be pressed to extract 
oil, cotton, and tuber crops and remains produced during the 
initial processing of crops. To be eligible for support from the 
Special Fund for Straw, the following requirements must be 
satisfied:
	 •	 Enterprise	must	have	registered	capital	of	RMB	10	million	
or more;
	 •	 Enterprise’s	utilization	of	straw	as	energy	resource	conforms	
to local regulations governing general utilization of straw;
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	 •	 Enterprise’s	 annual	 straw	consumption	 is	 at	 least	10,000	
tons; and
	 •	 Enterprise’s	 products	 are	 commercialized	 and	 has	 stable	
customers.
China’s energy technology subsidies programs are intended 
to increase the efficiency of biomass power generation and inte-
grate it with buildings (a major power user), which will help 
make biomass power generation less expensive and more finan-
cially stable. The Special Fund for Straw is intended to directly 
address the risks associated with biomass supply. However, 
these subsidies are likely to be temporary in nature. Thus, the 
long-term strategy should be to increase efficiency of biomass 
technologies, and to adapt technologies to the conditions of the 
biomass market. 
inDia
In 1981, India created a government commission with over-
all responsibility for developing renewable energy and a separate 
Department of Non-Conventional Energy Sources in the Minis-
try of Power that eventually evolved into the Ministry of New 
and Renewable Energy.34 The Ministry of New and Renewable 
Energy issued the Renewable Energy Power Purchase Guide-
lines to all States in 1993, followed by the Energy Conservation 
Act of 2001, which mandated adoption of standards and proce-
dures and prescribed measures for energy conservation.35 The 
Electricity Act of 2003 guaranteed interconnection for renew-
able energy sources and provided recommendations for prefer-
ential tariffs and quotas for renewable generation.36 Almost all 
states have implemented some form of preferential tariffs for 
renewable energy generation, and have set general quotas for 
renewable energy, but have not specified quotas by energy type. 
The amount of subsidies depends upon the type of technology 
used in the project and the equipment’s level of efficiency.37 
These measures have been strengthened by the National Elec-
tricity Policy of 2005, the Tariff Policy of 2006, the Rural Elec-
trification Policy of 2006, and the Integrated Energy Policy 
Report of the Planning Commission of India in 2006.38 Today, 
India’s power market mostly comprises regulated prices with a 
few states introducing open bidding on electricity through ten to 
fifteen year power purchase agreements.
In addition to preferential rates specified by the state regula-
tory authority39 and guaranteed grid access, a number of cash 
and tax subsidies are available to aid in the development of bio-
mass. Federal subsidies are available to developers of biomass 
power plants. The amount of the subsidy depends upon the effi-
ciency rating of the plant. The government exempts imported 
and domestic equipment from excise duties, and offers acceler-
ated depreciation treatment for energy efficiency and biomass 
power generation equipment. Finally, the government offers a 
10-year tax holiday that applies to biomass power plants.40
Regarding the natural resources available for the facilita-
tion of biomass development, abundant sugarcane bagasse is 
the main raw material for biomass power generation in India. 
India is the world’s second largest sugarcane producing coun-
try, following Brazil.41 In India, bagasse electricity production 
is generally combined with the production of sugar, with a por-
tion of the electricity used to power the mill, and the excess sold 
into the grid. The cogeneration of power with sugar production 
strengthens the overall financial condition of the project.
In order to promote sufficient biomass supply for each 
facility, sugarcane mills are required to be located a minimum 
distance from each other by state law. For example, in Uttar 
Pradesh, India’s leading sugar cane growing region,42 mills may 
not be located within a 15 km radius of each other.43 
waTer-eFFIcIenT sugarcane  
FarmIng In InDIa1
Sugarcane is traditionally a water-intensive crop, 
requiring steady irrigation for a full eighteen-months to 
two-year growing period. Without abundant local water 
resources, sugarcane requires extensive irrigation that 
competes against other food crops and can be costly both 
financially and ecologically. Conventional sugarcane 
farming also relies heavily on fertilizers and pesticides.
An innovation pioneered by a local farmer in Kar-
nataka, India, replaces the practice of soil flooding with 
providing enough water to maintain soil moisture. The 
method involves reducing the number of irrigation 
channels, building up the soil’s organic content and 
earth fauna, eliminating synthetic fertilizers and pesti-
cides, and adopting no-till practices. Elimination of the 
water flood and these other changes enhance soil aera-
tion and fertility, and reduce susceptibility to disease. 
The method reduces water requirements by as 
much as seventy-five percent compared to conventional 
sugarcane farming, increases farming profits by elimi-
nating costs of fertilizer and pesticides, better preserves 
the soil, and produces comparable or better yields. 
Farming associations, such as the Organic Farmers 
Club, teach these and other techniques; however, these prac-
tices have yet to be institutionalized in government policy.
1 See Special Unit for South-South Cooperation, UN Development 
Programme, Water-efficient sugarcane farming; India, in exampleS 
of SucceSSful economic, environmental anD SuStainable liveli-
hooD initiativeS in the South 102 (Sharing Innovative Experiences 
Series, vol. 3, 2000), available at http://tcdc.undp.org/Sie/experi-
ences/vol3/Water-efficient.pdf; Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations, Farmers Innovations, Community Develop-
ment and the Ecological Management in Organic Agriculture, Case 
Study 1: No-till sugar cane cultivation with alternate row irrigation, 
Belgaum, Karnataka, India, in organic agriculture, environment 
anD fooD Security (Nadia El-Hage Scialabba & Caroline Hattam, 
eds., 2002), available at  http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/
Y4137E/y4137e07.htm. 
caSe StuDy: inDia
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The Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Lim-
ited (“IREDA”), a government-owned corporation that promotes, 
develops and finances renewable energy and energy efficiency 
projects, requires biomass power plant seeking financing to 
demonstrate that, for each MW of nameplate capacity, a plant 
will have access to at least 10,000 tons of biomass material each 
year in close proximity to the plant, and an additional 10,000 
tons of surplus in the surrounding area. As a general guideline, 
in order to ensure supply of biomass, IREDA prohibits more 
than one biomass power plant in a single district and a mini-
mum distance of at least 50 km between power plants. IREDA 
further requires that the quality of the biomass material have at 
least 2,000 kilocalories per kilogram. Finally, to be eligible for 
financing, the cost of the plant may not exceed U.S. $800 per 
KW nameplate capacity, depending upon boiler configuration 
and cooling system.
In the context of a private market, India’s laws provide a 
degree of protection from over-competition for supply of biomass; 
this is particularly important where land ownership is predomi-
nately private, as it is in India. Even with these protections, power 
plant owners still have ample incentive to pay a competitive rate 
for biomass supply, and to maintain good relationships with farm-
ers. We are aware of examples of power plant owners providing 
their farm suppliers with financial assistance to purchase fertilizer, 
offering education on agricultural techniques, and even access to 
company health care facilities, schools, and other services.44 
conclusIons
China and India both plan for biomass power generation to 
increase significantly. Both countries have provided preferen-
tial electricity tariffs and guaranteed sale of biomass and other 
renewable energy to the power grid. Beyond these steps, the 
approaches taken by the countries diverge.
India has developed an innovative institutional approach 
that is appropriate to its market economy and legal system. It 
relies on private sector generation of power and limiting (without 
eliminating) competition for the supply of biomass through state 
law and IREDA’s lending guidelines. In contrast, China’s efforts 
focus on financial support of developing biomass resources and 
technology and financial support for the purchase of biomass. 
China’s technology development efforts include research and 
development to increase the efficiency of traditional biomass 
technologies and an innovative program to develop microtur-
bine biomass facilities in an effort to adapt to the institutional 
and market conditions facing biomass technology in China. 
Notably, China and India’s policies focus primarily on the 
promotion of the use of biomass. Our survey did not identify 
laws or policies designed to address water and food security 
issues. Both China and India will need to more fully integrate 
water resource planning into their energy policies as biomass 
power generation is scaled up to meet energy demand.
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the american recovery anD reinveStment 
act anD a new role for government in clean 
technology proJect financing by James Hunter*
* James Hunter is a J.D. Candidate, May 2010, at American University, Wash-
ington College of Law.
As a result of the current global economic crisis and credit crunch, financial institutions, governments, and compa-nies recognize that traditional project finance regimes 
in the realm of clean technology are potentially outmoded.1 
For example, traditional tax incentives that once spurred major 
financial institutions towards investing in clean technology proj-
ects no longer fuel the sector’s financial development, as the tax 
incentives for those investments dried up along with banks’ prof-
its in 2008 and 2009.2 Additionally, investors are shifting their 
focus from capital-intensive projects like solar energy technol-
ogy towards less capital-intensive projects like emerging smart 
grid technologies.3 Revisions to tax incentives and the revital-
ization of the Department of Energy (“DOE”) Loan Guarantee 
Program are two innovative responses introduced by the Obama 
administration and the U.S. Congress through the passage of 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (“ARRA”) that 
address this realignment.4 With these programs, the new admin-
istration is signaling that the development and success of a clean 
technology sector is both the litmus test and poster-child for eco-
nomic recovery.
The Business Energy Investment Tax Credit (“ITC”)5 and 
the Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit (“PTC”)6 are 
among the most important tax incentives for institutional invest-
ment into clean technologies. The ITC provides a tax credit on 
up to thirty percent of expenditures for investment in alternative 
energy sources, such as solar power, fuel cells, and small wind 
turbines.7 Similarly, the PTC institutes a “per-kilowatt-hour tax 
credit for electricity generated by qualified energy resources 
and sold by the taxpayer to an unrelated person” for a specified 
period of time—usually 10 years.8 These corporate tax incentives 
worked so long as the financial institutions had profits and tax 
liabilities to be offset by the tax credits; unfortunately, since the 
financial crash in 2008, this system is no longer sustainable.9
In light of this development, Congress and the Obama 
administration enacted important revisions to the incentive 
structures of both the ITC and the PTC through the ARRA. The 
credits now provide for the option to take either the PTC or ITC 
credit, or to receive an equivalent cash grant from the Treasury 
Department.10 Further, the ARRA extended the deadlines of 
PTC credits and removed an ITC provision limiting the credit 
for new projects that also receive subsidized financing.11 Critics 
have applauded this revision, noting that the ability for investors 
to receive federal cash almost immediately “is much simpler and 
more affordable than the old periodic tax credit schemes favored 
by Congress” and will “significantly lower the cost of financ-
ing.”12 Effects of the revised tax incentive structure and the 
credit crunch are leading some businesses to reassess traditional 
project financing and business models. For example, the Cali-
fornia based utility Pacific Gas & Electric recently announced it 
would install solar power facilities using its own capital to take 
advantage of the ITC.13
On March 20, 2009, DOE announced the first clean-energy 
loan guarantee for the California solar company, Solyndra.14 The 
$535 million loan guarantee is the result of a $39 billion appro-
priation in the ARRA to DOE for direct investment in backing 
renewable energy projects.15 This loan guarantee program is 
not new—in fact the Energy Policy Act of 2005 first authorized 
DOE to issue these loan guarantees16—however, DOE, for vari-
ous reasons, has failed to disburse any funds until now.17 Not 
only will the loan guarantee program assist in revitalizing proj-
ects that may have lost financing as a result of the credit cri-
sis,18 the program will also aid in allaying the fears of risk averse 
investors who may see potential in projects, but have shied away 
from investing in capital-intensive and unproven technologies.
Several other noteworthy projects are awaiting review of 
their loan guarantee applications, including the highly antici-
pated all-electric Tesla Motors Model S sedan. Tesla requires 
$450 million in government funds—$250 million of which would 
come from the DOE loan guarantee program, and the remainder 
from a 2007 Congressional bill authorizing $25 billion for elec-
tric vehicle technologies—in order to continue production of the 
car.19 Energy Secretary Steven Chu aims to streamline the loan 
application process and disburse seventy percent of the ARRA 
funds by the end of 2010.20
The latter ARRA provisions represent a significant shift 
from traditional bank backed project finance and help to keep 
capital-intensive projects afloat in these tough economic times. 
Additionally, the provisions help stabilize the incentive structure 
surrounding clean technology investment in order to avoid the 
historical cycle of “unnecessary fluctuation in tax credits, lead-
ing to alternating periods of investment followed by instability 
when the federal credit terminates.”21 Despite the controversies 
surrounding the expenditures required by the ARRA, the provi-
sions regarding clean technology are sound policies in uncertain 
times.
Endnotes: The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
continued on page 65
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InTroDucTIon 
“Not everything that is faced can be changed. But nothing 
can be changed until it is faced.”
—James Baldwin 
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (“Montreal Protocol”) has forced the phase-out of more than ninety-five percent of several classes of 
chemicals that deplete the ozone layer in developed countries 
and approximately fifty to seventy-five percent of these ozone 
depleting substances (“ODSs”) in developing countries.1 As a 
consequence of these phase-outs, a significant portion of ODSs 
that are used as refrigerants and foam-blowing agents are now 
being replaced with hydrofluorocarbons (“HFCs”). Although 
HFCs are not ODSs, they are extremely powerful greenhouse 
gases (“GHGs”) that exacerbate climate change. Most HFCs 
have a global-warming potential (“GWP”)2 hundreds to thou-
sands of times greater than carbon dioxide (“CO2”). The Mon-
treal Protocol must respond to climate impacts of HFCs by 
encouraging the use of other energy-efficient ODS substitutes 
with low GWP.
A second issue that the Montreal Protocol must address is 
that, although existing stockpiles of ODSs have been taken out of 
service, ODSs in discarded stockpiles, equipment, and products, 
collectively referred to as “Banks,”3 are rapidly emitting power-
ful GHGs into the atmosphere.4 The emissions from Banks are 
delaying the recovery of the ozone layer and exacerbating global 
climate change. Banks are currently not regulated by either the 
Montreal Protocol or the Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”). The 
Montreal Protocol must take responsibility for the Banks, cre-
ated by the use and effective phase-out of ODSs, before these 
GHGs are emitted to the atmosphere. The International Panel on 
Climate Change (“IPCC”) and the Technology and Economic 
Assessment Panel (“TEAP”) estimated in 2002 that approxi-
mately 21 gigatons (“Gt.”) of CO2 equivalent (“CO2-eq.”) are 
contained in Banks.5 Unless action is taken now, the IPCC/
TEAP Special Report predicts that total direct emissions of 
CO2-eq. are expected to reach 2.3 Gt. per year by 2015, nullifying 
all of the reductions in GHGs achieved under the Kyoto Protocol.6 
The history of the Montreal Protocol is one of a dynamic 
and evolving treaty that responds quickly to changes in ozone 
and climate science, technology, and the needs of industries and 
countries dependent on ODSs and their substitutes. Following 
the montreal protocol muSt act to  
prevent global climate change while  
reStoring the ozone layer
by Mark W. Roberts*
* Mark W. Roberts is a partner at the law firm of McRoberts & Roberts, LLP 
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participated at the Montreal Protocol as an NGO representative. J.D., University 
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the report “A Climate Briefing” with permission from the Environmental Investi-
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in this tradition, and consistent with the purpose and spirit of 
the Montreal Protocol to protect the global environment, deci-
sions should be made to include high-GWP HFCs among the 
categories of regulated chemicals and to expand the Montreal 
Protocol’s mandate by covering the destruction of Banks. Criti-
cally-necessary actions to achieve these goals include:
 1. A decision by the Montreal Protocol to add high-GWP 
HFCs as controlled substances.
 2. A decision by the Montreal Protocol to discourage the pro-
duction and consumption of high-GWP HFCs and to finance 
the incremental costs that developing countries must incur 
to avoid using high-GWP HFCs.
 3. Expansion of the Montreal Protocol’s activities to include 
the management and destruction of Banks worldwide.
 4. Coordination with the UNFCCC to: (a) have the phase-out of 
high-GWP HFCs serve as a case study for effective technol-
ogy transfer and funding mechanisms that can be incorpo-
rated into post-Kyoto Protocol institutions for other GHGs; 
and (b) develop effective funding mechanisms for destroy-
ing Banks before they are released to the atmosphere.
The Montreal Protocol and its Parties have repeatedly recog-
nized the need to address the full environmental implications of 
their actions.7 Regulation of high-GWP HFCs, a class of chemi-
cals that was commercialized directly due to the phase-out of 
ODSs under the Montreal Protocol, and managing and destroying 
the Banks of ODSs are the next steps in fulfilling this mandate.
The monTreal proTocol
The Montreal Protocol has been widely touted as the most 
successful international environmental treaty to date, having 
phased out the production and consumption of the vast major-
ity of ODSs in accordance with set timeframes. The Montreal 
Protocol includes the innovative approach of having devel-
oped countries (“non-Article 5 countries”) phase out ODSs on 
a faster schedule than developing countries (“Article 5 coun-
tries”), thereby acknowledging both developed nations’ larger 
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contributions to historic emissions and developing nations’ 
need to provide for their own future economic and environmen-
tal development. Additionally, the Montreal Protocol includes 
proven mechanisms to assist Article 5 countries in meeting their 
ODS reduction goals by facilitating technology transfer and pro-
viding financial assistance to ensure compliance and the creation 
of necessary infrastructure. 
The most basic tenet of the Montreal Protocol is the Parties’ 
obligation to limit “consumption” and “production” of “controlled 
substances.”8 By definition, “controlled substances” include any 
substance listed in the annexes to the Montreal Protocol, regard-
less of whether it exists alone or within a mixture.9 To enable the 
Parties to meet their mandate to 
restore the ozone layer, the Mon-
treal Protocol can add a substance 
to the annexes of controlled sub-
stances when it is recognized as a 
significant ODS.10 Additionally, 
the Montreal Protocol permits 
Parties independently to regu-
late substances not included in 
the Protocol or undertake more 
stringent control measures than 
required under the Montreal 
Protocol.11
It is important to note that, 
while the Montreal Protocol sets 
specific timelines for the phase-
out of ODSs, it does not specify 
the manner in which the phase-
out goals are to be achieved. 
This flexibility allows Parties 
to meet the targets in a manner 
best suited to their individual 
situations.12 Parties are permit-
ted to utilize materials that have 
been stockpiled, produced, or used as a feedstock in the produc-
tion of other chemicals.13 Moreover, trade in recycled and used 
chemicals is not included in the calculation of consumption to 
encourage the recycling of materials as a means of satisfying 
consumption needs while facilitating phase-out of production.14 
Article 5 of the Montreal Protocol, entitled Special Section 
of Developing Countries, was negotiated to establish a grace 
period for compliance with the control provisions to phase out 
consumption and production of ODSs ranging between ten and 
fifteen years, depending on the chemical, beyond the deadlines 
for developed countries.15 Only those nations with an annual 
per capita consumption of ODSs of less than 0.3 kilograms per 
year can take advantage of the more lenient extended phase-out 
schedule.16 Article 5 charges developed nations with the respon-
sibility to provide financial and technological assistance to the 
developing nations in the implementation of technologies and 
processes with less ozone depleting effects.17 
Under Article 10A of the Montreal Protocol, non-Article 5 
countries are required to transfer “best available, environmentally 
safe substitutes and related technologies” to Article 5 nations at 
“fair and most favorable trade conditions.”18 This commitment 
to facilitate the access of developing countries to relevant scien-
tific information, data, training, and technology was reasserted 
in the Helsinki Declaration adopted at the First Meeting of the 
Parties in 1989.19 
financial mechaniSm/multilateral funD 
To address the hesitancy among developing nations to ratify 
the Montreal Protocol due to concerns over resources required 
for compliance and impacts on their development,20 mecha-
nisms were incorporated into the Montreal Protocol to provide 
the financial resources necessary for developing nations to meet 
their shared obligations. The 
dominant feature of the financial 
mechanisms is the Multilateral 
Fund for the Implementation of 
the Montreal Protocol (“Mul-
tilateral Fund”),21 designed to 
cover incremental costs incurred 
by developing countries as a 
result of the phase-out of their 
consumption and production of 
ODSs.22 
Every three years, the Par-
ties to the Montreal Protocol 
determine the budget for the 
Multilateral Fund for a three-
year “triennium,” with contribu-
tions from over forty developed 
nations based on a United 
Nations assessment scale.23 The 
Multilateral Fund is managed by 
an Executive Committee com-
prised of seven industrialized 
nations and seven developing 
countries, which reports annually to the Meeting of the Parties.24 
At the 56th Meeting of the Executive Committee in Doha, Qatar 
in November 2008, the Executive Committee approved 116 proj-
ects and activities for sixty-five countries totaling $57,347,247 
plus $9,956,600 support costs for bilateral and implementing 
agencies.25 
The Multilateral Fund has helped industry in develop-
ing countries replace chemicals and equipment and reorganize 
production processes, effectively stimulating the redesign of 
products.26 The Multilateral Fund has played a pivotal role in 
facilitating the transfer of technology and enhancing capacity 
building and development capabilities, thereby contributing to 
the overall success of the Montreal Protocol.
recognITIon oF The InTerplay beTween  
oDss anD clImaTe change
The Montreal Protocol has already significantly benefited 
international climate change mitigation. It is estimated that the 
phase-out of chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCs”) and other ODSs will 
The Montreal Protocol’s 
continued condoning of 
the use of high-GWP 
HFCs conflicts with its 
precautionary and holistic 
approach to phasing 
out ODSs by creating 
altogether different, but no 
less dire, environmental 
consequences.
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have reduced GHG emissions by 135 Gt. of CO2-eq. between 
1990 and 2010.27 Both the text of the Montreal Protocol and sub-
sequent decisions by the Parties make clear that the phase-out 
of ODSs should not occur in a vacuum; rather, relevant scien-
tific information and environmental impacts, including climatic 
effects, should be considered. The Parties supported this concept 
by adopting Decision V/8 in 1993,28 requiring Parties to con-
sider ODS substitutes in light of their environmental impacts. 
The following year, the Parties further expanded their mandate 
to consider environmental impacts other than ozone depletion 
by adopting Decision VI/13.29 
That requires the TEAP to “con-
sider how available alternatives 
compare with hydrochloro-
fluorocarbons (“HCFCs”), with 
respect to such factors as energy 
efficiency, total global warming 
impact, potential flammability, 
and toxicity.”30
The interplay between the 
phase-out of ODSs and climate 
change was again explicitly 
recognized at the Tenth Meet-
ing of the Parties in 1998 when 
forty Parties issued a statement 
making it clear that climate 
impacts should be considered in 
the work of the Montreal Proto-
col. The Parties stated that there 
are “scientific indications that 
global warming could delay the 
recovery of the ozone layer” and 
“environmentally sound alternative substances and technologies 
are available for virtually all HCFC applications.”31 The Parties 
urged:
all Parties of the Montreal Protocol to consider all ODS 
replacement technologies, taking into account their 
total global-warming potential, so that use of alterna-
tives with a high contribution to global warming should 
be discouraged where other, more environmentally 
friendly, safe and technically and economically feasible 
alternatives or technologies are available.32 
The Montreal Protocol’s contribution to climate change and 
the high GWP of many ODSs and their substitutes are widely 
recognized.33 As a result, in 2007, the Parties decided to accel-
erate substantially the phase-out of HCFCs, primarily due their 
emissions contribution to global climate change.34 It is esti-
mated that the more rapid phase-out of HCFCs will result in the 
following:
	 •	 A	reduction	of	potential	emissions	of	HCFCs	by	approxi-
mately forty-seven percent from what would have been 
emitted if the accelerated phase-out had not been adopted, 
avoiding the emission of nearly one million tons of ODSs; and
	 •	 A	 transition	 to	 low-GWP	substitutes	 for	HCFCs	 that	 are	
currently commercially available and under development, 
avoiding between 3 and 16 Gt. of CO2-eq. emissions into 
the atmosphere.35
The role of the Montreal Protocol in controlling GHGs was 
explicitly affirmed in the 2007 G8 Summit Declaration, which 
pledged: “We will also endeavor under the Montreal Protocol 
to ensure the recovery of the ozone layer by accelerating the 
phase-out of HCFCs in a way that supports energy efficiency 
and climate change objectives.”36 Following the historic agree-
ment to accelerate the phase-out of HCFCs, the Leaders Meeting 
of Major Economies on Energy Security and Climate Change 
reaffirmed their commitment to 
helping the climate by declaring 
on July 9, 2008: “[R]ecognizing 
the need for urgent action . . . 
we commit to . . . actions under 
the Montreal Protocol on Sub-
stances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer for the benefit of the 
global climate system.”37 The 
explicit focus on climate ben-
efits and energy efficiency, in 
addition to ozone benefits, when 
assessing the overall impacts 
of ODS substitutes and other 
strategies adopted by the Mon-
treal Protocol, is consistent with 
the Montreal Protocol’s history 
of basing actions on sound sci-
ence and objective technical 
assessments.
At the Twentieth Meet-
ing of the Parties in November 
2008, the impact on the global climate of ODS substitutes was 
recognized in Decisions XX/7 and XX/8, which began the pro-
cess of evaluating the management and destruction of Banks 
and the availability and feasibility of low-GWP alternatives to 
ODSs.38 
preempTIve acTIon encouragIng The use oF 
low-gwp alTernaTIves To oDss wIll have 
sIgnIFIcanT clImaTe beneFITs
The timing is right for the Parties to control the use of high-
GWP HFCs as ODS substitutes, even if these substitutes are 
not ODSs themselves, as the commercialization of high-GWP 
HFCs is the direct result of the Montreal Protocol’s phase-out of 
ODSs. The UN Conference on Environment and Development 
calls on the Parties to “[r]eplace CFCs and other ozone depleting 
substances, consistent with the Montreal Protocol, recognizing 
that a replacement’s suitability should be evaluated holistically 
and not simply on its contribution to solving one atmospheric 
or environmental problem.”39 The Montreal Protocol’s contin-
ued condoning of the use of high-GWP HFCs conflicts with its 
precautionary and holistic approach to phasing out ODSs by cre-
ating altogether different, but no less dire, environmental con-
sequences. This is particularly true where substitutes for ODSs 
The regulation and  
phase-out of high-GWP 
HFCs under the Montreal 
Protocol would ensure 
a more comprehensive 
approach by all significant 
producers and users  
of HFCs on an  
equitable basis.
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with low-GWP, including carbon dioxide (GWP = 1), hydrocar-
bon and hydrocarbon blends (GWP < 3), and HFC-152a (GWP 
= 140) are all technically- and economically-feasible replace-
ments for high-GWP HFCs currently used in both automotive 
and stationary air conditioning and refrigeration units.40
The Montreal Protocol has historically regulated refriger-
ants, foam-blowing agents, aerosols, firefighting chemicals, 
specialty medical chemicals, and a limited number of other 
chemicals that deplete the ozone layer. As a result, the Parties 
have acquired an in-depth understanding of these industries and 
the uses of ODSs. HFCs are now being used as replacements for 
ODSs in the same sectors41 or are being created as by-products 
of the production of these ODSs.42 Therefore, regulating HFCs 
would be a logical extension of the Montreal Protocol’s mandate 
and consistent with its holistic approach to sectors interacting 
with and affected by the phase-out of ODSs.
Decision XX/8, adopted in November 2008, requested that 
the TEAP report on the status of alternatives to HCFCs and 
HFCs include a description of the various use patterns, costs, 
and potential market penetration of alternatives.43 The results of 
the TEAP’s investigation are going to be presented at a work-
shop before the next Open-Ended Working Group Meeting in 
Geneva, Switzerland in July 2009.44 The meeting will address 
technical and policy issues related to ODS alternatives, with a 
particular focus on how the Montreal Protocol can address the 
impact of high-GWP HFCs while maximizing the ozone and cli-
mate benefits of the early phase-out of HCFCs.45 The UNFCCC 
has been invited to participate, as HFCs are within the “basket” 
of GHGs being controlled by the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Pro-
tocol. It is anticipated that the results of the investigation and 
workshop will lead to concrete measures to encourage the use of 
low-GWP substitutes for ODSs. 
Unless the use of high-GWP HFCs is promptly curtailed 
globally, their rapid emergence as the primary substitutes for 
HCFCs and other ODSs could significantly negate the cli-
mate mitigation benefits achieved by the historic phasing-out 
of ODSs, offsetting reductions of other GHG emissions under 
the Kyoto Protocol. Absent coordinated global action under the 
Montreal Protocol in consultation with the UNFCCC, emissions 
of ODS substitutes will exacerbate the global climate crisis. The 
Montreal Protocol has the technical and funding mechanisms 
in place to implement control measures in order to address the 
prompt phase-out of high-GWP HFCs and demonstrate how 
classes of GHGs within specific sectors can be effectively con-
trolled and eliminated. However, having the phase-out of HFCs 
occur under the Montreal Protocol will require substantial inter-
national support. The control of HFCs by the Montreal Protocol 
would be a model for a UNFCCC sectorial approach to control 
of GHGs after 2012. The Parties must act with urgency once 
again to strengthen and expand the scope of the Montreal Proto-
col by amending it to control high-GWP HFCs before their use 
and production are widespread and the cost to transition to low-
GWP substitutes increases exponentially and becomes poten-
tially prohibitive.
emIssIons From banks pose an ImmeDIaTe 
clImaTe ThreaT
Emissions from Banks threaten to delay the recovery of the 
ozone layer and dramatically impede global efforts to combat 
climate change. While the use and production of many ODSs 
have been drastically reduced over the past two decades, ODS 
Banks still remain in products and machinery throughout the 
world. ODSs in Banks are continuously being released to the 
atmosphere, either through leakage or when ODSs or prod-
ucts containing them are disposed of at the end of their useful 
lives.46 However, the Montreal Protocol defines “consumption” 
as imports plus production minus export, thus excluding the 
regulation of ODSs in Banks from the Montreal Protocol.47 This 
does not include the atmospheric release of ODSs from Banks 
and as a result ODSs have not been regulated by the Montreal 
Protocol to date. Nonetheless, potential solutions exist to rem-
edy this problem. 
bankS can be effectively maintaineD anD 
DeStroyeD 
The mandate for the Montreal Protocol must be immediately 
expanded to implement a comprehensive program to address the 
maintenance and destruction of Banks. The TEAP has estimated 
that the potential cumulative savings if ODSs were recovered 
and destroyed across all sectors would be approximately six 
billion tons of CO2-eq. between 2011 and 2050, noting that a 
sizeable portion of those ODSs would require significant collec-
tion efforts.48  To put this into perspective, this large a release 
of GHGs would offset all of the gains accomplished under the 
Kyoto Protocol.49 If the world’s Banks of ODSs in refrigeration, 
stationary air conditioning, and mobile air conditioning (i.e., 
those that are most easily and cost-effectively recovered) were 
destroyed, it is estimated that the release of approximately 2.8 
Gt. of CO2-eq. would be prevented by 2015.
50 As these emis-
sions are already occurring continuously throughout the world, 
the gains that could be achieved by preventing these “super” 
GHGs from being emitted to the atmosphere are available 
immediately. 
Approximately forty percent of Banks are installed in the 
refrigeration and stationary and mobile air conditioning sectors, 
while the remaining sixty percent are in foams, medical aero-
sols, fire protection, and other sectors.51 Furthermore, Banks are 
continuing to increase as the complete phase-out date for ODSs 
approach52 and the phase-out of HCFCs is being expedited. 
Therefore, Banks will become an increasing problem in the near 
future.
The Montreal Protocol and the Parties to it have recognized 
the risk to both the ozone layer and global climate from emis-
sions from Banks. As a result, the scope of the problem and the 
destruction options and their associated costs have been evalu-
ated for many years.53  
In November 2008, at the Twentieth Meeting of the Parties, 
the Parties took the first concrete steps to manage and destroy 
Banks. In Decision XX/7,54 the Parties agreed to a broad range 
of actions to evaluate the management and destruction of Banks, 
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including: (1) evaluating ways to mitigate emissions of ODS 
from Banks through the Montreal Protocol or by national and/
or regional legislative strategies; (2) authorizing pilot projects to 
evaluate collection, transport, storage, and destruction of ODSs 
to generate data on how these measures will protect the ozone 
layer and achieve climate benefits; and (3) evaluating and adopt-
ing best practices and performance standards to prevent emis-
sions from Banks, whether by recovery, recycling, reclamation, 
reuse as feedstock, or destruction.55 The Parties also commis-
sioned the TEAP to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of destroying 
banks of ODSs versus recycling, reclaiming, and reusing such 
substances, taking into consideration the relative economic costs 
and environmental benefits to the ozone layer and climate.56 
Additionally, recognizing that financial constraints limiting the 
ability to manage and destroy Banks are going to be the decisive 
factor as to whether emissions from Banks can be effectively 
destroyed, the Parties scheduled a meeting of experts from fund-
ing institutions, such as the UNFCCC, the Global Environment 
Facility, the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mecha-
nism, and the World Bank, to assess possible funding oppor-
tunities before the next meeting of the Open-Ended Working 
Group.57
Twelve technologies have been approved to date under the 
Montreal Protocol for the destruction of CFCs and halons.58 In 
developed countries, different technologies are in use for CFC 
destruction on a commercial basis. For instance, in Japan, more 
than ten technologies were being used in approximately eighty-
two ODS destruction plants in operation as of 2006.59 Commer-
cial ODS destruction facilities using technologies approved by 
the TEAP are in operation in twenty countries worldwide.60 ICF 
estimates that ODS destruction capacities range roughly from 
forty to six hundred metric tons per year.61 The cost to destroy 
ODS at these facilities varies by country, technology, capacity, 
and ODS type. Overall, it was estimated that ODS destruction 
costs range between two and thirteen dollars per kilogram, with 
an average of about seven dollars per kilogram.62 The pilot stud-
ies approved by the Montreal Protocol and a similar study being 
undertaken by the World Bank63 are intended to determine what 
technologies work best for which ODSs, to identify ODSs that 
are actually recoverable, to devise a plan to address ODSs in 
Article 5 countries, to ascertain the recovery costs for different 
ODSs, and to suggest methodologies for validation and verifi-
cation of the destruction of ODSs. These findings can then be 
incorporated into international carbon off-set regimes.
Tackling the destruction of Banks will require a multi-fac-
eted approach. In non-Article 5 countries, feasible regulatory 
approaches include requiring producer/retailers to collect and 
destroy ODSs, providing incentives for ODS destruction, and 
creating industry-lead programs for this purpose.64 Most non-
Article 5 countries have available infrastructure and facilities 
to destroy ODSs effectively in a validated and verifiable man-
ner.65 In Article 5 countries, however, there will be a need for 
financial and technology transfers to store and maintain existing 
Banks, create destruction facilities, and transport ODSs to exist-
ing facilities for destruction, all activities consistent with those 
traditionally occurring through the Multilateral Fund. Infrastruc-
ture building and personnel training in these countries will also 
be necessary so that the ODS destruction can be validated and 
verified.
funDing the DeStruction of bankS
To encourage and finance the destruction of Banks in the 
short available time frame, funding the Multilateral Fund at tra-
ditional levels will not be adequate. One way to generate addi-
tional funding would be to tap into the funding from Global 
Environment Facility (“GEF”)66 and the carbon trading systems 
(e.g., the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”), Chicago 
Climate Exchange (“CCX”), and Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (“RGGI”)). As of September 2008, the CCX is the 
only carbon-trading platform that has an established protocol 
for generating credits for the destruction of ODSs.67 The CCX 
has developed a protocol to measure and verify GHG emission 
reductions resulting from the destruction of ODSs.68 
Currently, the destruction of ODSs has not been approved as 
an acceptable offset project under the CDM and therefore cannot 
generate Certified Emissions Reductions (“CERs”) under the 
Kyoto Protocol. Under current CDM rules, however, an inter-
national body such as the Montreal Protocol can apply to gener-
ate CERs by coordinating a Program of Activities comprised of 
numerous CDM programs. By applying and taking control of 
ODS destruction programs, the Montreal Protocol could issue 
CERs and generate significant funds for the Multilateral Fund 
to distribute to Article 5 countries to ensure the expeditious and 
controlled destruction of Banks. If the Montreal Protocol takes 
on the phase-out of high-GWP HFCs, this could generate rev-
enues not only to fund the phase-out and destruction of Banks 
but also of HFCs as well.69
Obtaining funding from the various carbon trading platforms 
would result in substantial revenues that could be used to facili-
tate widespread and rapid Banks destruction. However, allowing 
the destruction of ODS Banks into the carbon trading system has 
to be structured carefully to maintain the stability of the markets, 
ensure that the ODSs destruction results in real climate impact, 
and prevent the increased production of ODSs or high-GWP 
substitutes simply to profit from the carbon market. Due to the 
extremely high GWP of many ODSs, the destruction of small 
volumes of ODSs can result in the potential issuance of very 
large numbers of CERs. For example, the most common CFCs 
in reachable refrigeration and air-conditioning are CFC-11 and 
CFC-12 which have GWPs of 5000 and 8500, respectively.70 
Therefore, destruction of one ton of these substances would 
result in the generation of thousands of CERs.  It was estimated 
that there were 218,318 tons of CFCs in refrigeration and air 
conditioning banks in 2002.71  Destruction of a fraction of these 
CFC banks and the resultant issuance of CERs could signifi-
cantly destabilize the carbon markets and divert funding from 
other projects that reduce the emissions of other GHGs or to pre-
vent deforestation. These problems could be avoided by having 
the CERs issued for ODS destruction controlled by the Mon-
treal Protocol and having the number of CERs issued correspond 
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to the actual cost of destroying the Banks. By tying the CERs 
issued to the actual cost of destruction, the Multilateral Fund 
would have the sales proceeds from the CERs to promote quick 
and comprehensive Banks destruction. This would not create a 
disproportionate number of CERs or destabilize the carbon mar-
kets; rather, it would ensure that the CERs issued were directly 
tied to the climate benefit achieved.
Destruction of only banned ODS Banks should initially be 
eligible for CERs in order to prevent the creation of a perverse 
incentive to produce more ODSs with high GWP simply for the 
value of the CERs. This prob-
lem has already been identified 
arising from the production of 
HCFC-22 (GWP = 178072), 
used widely in window unit air 
conditioners and small refrig-
erators, which produce HFC-23 
(GWP = 14,31073) as a byprod-
uct. CERs can be earned for the 
destruction of HCF-23 through 
the CDM. However, as the cost 
of destroying HFC-23 is very 
low, approximately $0.20 per 
ton of CO2-eq.,
74 and the price 
of CERs is typically between 
$5 and $15 per metric ton of 
CO2 -eq. reduction,
75 huge prof-
its could be made from HFC-23 
destruction. It has been calcu-
lated that the cost of the direct 
installation of equipment to 
destroy HFC-23 would only be 
$100 million compared to $6 
billion worth of CERs that have 
been issued.76 The CERs for the 
destruction of HFC-23 are suf-
ficiently profitable that industry 
observers have suggested that new HCFC-22 production facili-
ties can be financed on the expected profits from the CERs from 
the HFC-23 destruction alone.77 
Bank destruction can be incorporated into the carbon mar-
kets without creating such perverse incentives by limiting the 
issuance of CERs to ODSs that are banned. It will be important 
to also ensure that funding is available to investigate and prevent 
illegal production of banned ODSs given the sizeable profits that 
can be made if CERs are given for their destruction.
coorDInaTIon oF regulaTIon oF hFcs unDer 
The monTreal proTocol wITh The unFccc
HFCs are in the “basket” of gases regulated by the UNFC-
CC’s Kyoto Protocol.78 The current regulation of HFC emissions 
under the UNFCCC should not impede complementary regula-
tion under the Montreal Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol requires 
industrialized countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol to 
cut their GHG emissions by an average of 5.2% from the 1990 
level by the year 2012.79 The Kyoto Protocol has currently been 
ratified by 118 countries, including 32 industrialized countries, 
collectively representing only 44.2% of 1990 emissions.80 Con-
versely, all the major ODS and HFC-producing and consuming 
countries have ratified the Montreal Protocol, which has the 
ability to impose phase-out requirements on all of these Parties. 
Therefore, at this stage, the regulation and phase-out of high-
GWP HFCs under the Montreal Protocol would ensure a more 
comprehensive approach by all significant producers and users 
of HFCs on an equitable basis, thereby substantially reducing 
the likelihood of illegal trade in 
HFCs by creating an even eco-
nomic playing field as a result of 
the global regulation of HFCs.
In international law, suc-
cessive treaties on the same sub-
ject matter are commonplace, as 
recognized by the Vienna Con-
vention.81 International law prin-
ciples allow a treaty that covers 
the subject matter of an historic 
treaty to be entered into force, 
subject to established rules of 
interpretation.82 To the extent 
the successive treaties are com-
patible, the provisions of both 
treaties are enforceable. When 
they are incompatible and where 
the subject matter and parties 
to the treaties are the same, the 
language of the later treaty or the 
more specific treaty generally 
controls.83 
The Parties to the Montreal 
Protocol have the expertise to 
regulate high-GWP HFCs by 
controlling and phasing out their 
production and consumption. This is compatible with and com-
plementary to the UNFCCC’s regulation of emissions of HFCs. 
The technical expertise, mechanism for technology transfer, 
and Multilateral Fund to assist developing countries make the 
Montreal Protocol uniquely suited to control and phase out high-
GWP HFCs. The Montreal Protocol HFC phase-out would act 
as a mechanism for developed countries in UNFCCC to achieve 
deep emissions cuts and act as a technology transfer mechanism 
to help developing countries reduce their GHG emissions in a 
measurable, reportable, and verifiable manner. As the UNFCCC 
negotiates to extend efforts to control GHGs past 2012, it can 
work in collaboration with the Montreal Protocol to use an HFC 
phase-out as a tool for Parties to meet strong emissions reduc-
tion targets and to ensure that high-GWP HFCs are not need-
lessly substituted for ODSs in developing countries.
The UNFCCC’s Bali Action Plan84 makes it clear that the 
post-2012 climate framework will emphasize technology trans-
fer for developing countries and sectorial emissions reduction 
A successful collaborative 
effort between the 
UNFCCC and Montreal 
Protocols could alleviate 
some of the tensions 
in the current climate 
negotiations. The 
Montreal Protocol has 
demonstrated effective 
technology transfer and 
funding mechanisms for 
developing countries.
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approaches. Recent submissions by developing countries con-
cerning mechanisms for technology transfers have included 
the creation of technology assessment panels and encouraged 
capacity building to enable these countries to address GHGs 
effectively. These techniques have already been deployed by the 
Montreal Protocol; therefore, a phase-out of high-GWP HFCs 
under the Montreal Protocol would serve as a model to demon-
strate that these techniques can be usefully applied to control 
other GHGs.
A successful collaborative 
effort between the UNFCCC 
and Montreal Protocols could 
alleviate some of the tensions in 
the current climate negotiations. 
The Montreal Protocol has dem-
onstrated effective technology 
transfer and funding mecha-
nisms for developing countries. 
If applied to HFCs under the 
post-Kyoto Protocol regime, 
this could build trust between 
developed and developing coun-
tries within UNFCCC negotia-
tions and instill confidence that 
reductions in all GHGs would 
occur in an equitable manner, without disproportionately disad-
vantaging the economies of the developing countries.
acTIons neeDeD To aDDress hIgh-gwp  
hFcs anD banks
Decision to Add HFCs as a Class of Chemicals Regulated 
and Phased-Out Under the Montreal Protocol, Including a Pledge 
Not to Use High-GWP HFCs Where More Environmentally Suit-
able Alternative Substances or Technologies Are Available
To date, the Montreal Protocol has only regulated sub-
stances that directly deplete the ozone layer. However, the lan-
guage of the Montreal Protocol does not so limit its authority, 
and the Parties should amend the Montreal Protocol to expand 
its mission to include combating climate change associated with 
ODSs and their substitutes.85 Simple amendments would allow 
the Parties to ensure that the phase-out of ODSs is accomplished 
without exacerbating climate change.86 The need for the Mon-
treal Protocol to continue its work to find low-GWP substitutes 
for ODSs is particularly apparent with the projected massive 
increase in the use of high-GWP HFCs as the result of the phase-
out of the ODSs. The objectives of the Montreal Protocol will 
not be achieved until ODSs have been replaced by substances 
with minimal adverse impacts to the global environment.  
An amendment of the Montreal Protocol specifically to 
combat climate change caused by high-GWP HFCs, even though 
they are not ODSs, is consistent with international law princi-
ples for treaty interpretation. The first place to look for the intent 
and scope of a treaty is the text itself, including the Preamble.87 
When the Montreal Protocol was adopted, the Parties included 
in the Preamble both the concept that they were “[c]onscious 
of the potential climatic effects of” ODSs and that they were 
“[d]etermined to protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary 
measures to control equitably total emissions of [ODSs] . . . on 
the basis of developments in scientific knowledge.”88 The text 
has to be interpreted in the context of all of the decisions made 
and actions taken by the Parties under the Montreal Protocol.89 
These actions include all of the decisions cited above,90 where 
the climatic effects of ODSs have been recognized and where 
the reduction and phase-out of 
ODSs have been required to be 
viewed in the context of broader 
environmental consequences, 
including the environmental 
impacts of ODS substitutes, and 
the latest scientific and tech-
nological knowledge. These 
actions also include all of the 
work performed to evaluate the 
non-ozone implications of the 
phase-out of ODSs.91
Expand the Montreal Pro-
tocol’s Mandate to Control 
Management and Destruction 
of Banks
Developing countries want 
predictable and sustained financing if they are going to be obli-
gated to maintain and destroy Banks. The Montreal Protocol ties 
financial assistance to specific goals and projects.92 The Mon-
treal Protocol’s Multilateral Fund is one of the mechanisms that 
has created good relations between developed and developing 
countries as they have worked to phase out ODSs. By keeping 
HFCs within the “basket” of GHGs regulated by the UNFCCC, 
funding for the phase-out of high-GWP HFCs under the Mon-
treal Protocol could become available through the funding 
mechanisms created by or in conjunction with the UNFCCC to 
defray some or all of the costs of the phase-out. Financing from 
the funding mechanisms currently being negotiated within the 
UNFCCC climate talks, as well as approving the destruction of 
ODSs to generate CERs, could create substantial new sources 
of funding for the Montreal Protocol to take on this important 
work. A phase-out of high-GWP HFCs would again act as a 
model to demonstrate the efficacy of certain aspects of its finan-
cial mechanisms. 
conclusIon
Some of the recent reductions in ODS use have been 
achieved by unnecessarily replacing ODSs with high-GWP 
HFCs. It is now well-established that high-GWP HFCs are add-
ing to the global climate crisis. Likewise, to date, the Montreal 
Protocol has focused on regulation of production and consump-
tion of ODSs and has not regulated the management or destruc-
tion of Banks. The objectives of the Montreal Protocol obligate 
the Parties to complete the task of restoring the ozone layer 
without exacerbating the global climate crisis. The Parties can 
accomplish this by: (1) committing not to use high-GWP HFCs 
The objectives of the 
Montreal Protocol obligate 
the Parties to complete the 
task of restoring the ozone 
layer without exacerbating 
the global climate crisis.  
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as substitutes for ODSs if other more environmentally-suitable 
alternative substances or technologies are available; (2) amend-
ing the Montreal Protocol to make clear that the protection of the 
ozone layer is not going to be accomplished through measures 
that exacerbate the global climate crisis by (a) actively phasing 
out the production and consumption of high-GWP substitutes 
and providing financial incentives for the use of low-GWP sub-
stitutes for ODSs, and (b) expanding the mandate of the Mon-
treal Protocol to include the management and destruction of 
Banks; and (3) coordinating with the UNFCCC to (a) have the 
phase-out of high-GWP HFCs serve as a case study for effec-
tive technology transfer and funding mechanisms that can be 
incorporated into post-Kyoto institutions for other GHGs and (b) 
develop effective funding mechanisms for Banks management 
and destruction.
The climate crisis can be effectively combated if it is dis-
aggregated into smaller, manageable components where the 
strengths of international, regional, and national organizations 
and entities can be brought to bear. The Montreal Protocol has 
the unique capacity to regulate and promote the phase-out of 
high-GWP HFCs used as ODS substitutes and to manage and 
destroy Banks. Both the transition to the use of high-GWP HFCs 
and the emissions from Banks are occurring as of the writing of 
this article, and the opportunity to control both of these serious 
threats to the global environment is time limited. The Montreal 
Protocol must be amended promptly to meet these urgent global 
challenges.
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on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, London, Eng., June 27–29, 1990, 
Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Sub-
stances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Annex I, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3 (June 29, 
1990), available at http://www.unep.ch/ozone/2mlonfin.shtml. In 1995, the Par-
ties adopted a decision enabling developing countries to export ODSs to other 
developing countries. See Seventh Report, supra note 13, at Decision VII/9.
18  See Montreal Protocol, supra note 8, art. 10A.
19  See First Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer, Helsinki, Fin., May 2–5, 1989, Report of the First Meet-
ing of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, Appendix I (Helsinki Declaration on the Protection of the Ozone Layer), 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5 (May 6, 1989), available at http://ozone.unep.org/Publications/
MP_Handbook/Section_3.8_Annexes_Declarations/Helsinki_Declaration.shtml.
Endnotes:  The Montreal Protocol Must Act to Prevent Global 
Climate Change While Restoring the Ozone Later
Endnotes: The Montreal Protocol Must Act to Prevent Global 
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cleaning up the problem of  
poSt-combuStion coal waSte
by Amanda King*
* Amanda King is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University, Washing-
ton College of Law.
When a dike at the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (“TVA”) Kingston Fossil Plant failed on December 22, 2008, 5.4 million cubic yards of coal ash spilled,1 
covering an area forty-eight times larger than the 1989 Exxon 
Valdez oil spill.2 Families in the East Tennessee area filed a 
lawsuit against TVA for medical monitoring, testing, treatment 
and procedures, and environmental monitoring and clean-up 
costs, alleging TVA knew the coal ash containment pond was 
in danger of releasing the coal waste and had already failed on 
prior occasions.3 While much of the recent focus on “clean coal 
technology” has been on lowering the greenhouse gas emissions 
from coal power plants,4 the recent coal ash disaster in Tennes-
see has shifted attention to the environmental impacts of coal 
combustion waste. Unlike the capture and sequester technology 
for reducing global warming emissions from coal fired power 
plants, which currently is far from achieving any significant 
impact,5 clean technology for coal waste disposal can achieve a 
large impact today, but only if our regulatory structure encour-
ages it. By classifying coal waste as a hazardous waste and cre-
ating stricter standards for disposal sites, we can prevent future 
coal waste environmental disasters. 
Coal waste is typically disposed of in surface impoundments, 
minefills, landfills, and recycled into other products. Although 
there has been a recent trend away from disposal of coal wastes 
in surface impoundments and towards landfills,6 according to an 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) estimate as many as 
three hundred sites still use surface impoundments.7 Unlike a 
landfill, which only holds dry wastes, a surface impoundment 
is an uncovered area of hollowed land, made of mainly earthen 
material, which holds liquid wastes.8 Under Subtitle C of the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), surface 
impoundments must have a double liner system to prevent the 
liquid waste from leaching through the ground to local water 
supplies.9 Due to an exemption in Subtitle C, coal waste is not 
currently regulated as a hazardous waste, and the regulation of 
coal waste surface impoundments is left to the states.10 
Although EPA concluded in a 2000 report that coal waste 
disposal in surface impoundments, underground mines, and 
landfills should be regulated under Subtitle C as a hazardous 
waste, EPA reversed its recommendation just a few weeks 
later.11 In the second regulatory determination, EPA stated that 
some regulation of coal wastes under RCRA would be neces-
sary to protect human health, but did not state whether Subtitle 
C regulation was required.12 Post combustion coal waste is a 
threat to human health because it contains numerous chemicals 
including aluminum, arsenic, boron, cadmium, chromium, lead, 
manganese, molybdenum, selenium, and sulfate, which can 
cause health problems such as cancer, birth defects, and cen-
tral nervous system damage.13 Furthermore, with stricter toxics 
emissions standards for coal-fired power plants, the waste will 
contain increased levels of arsenic, thallium, boron, barrium, and 
other harmful chemicals.14 Although clean technology to reduce 
emissions will help the environment, new emissions technology 
will make regulating coal waste disposal more important as coal 
waste becomes dirtier and more toxic. 
On March 9, 2009, EPA announced that it planned to pro-
pose regulations for coal waste by the end of the year.15 However, 
EPA was silent on whether the regulation would be under Sub-
title C as a hazardous waste or under Subtitle D’s less stringent 
standards.16 Subtitle C hazardous waste regulations differ from 
Subtitle D in that, under Subtitle C, the federal government is 
authorized to do the permitting for the hazardous waste sites and 
has set specific standards.17 Because design criteria of coal waste 
surface impoundments is not regulated at all under either Sub-
title C or Subtitle D, the regulation of landfills provides insight 
into the difference between the two types of regulations. Under 
the Subtitle C requirements, landfills must have multiple liners, 
be made of materials chemically resistant to the waste, and have 
a system in between liners for collection and removal of liquid 
leaching from the landfill.18 In contrast, for Subtitle D landfills 
EPA specifies only minimum standards, including a composite 
liner with two components, and gives states the authority to issue 
landfill permits and set more specific standards.19 
Of the fifteen states that create nearly three-quarters of all 
the coal combustion waste in the United States, only one requires 
liners for surface impoundments and only three require liners for 
landfills for coal waste.20 Although regulating coal waste under 
Subtitle D could help by creating minimum standards for surface 
impoundments, based on current regulation of coal waste by the 
states it is unlikely many would require high enough standards. 
Coal waste must be recognized and regulated for what it is—a 
hazardous waste. Regulation of coal waste under Subtitle C 
and use of currently available technology to contain coal waste 
are needed to reduce environmental contamination and prevent 
future disasters.
Endnotes: Cleaning Up the Problem of Post Combustion Coal Waste
 continued on page 68
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diffusion are considered and a range of mechanisms to improve 
technology transfer are proposed.
FacTors resTrIcTIng Technology TransFer
Despite clear recognition of the benefits technology diffu-
sion offers to mitigate climate change, not enough has been done 
to advance that role. There are various factors acting as barriers 
to efficient and useful technology transfer from advanced and 
developed countries to recipient developing countries.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) 
has listed high capital costs, limited access to capital, poor access 
to information, institutional and administrative difficulties in 
developing technology transfer contracts, lack of infrastruc-
ture to absorb riskier technologies, absence of economic incen-
tives, and intellectual property rights as hurdles for technology 
InTroDucTIon
It is generally agreed upon that an efficient diffusion and deployment of technology has the potential to mitigate the adverse impacts of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions and 
to reduce emissions.1 If developing countries were able to use 
available technologies to reduce their energy consumption by 
twenty percent, the currently projected increase between 2000 
and 2020 in carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emissions from develop-
ing countries could be cut by almost half.2 Although the role of 
technology transfer in reducing emissions is widely recognized, 
effective wide-scale transfer has been hindered by a number of 
factors, including international property rights regimes. 
Transfer of technology in the international context com-
monly refers to sale or licensing of intellectual property, but 
the term includes any process by which users in one country 
gain access to and utilize technology developed in another 
country.3 The term technology implies any practical applica-
tion of knowledge in a particular area,4 but it is usually associ-
ated with machines and related infrastructure, and technology 
is often discussed in this constricted sense. This narrow view 
combined with developing countries’ large-scale import of 
knowledge based machinery, products, and process licenses 
creates the perception of developing countries as “technol-
ogy users” and “passive recipients” of developed country 
technologies.5
In a globalized world, technology may be transferred 
from developed countries to developing or between develop-
ing countries, based on cost or other considerations, even if 
similar technology is locally available. Hence, using a foreign 
source of technology does not necessarily mean a “transfer of 
technology” has occurred. An analysis of the sixty-three Clean 
Development Mechanism (“CDM”)6 projects that were regis-
tered on January 1, 2006 offers a picture of the current state of 
technology transfer.7 Of the twenty-nine overall CDM projects 
that involved foreign technology, the largest number (twelve) 
were in hydropower, and the technology for them came from all 
over the world, including several developing countries like Bra-
zil, China, India, Panama, Peru, and Sri Lanka.8 Technology for 
hydropower is fairly standardized and the use of a foreign source 
of technology in many CDM projects may not mean that transfer 
of high value technology was involved. 
This paper provides an overview of barriers to technol-
ogy transfer and specifically examines problems posed by both 
strong and weak international property rights (“IPR”) regimes. 
Whether and how IPR regimes act as limiting factor in effective 
clean technology tranSfer anD  
intellectual property rightS
by Nitya Nanda & Nidhi Srivastava*
* Nitya Nanda is a Fellow and Nidhi Srivastava is a Research Associate with 
the Centre for Global Agreements, Legislation and Trade at The Energy and 
Resources Institute (TERI), New Delhi. This paper draws heavily from the work 
done under the project titled “Building an Energy Secure Future for India through 
a Multistakeholder Dialogue Process” supported by the Nand and Jeet Khemka 
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Technology
Number  
of 
projects
Emission 
reduction
[Ton of  
CO2-eq]
Share of 
total  
emission 
reduction 
[%]
Biogas 6 387,591 1.4
Biomass 10 302,735 1.1
Energy 
efficiency 1 6,580 0.0
Fuel switch 1 19,438 0.1
HFC-23 
destruction 3 8,233,566 28.9
Hydropower 22 775,471 2.7
Landfill gas 10 2,712,395 9.5
Methane capture 3 410,378 1.4
N2O destruction 2 15,111,165 53.0
Wind energy 5 573,013 2.0
Total 63 28,532,332 100
Figure 1. Emission Reductions by Technology in the 63 Registered 
CDM Projects.9
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transfer.10 Causes may vary not only from country to country, 
but technology to technology as well. 
Both developed and developing countries accept that transfer 
of technology has been slow and ineffective, but they attribute it 
to different causes. The Institute for Global Environmental Strat-
egies (“IGES”), in Asian Aspirations for Climate Change beyond 
2021, has highlighted the contrasting perspectives of developed 
and developing countries with regard to technology transfer.11 
The developed countries hold lack of robust legal mechanisms 
and domestic institutions in developing countries responsible.12 
Since most of the CDM technologies are developed and owned 
by a few private companies, developed countries cite the need 
for friendly domestic policies, institutions, and strong intellec-
tual property rights protection in developing countries to encour-
age technology diffusion.13 
On the contrary, from the perspective of developing coun-
tries, the failure of developed countries to meet their obliga-
tions under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(“UNFCCC”), and their lack of awareness and willingness to 
do so, are cited as primary reasons for inadequate technology 
transfer.14 Other reasons often cited are the lack of programs and 
initiatives at the government level, as well as high capital and 
licensing costs.15
InTellecTual properTy rIghTs (“Ipr”)
Intellectual property is a category of intangible rights pro-
tecting commercially valuable products of human intellect.16 It 
refers to creations of the mind: inventions, literary and artistic 
works, as well as symbols, names, images, and designs used in 
commerce.17 The impact of IPR on technology diffusion is con-
text specific and complex. IPR in the hands of a few has the 
ability to create a monopolistic situation where dissemination of 
knowledge is restricted on account of limited access and higher 
prices for climate friendly technologies. Strongly protected IPR 
held by supplier firms may also prevent users or recipients from 
obtaining access to technologies in order to adapt them to suit 
their own needs and requirements. However, an assurance of 
one’s IPR being protected may encourage the owner to transfer 
his technology to another country. Therefore, a lack of adequate 
protection for IPR in the recipient country can also inhibit trans-
fer of technology.
lack of ipr protection
In its Special Report on Climate Change, the IPCC observes 
that a “major requirement for successful agreement in technol-
ogy transfer is the guarantee of intellectual property rights.”18 
An effective and enforceable IPR law provides an incentive for 
private companies to disseminate or transfer their technology. 
A strong IPR protection may also facilitate transfer of technol-
ogy through increased trade in goods and services, foreign direct 
investment (“FDI”) by private companies, technology licensing, 
and joint ventures.19 IPR protection may result in larger trade 
flows, “albeit mainly for countries with imitative capability” 
involving “substitution of domestic innovation for technology 
produced abroad.”20 
It is generally believed that most developing countries do not 
fully enforce their IPR protection laws.21 Hence, one may hasten 
to conclude that the lack of adequate IPR protection might have 
been a factor inhibiting transfer of technologies. Though much is 
unknown about the actual extent of weakness in the IPR protec-
tion regimes in developing countries by way of comprehensive 
survey, the annual “Special 301” reports, prepared by the Office 
of the U.S. Trade Representative on the adequacy and effective-
ness of IPR protection by U.S. trading partners, can shed some 
light.22 Along with many developing countries, the EU has been 
on the list of countries that infringes on IPR and only recently 
moved off of the list in 2007.23 
It is difficult to infringe on the IPR of a sophisticated 
technology that requires extensive scientific and technical 
knowledge. In some cases, the basic scientific knowledge of 
patented technologies is accessible—what is not available 
is the right to use such knowledge. If developing country 
companies are not using such technologies, they are either 
respecting the patent rights or they are not technologically 
capable of using them.
ipr-baSeD market power
A technology protected by a strong IPR regime is less likely 
to reach a vast number of users in developing countries as there 
may be high licensing costs.24 In some cases, the owner may 
refuse to grant a license altogether, halting the spread of the 
technology. DuPont, for example, refused to grant licenses for 
the production of chlorofluorocarbon substitutes to Korean and 
Indian firms that sought to use the substitutes to meet the phase 
out requirements for ozone depleting substances.25 When a par-
ticular technology is not licensed to other users and the owner 
sells it in the form of products and equipment, a monopoly is 
created. Monopoly production is often inefficient and pushes 
prices even higher.26
In the context of most technologies, especially climate 
change mitigation, gaining access or ownership of the IPR 
is not the sole and sufficient requirement for a successful 
diffusion and deployment of technology. The licensing of a 
technology may have to be accompanied by large investments 
in developing the skills and know-how to incorporate, adapt, 
and develop further the technology obtained. Some experts 
opine that IPR regimes should address factors such as absorp-
tive capacity and tacit knowledge in addition to technology 
access issues.27 The importance of this assertion can be high-
lighted through two examples in India, light-emitting diode 
(“LED”) manufacture and Integrated Gasification Combined 
Cycle (“IGCC”) power plant technology. Without technologi-
cal capacity, IPR ownership would not have improved India’s 
ability to manufacture LEDs.28 Similarly, the main barrier to 
the use of IGCC technology is lack of knowledge about its 
performance with low quality Indian coal, rather than IPR 
ownership.29 
The present IPR regime has a limited scope for improving 
transfer of technology to developing countries in this respect. 
Lynn Mytelka, former director of the United Nations University 
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Institute for New Technologies, suggests that the possibility 
for the transfer of technical assistance and capacity building to 
developing countries in areas capable of meeting local devel-
opment needs and global environmental concerns should be 
enhanced through the patent system itself.30
The stage of commercialization of a technology determines 
the extent to which the developer needs and expects returns.31 
The level of a country’s development is also a determining factor 
for the IPR impact on technology 
transfer. In cases of developed 
and technologically advanced 
countries, strengthening IPR can 
increase innovation and technol-
ogy diffusion. In middle-income 
countries, a stronger IPR regime 
may encourage both domestic 
innovation and technology dif-
fusion through foreign patenting 
and international trade, both of 
which can encourage growth. But 
the beneficial impact of stronger 
IPR protection on domestic inno-
vation and technology diffusion 
can offset the growth-enhancing 
benefits otherwise obtained from 
imitation.32 
Apart from IPR, a range of 
other factors, including the level 
of development, nature of tech-
nology, and technical know-how 
to adapt and develop technolo-
gies, affect transfer of technology. These factors also determine 
the manner in which IPR impacts technology transfer for fight-
ing climate change in developing countries.
aDDressIng Ipr as a challenge
It is difficult to determine the precise impact that IPR has 
on technology transfer, either by way of reduced access or 
increased prices. To do so would require a detailed product-by-
product and country-by-country analysis. There have been many 
suggestions in the recent past to address IPR as a challenge to 
efficient transfer of climate change fighting technologies. Sug-
gestions range from compulsory licensing, to joint ownership, to 
technology acquisition, and knowledge repository funds. Some 
of these are discussed below as possible mechanisms to mitigate 
the negative impact of IPR.
compulSory licenSing
A compulsory license is a statutorily created license that 
allows certain people to pay a royalty and use an invention with-
out the patentee’s permission.33 Ordinarily, compulsory licens-
ing refers to the government authorizing itself to use otherwise 
protected intellectual property without having to obtain the per-
mission or authorization of a patent holder in cases of national 
emergency or for public good.34
An old IPR concept, the term compulsory licensing is not 
explicitly incorporated into the Trade Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) regime of the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”). However, compulsory licensing can be 
read into the provision of TRIPS Agreement on “Other Use [of 
the patented subject matter] Without Authorization of the Right 
Holder.”35 Articles on “Exceptions to Rights of Conferred”36 and 
“Principles,” including reference to measures “needed to prevent 
the abuse of intellectual prop-
erty rights by right holders” and 
“the resort to practices which 
unreasonably restrain trade or 
adversely affect the interna-
tional transfer of technology”37 
also provide reasonable flexibil-
ity for countries to use compul-
sory licensing. Drawing from 
TRIPS and the Doha Develop-
ment Declaration, a compulsory 
license can be granted to meet 
government requirements, over-
come an abuse of patent rights, 
in a national emergency, for 
public non-commercial use, and 
for a technical advance of con-
siderable economic significance 
over the existing patent.38 
Article 31(c) of TRIPS also 
provides that a country can use 
such a measure “to remedy a 
practice determined after judi-
cial or administrative process to be anti-competitive.”39 Hence, 
countries can invoke their competition law where “abuse of 
dominance” is included as one of the anti-competitive practices 
and the source of dominance is an IPR.40
Similarly, Article 40 of TRIPS, dealing with control of anti-
competitive practices in contractual licenses, states that “[n]oth-
ing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying 
in their legislation licensing practices or conditions that may 
in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property 
rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant 
market.”41 Hence, refusal to give license can also be included as 
an anti-competitive practice and may be remedied with compul-
sory licensing.
compulSory licenSing in public health
Rights of the TRIPS member countries to make use of 
compulsory licensing in the interest of public health have been 
explicitly recognized in the Doha Declaration on Public Health. 
In order to make use of compulsory licensing in the CDM con-
text, climate change mitigation must be treated as a public good. 
Here, we briefly examine the issues of compulsory licensing in 
public health and then we will look at clean technology.
The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health clarified the rights of member countries with regard to 
IPR in the hands  
of a few has the 
ability to create a 
monopolistic situation 
where dissemination of 
knowledge is restricted 
on account of limited 
access and higher prices 
for climate friendly 
technologies. 
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the compulsory licensing system by recognizing that each mem-
ber has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to 
determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted.42 
Subsequently, Thailand issued a compulsory license in late 
2006 for five years on Efavirenz, a patented AIDS drug from 
Merck.43 More recently, Brazil issued a compulsory license in 
May of 2007 for the same product.44 However, countries still 
face difficulties with compulsory licensing for pharmaceuticals. 
For example, Brazil came under tremendous pressure from the 
United States—which filed and later withdrew a complaint to 
the WTO—to repeal a law that allowed the government to issue 
a compulsory license when patent holders do not manufacture 
the drug in Brazil. Although Brazil successfully defeated the 
challenge by the United States, 
many smaller countries are not 
able to do so.45
Although some steps have 
been taken in this direction, 
the declaration and the subse-
quent TRIPS amendment have 
left many issues untouched and 
lack guidelines for eligibility 
for compulsory licensing. 
compulSory licenSing in 
clean technologieS
At the UN Climate Change 
Conference in Poznanń in 
December 2008, developing 
countries advocated a paradigm 
shift in the way climate mitiga-
tion technologies are subject 
to intellectual property rights 
protection. Many suggested 
a strategy similar to afford-
able medicines.46 For example, 
India proposed an approach 
analogous to pharmaceuticals: creating a mechanism that would 
ensure that privately owned technologies are available on an 
affordable basis, including through measures to resolve the bar-
riers posed by intellectual property rights and addressing com-
pulsory licensing of patented technologies.47
TRIPS has recognized countries’ freedom to determine for 
themselves what constitutes national emergency for the pur-
poses of compulsory licensing. Although countries have some 
flexibility to determine when and in which cases to make use of 
compulsory licensing, confusion and conflict will likely result 
without guidelines or directives. As mentioned above, to make 
use of the provisions of compulsory licensing, first and foremost 
climate change mitigation has to be treated as a public good. 
Detailed guidelines and specifications to help a country identify 
a technology that can be eligible for issuing of a compulsory 
license are needed. Similarly, an eligibility criterion for coun-
tries should be created because many developing countries lack 
domestic capabilities for production and may not be able to use 
a technology unless there is an amendment in TRIPS in line with 
the one made for pharmaceutical products.48 
Even if compulsory licensing is adopted for climate change 
technologies, it may not alone solve the problem as incremental 
costs for adapting and putting the technology to use in local con-
text may also be high. 
It is not an easy task to accommodate the interests of the 
developer of the technology (and indirectly incentives for fur-
ther research and development) on the one hand and the need to 
address rapid climate change on the other. This balance has to be 
met in a manner that is diplomatic and as minimally politically 
contentious as possible. There have been only few instances 
of compulsory license issuing, and instances of compulsory 
licensing by a national authority 
where the IPR-owner is a foreign 
national or domiciliary are even 
less common.49 It is a very politi-
cal issue.50
other flexibilitieS in the 
exiSting regimeS
In addition to compulsory 
licensing, other measures beyond 
the TRIPS regime, such as coop-
erative research and development 
and technology acquisition funds, 
could be used to reduce the high 
costs resulting from strong IPR 
protection. Creation of a technol-
ogy acquisition fund has been 
proposed within the framework 
of the UNFCCC.51 Such a fund 
could be managed by a multi-
lateral organization or a trust, 
which serves to acquire or buy 
out patented technologies that 
are climate friendly and make 
them available to developing countries in need of technology to 
reduce or mitigate GHG emissions.
Most of the clean technologies are owned by a handful of 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”) countries. The largest environmental corporations in 
the world are from Germany, France, Japan, the United King-
dom, and the United States, who export equipment, technology, 
and services worldwide.52 These large corporations typically 
provide integrated products and services and account for about 
fifty percent of the global market.53 If one considers the mar-
ket for technology only, their share is likely even higher. Within 
specific segments of the environmental industry, a few large 
corporations virtually dominate.54 Three countries—Germany, 
Japan, and the United States—submit about sixty-four percent 
of the patent applications related to environmental technology 
in the European Patent Office.55 A patent buy-out mechanism 
is an option that could avoid the need for compulsory licens-
ing, thereby accounting for the patent owners’ concerns as well. 
The fact that the 
companies holding 
[climate-related] 
technologies are 
powerful companies 
from powerful countries 
makes technology transfer 
difficult for politically 
weaker developing 
countries.
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Endnotes:  Clean Technology Transfer and Intellectual 
Property Rights
It is likely the “most diplomatic alternative” to compulsory 
license.56 
Kevin Outterson, a law professor at Boston University who 
focuses on achieving equitable access to pharmaceuticals while 
still encouraging innovation, has outlined a detailed process for a 
suitable buy-out mechanism.57 He suggests that it may be owned 
or purchased by an intergovernmental organization or a philan-
thropic foundation and should not be limited to any one technol-
ogy or region. To make the provision attractive to developers of 
technology as well, the compensation to be paid in an acquisition 
could be determined by the net present value of expected future 
profits.58 Such a proposal has also been advocated by Mytelka, 
suggesting a knowledge fund as the repository of patents dealing 
with environmentally sound technologies.59
In setting up a technology acquisition or repository fund, 
many details will have to be considered. These may include 
how to gain the knowledge required to work the acquired pat-
ents locally, whether the patents will be in public domain or the 
purchaser would have exclusive rights, what the grounds and 
conditions for transfer will be, what modes of acquisition will 
be used, and how much will be adequate compensation to the 
patent holder.
Another possible mechanism is mandatory price negotia-
tion. This is very common in many countries, both developed 
and developing, in pharmaceutical products.60 Price regulation 
can be imposed even as a competition-remedy measure. Since 
countries are empowered to act under their competition regimes, 
such a mechanism is legally possible. However, for many 
developing countries, it would not be easy to enforce when the 
companies in question are large transnational companies from 
powerful countries. There are very few cases of a country tak-
ing action on a foreign company under competition law, even in 
the developed world. In the developing world such an action is 
almost non-existent.61 
conclusIon
Transfer and diffusion of technology from developed to 
developing countries is happening at a very slow pace. Trans-
fer is even slower in climate-related technologies. The intellec-
tual property rights regime can be an important factor. In the 
developed world, compulsory licensing has often been used to 
make technology readily available. Mandatory price negotia-
tions, as well as price regulations, are also used in some measure 
especially in pharmaceutical products. However, what is legally 
possible is not always practically feasible. The fact that the 
companies holding such technologies are powerful companies 
from powerful countries makes technology transfer difficult for 
politically weaker developing countries. Thus, the economic and 
political factors make it difficult to invoke the basic legal instru-
ments to access these technologies. 
Given this, it appears that a global technology acquisition 
fund is the most promising means to spread these technologies. 
This is, of course, not in lieu of other available instruments, but 
in addition to them. It would be difficult to create such a mecha-
nism given the present global geo-political context. It is often 
said that developed country governments cannot control tech-
nology transfer, as it is private companies, not governments, that 
actually own the technologies. However, the governments may 
be able to pay their companies adequate compensation in order 
to make the technologies available to developing countries. But 
merely making the technologies available may not be enough. 
The use of technologies may be expensive and difficult in devel-
oping countries without the necessary capacity. Generous finan-
cial assistance would also be required, even for deployment of 
technologies that are available at concessional rates. 
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International trade in clean technology is still a nascent market and requires encouragement from multilateral agreements, public-private partnerships, and tax incentives. This article 
will survey various drivers of North-South and North-North 
cleantech trade including the Clean Development Mechanism, 
the Private Financing Advisory Network, and tax incentives, and 
explore potential issues involved in their implementation. 
The Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) aims to incen-
tivize North-South trade of clean technology. A provision of the 
Kyoto Protocol, the CDM allows developed countries to gain car-
bon credits by funding clean technology projects in the develop-
ing world.1 In theory, the CDM lowers the cost of reducing carbon 
emissions for developed countries,2 while stimulating an influx 
of clean technology into developing countries.3 As of 2008, the 
CDM’s 3,296 proposed projects represented $95 billion in potential 
investments.4 However, the money currently invested in approved 
projects does not exceed $5 billion.5 On average, thirty-six percent 
of CDM projects require technology transfer.6 This percentage 
increases dramatically when examining different types of projects.7 
For instance, ninety-two percent of agricultural CDM projects ben-
efit from cleantech trade.8 Based on the amount of money spent 
through CDM and the percentage of projects that encourage clean 
tech trade, the CDM is responsible for roughly $1.8 billion of actual 
clean technology trade.9 If the trends continue, the CDM could 
potentially encourage roughly $34 billion in cleantech trade.10 
In spite of its potential to encourage cleantech trade, the 
destination of CDM financing raises questions about the equi-
table geographic distribution of CDM projects.11 Currently, 
China, India, Brazil, Mexico, and Malaysia account for eighty 
percent of the total number of CDM projects.12 These countries 
also have some of the lowest rates of clean tech transfer,13 which 
indicates that the CDM is increasingly encouraging projects that 
draw from the host country’s domestic technology. As countries 
like China, India, and Brazil internalize clean tech, countries 
financing CDM projects should invest in countries that have less 
advanced technology to increase the rate of clean tech trade. 
Further encouraging clean tech trade is the Private Financing 
Advisory Network (“PFAN”), a public-private partnership that 
finances clean tech projects in countries where clean tech is cur-
rently unavailable.14 PFAN is supported by the Clean Technology 
Initiative, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change’s (“UNFCCC”) Expert Group on Technology Transfer, 
government agencies such as the U.S Agency for International 
Development (“USAID”), and various private companies.15 PFAN 
provides guidance on clean technology projects in the developing 
world, matches investors, and arranges financing directly from 
PFAN members.16 PFAN primarily benefits developers working on 
mid-size projects who would not otherwise have access to financial 
advisory services.17 PFAN’s projects include a twenty-megawatt 
(“MW”) wind farm in Chile, a 9.3 MW geothermal plant in Geor-
gia, and a bio-ethanol plant in the Philippines.18 Over the next three 
years, PFAN will leverage roughly $500,000 in government funds 
to generate $255-550 million in private sector financing for thirty 
to forty-five clean tech projects.19 PFAN is still a small initiative 
compared to the CDM and may not adequately address the need for 
clean tech trade with the developing world. Although the partner-
ship plans to expand over the next few years,20 PFAN’s members 
should invest more money so that as the economies of the develop-
ing world grow, they can grow with clean tech.
Tax incentives largely drive the North-North clean tech trade. 
In the United States both federal and state governments offer indus-
try support, tax incentives, loans, and rebates to encourage the use of 
clean tech.21 For instance, the United States provides tax credits to 
individuals who buy qualified hybrid vehicles,22 which historically 
have been foreign hybrids.23 Additionally, the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act provides tax credits to consumers for the first 
200,000 plug-in electric vehicles sold by a company.24 The credit 
may range from $2,500 to $7,500 depending on the vehicle’s battery 
capacity.25 This tax credit could encourage more North-North clean 
tech trade as Toyota, Mercedes-Benz, and Mitsubishi have announced 
plans to produce plug-in electric vehicles in 2010.26 A problem with 
these tax incentives is that they often complement protectionist poli-
cies.27 Many countries want to foster domestic growth of clean tech 
industries by placing tariffs on imported clean tech.28 Protectionism 
and tax incentives could result in governments encouraging domes-
tic growth in clean tech over international trade because tariffs effec-
tively exclude foreign clean tech from developed markets.29
Although the Clean Development Mechanism, the Private 
Financing Advisory Network, and tax incentives in developed coun-
tries are key components in driving international trade in clean tech-
nology, each driver could be improved to better promote clean tech 
trade. These improvements would include broadening the geographic 
distribution of CDM projects, increasing funding for public-private 
partnerships, and eliminating barriers to trade in clean tech. 
Endnotes: Analysis of Multilateral Agreements continued on page 69
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InTroDucTIon
“Clean tech” developments are widely recognized as critical to the fight against climate change. How-ever, putting climate change rhetoric into action 
has often proven both complex and controversial. One clear 
global necessity is the transformation of energy production from 
a hydrocarbon-based paradigm to one comprised of “clean” 
energy that emits little or no greenhouse gases (“GHGs”). One 
of the most pressing elements of the realization of this transfor-
mation is power production and transmission project funding. 
The burgeoning field of renewable energy finance is rife with 
experimental finance options. 
Although the recently passed 
American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act (“ARRA”) pro-
vides $4.5 billion to update the 
U.S. electricity grid and another 
$16.8 billion for broad energy 
efficiency and renewable energy 
(“RE”) measures,1 the bulk of 
the costs of bringing new energy 
sources online necessitate a 
more sustainable finance struc-
ture. Net metering programs, 
the voluntary U.S. cap-and-
trade market, and, most recently, 
feed-in tariffs, have become central to the debate in finding—
and funding—a way toward a greener energy infrastructure in 
the United States. This Article briefly surveys current finance 
options for RE to supply the main electrical grid and examines 
current U.S. legislative trends aimed at meeting national goals 
in an international context to combat climate change through the 
increased implementation of RE generation and distribution as 
part of a new national “smart grid.” 
The transition to clean energy in the United States has 
inched its way forward through the incremental establishment of 
regulations encouraging state-level Renewable Portfolio Stan-
dards (“RPS”) and tax incentives for RE production. Particu-
larly in light of the Obama administration’s call for a nationwide 
renovation of the energy grid, a clearly-defined and uniform 
finance structure has never been more appropriate or necessary. 
The market for renewable energy was effectively launched in 
1978 by the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act, which man-
dated that utilities purchase energy from “qualifying facilities” 
such as cogeneration plants and small power production plants at 
“avoided cost” rates that were often above market prices.2 Since 
then, state-level legislative development regarding renewable 
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energy production has been widely varied, with some states 
embracing progressive energy programs more than others.3 Per-
haps as a consequence of the somewhat scattered and spasmodic 
policy development across the country, implementation methods 
are also diverse, not the least of which are the financial mecha-
nisms that fund RE development. 
While the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPACT2005”)4 
extended existing tax incentives5 to encourage the integration 
of RE production within state-level Renewable Portfolio Stan-
dards, no federal legislation has yet mandated a specific financial 
mechanism to implement clean technology in the energy sec-
tor, leaving states to construct 
their own solutions. However, 
it is widely anticipated that the 
Obama administration will con-
tinue its stated goals to develop 
a national “smart grid”—a 
nationally interconnected net-
work of electricity generation 
and transmission lines, updated 
with the latest digital technol-
ogy for optimal efficiency and 
cost savings. Such a broad new 
regulatory plan would neces-
sarily include finance options 
as a primary consideration, and 
the political trend appears to be moving toward cost allocation 
systems that spread the costs of new electricity generation and 
distribution to ratepayers. However, the specific cost allocation 
structure continues to be a topic ripe for discussion. 
The GHG emissions reduction rhetoric offered over the last 
several years by the Bush administration largely relied on “volun-
tary” market measures that presupposed an inclination of private 
operations to contribute to the implementation of clean technolo-
gies, including RE production. The dearth in domestic imple-
mentation mirrored the disinterest in international involvement in 
forming mandatory regulations. Consequently, the United States 
currently lags behind the rest of the industrialized world in the 
development of RE production. The new direction of the Obama 
administration effectively reverses the position of the federal 
government both internationally and domestically and gives new 
hope to the development of national-level legislation to regulate 
the transition to a clean and modern energy infrastructure. 
The transition to clean 
energy in the United 
States has inched its way 
forward through the 
incremental establishment 
of regulations.
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markeT mechanIsms For u.s. clean Tech 
ImplemenTaTIon
A variety of market mechanisms have been developed over 
the past few decades to encourage green technology through eco-
nomic benefit. Compulsory cap-and-trade programs such as the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme (“EU ETS”) that promote 
the reduction of GHGs through emissions credits have enjoyed 
some success among polluting businesses.6 However, in the 
United States, such options have not yet been made mandatory. 
Despite the popularity of emissions trading worldwide, criticism 
has been directed at the tendency to “shift” the emissions and 
reward the heaviest polluters rather than actually reduce total 
emissions.7 Conversely, proponents argue that the overall reduc-
tions target can be reduced on a set schedule over a period of 
years, effectively creating a positive market mechanism while 
tackling global warming.8 In any case, emissions trading will 
likely continue to be used as a means of reducing GHG emis-
sions in an economically appeal-
ing way for emitters.
In addition to emissions 
trading, which takes a system-
wide approach to reducing over-
all existing emissions, rather 
than directly mandating the 
replacement of GHGs with clean 
energy production, other mecha-
nisms have been developed in an 
attempt to create a more individ-
ual approach to encouraging RE 
generation. Net metering, which was introduced by EPACT2005 
and which requires all public utilities to be offered to consum-
ers upon request, encourages homeowners and small electricity 
generators by providing retail credits for on-site RE generation.9 
Thus, net metering has become recognized as a reliable way to 
reward small-scale RE production. However, the demand for a 
dramatic increase in RE production encourages the creation and 
integration of other clean tech policies.
Another financial mechanism, variations of which have 
been adopted throughout most of the EU and introduced for dis-
cussion throughout the world to boost the installation and trans-
mission of RE, has been the feed-in tariff (“FIT”).10 While there 
are several structural variations, the German model has been 
used to construct other FITs throughout Europe. The German 
model requires utilities to pay a fixed premium price to small 
renewable energy producers and homeowners for the clean 
energy they contribute to the grid. The price is sector-specific 
and based on the cost of production. The FIT policy is credited 
with the dramatic growth in renewable energy resources in Ger-
many, which is now the world’s largest market for photovoltaic 
and wind energy. Spain, having adopted a similar FIT policy, 
has also seen explosive growth in the renewable energy sector. 
The German model has since been applied in many countries 
throughout Europe as well as in Canada, so far largely success-
fully.11  Other adaptations of FIT policy have been adopted in 
China, Thailand, and parts of India.12 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the European Commission found 
in 2005 that FITs were a highly effective finance mechanism to 
promote new RE production.13 Echoing this and referencing the 
European model, the World Future Council’s (“WFC”) Policy 
Action Climate Toolkit Project has suggested that feed-in tar-
iffs are the most promising finance mechanism to promote RE 
generation worldwide.14 Accordingly, a WFC-funded report 
supports the idea of a U.S. national feed-in tariff to expedite the 
transition to a clean energy infrastructure.15  
Despite the success of FITs throughout the world, the United 
States has not yet adopted a national strategy to finance the shift 
to a clean energy economy. However, several states have begun 
to consider FIT policies, in many cases to complement exist-
ing RPS requirements that focus on percentage-oriented reduc-
tion targets.16 As is so often the case in the environmental field, 
California has led the way in the United States for developing 
feed-in tariff legislation for renewable energy projects. Assem-
bly Bill 1969 of 200617 estab-
lished feed-in tariff systems 
that offered the same price for 
all technologies but varied from 
Germany’s system in that the 
determining factor is whether 
the energy is delivered dur-
ing peak hours, rather than the 
cost of generation per technol-
ogy. To date, no other state has 
passed legislation requiring any 
form of feed-in tariff; however, 
the city of Gainesville, Florida 
launched a feed-in tariff system similar to that of Germany and 
Spain in March 2009 and is already reporting economic success 
through its implementation.18 Several other states, including 
Illinois, Minnesota, and Rhode Island, are considering or have 
introduced similar bills. In 2008, U.S. House Representative Jay 
Inslee introduced legislation for a national-level FIT that also 
included the basic uniform minimum standards;19 although the 
bill did not pass, it perhaps helped to set the scene for legislation 
to come. Especially given the new national push to implement 
green policies, it is quite possible that a federal feed-in tariff 
bill will pass relatively soon, despite the fact that some political 
opposition is expected in many states.20
The role oF The comIng “smarT grID” 
Technology In IncreasIng energy eFFIcIency 
anD boosTIng cosT savIngs
The idea of an electrical “smart grid” focuses on reliability, 
efficiency, and safety. However, it is generally accepted that a 
longer-term strategy should include RE as the energy source to 
power a smart grid. According to a recent report from the Center 
for American Progress (“CAP”):
Federal incentives for new renewable energy transmission 
projects should be strengthened—through accelerated 
depreciation schedules, increasing Private Activity Bond 
authority for states, or other federal tax incentives—directly 
The idea of an electrical 
“smart grid” focuses on 
reliability, efficiency,  
and safety.
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involving taxpayers in the fulfillment of the clean-energy, 
reliability, and national-security benefits of an updated 
grid. Smart distribution investments warrant public invest-
ment due to their broad public benefits. While in most 
cases transmission projects will be financed by the private 
sector, some lines will also need public financing or incen-
tives to ensure they are built.21
CAP thus argues that updating the electricity grid is a mat-
ter of national security as well as environmentally sound policy, 
and as such it is reasonable to increase public funding of relevant 
projects. Policy trends across the states seem to reflect a similar 
perspective, resulting in a myriad of implementation mecha-
nisms to push forward progressive energy policies. CAP further 
suggests that it may be procedurally more prudent to spread the 
costs of a group of new electricity generation projects to all rate-
payers, rather than take the more specific but more complicated 
approach of directing project-specific costs to ratepayers accord-
ing to load-specific consumption in addition to an assumed tax-
payer contribution—in effect creating a uniform FIT.22 
Along the same vein, a federal legislative proposal to build 
a national smart grid is now being considered. In March 2009, 
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid introduced the Clean Renew-
able Energy and Economic Development Act, which requires the 
construction of a smart grid based on reliable transmission fed 
by RE generation through the designation of “renewable energy 
zones” that will integrate RE into the mainstream electrical 
transmission grid.23 The bill also provides that the cost recovery 
plan will include a federal surcharge24 in addition to cost recov-
ery plans submitted by regional planning entities.25 Given the 
current state-level push for FITs, it is quite possible that the cost 
allocation plans submitted by regional planning entities could 
incorporate such policies, even if no national mandatory stan-
dard for FITs is implemented. The bill has been referred to the 
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. The timing is well 
planned. The Obama administration’s recent endorsement for 
a national smart grid makes the creation of a national standard 
to increase the integration of RE production and transmission 
likely. The Department of Energy has already collected a num-
ber of documents and reports concerning the development of a 
smart grid, and seems poised to implement any relevant legisla-
tion that may be passed.26
conclusIon
The new direction of the Obama administration gives hope 
to several concurrent initiatives integrating digital technology, 
green energy, and economic benefit to RE generators.  The need 
for such progressive policy is increasingly recognized as criti-
cal to national security and energy reliability and is more urgent 
than ever in the larger fight against global climate change. Thus 
far, the United States has developed RE technology in a patch-
work fashion, with some states taking the legislative lead while 
others are doing little to nothing to integrate RE, despite incre-
mental federal-level encouragement. The passage of the legisla-
tion such as that recently introduced in the U.S. Senate to create 
a national, “green” smart grid will create a uniform national 
standard for RE generation and distribution as well as the cost 
recovery mechanisms so critical to implementation.
The timing for such policy harmonization could not be bet-
ter. The UN Conference on Climate Change meeting in Copen-
hagen in December 2009, where the follow-up framework to the 
Kyoto Protocol is expected to be drafted, will address the finance 
implementation strategy of energy projects among other critical 
facets of a climate change mitigation strategy. UN climate chief, 
Yvo de Boer, has cited numerous challenges to financing new 
RE production, including the current economic crisis.27 Thus, 
in order to push forward with the fight against global warming 
and climate change, establishing uniform financial mechanisms 
to facilitate domestic level realization of the international goals 
set forth by Kyoto and its successor will remain paramount in 
the policy formation process at all levels of implementation. 
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The international transfer of clean technology has the abil-ity to promote positive human rights, such as the right to health care and the right to enjoy scientific advancements 
to one’s benefit. Although human rights appear to be inapposite 
to intellectual property rights, the protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights will lead to increased clean technology transfer, which 
will thus increase the quality of life for many. Under the lens 
of climate change, the access to scientific advancements could 
protect those at risk to the adverse effects of climate change as 
technology to protect against droughts, flooding, water tempera-
ture changes, habitat deconstruction, and irrigation problems can 
protect people from famine, dehydration, and forced migration.1 
These rights take the shape of positive human rights, or those that 
are a guarantee that a government or other provider will supply a 
citizen with something. In the case of technology transfer, these 
positive human rights may compete with negative human rights, 
which require governments to enforce a right, such as the intel-
lectual property right of the technology. Although seemingly 
at odds with each other, a middle ground can be reached that 
promotes human rights and intellectual property rights for the 
benefit of all. While a great deal of countries protect intellectual 
property to promote the advantages that come with new technol-
ogy, other countries such as China lack strong protections for 
intellectual property; this may harm the clean tech trade.2 For 
example, some clean tech producers are reluctant to sell in China 
because a producer there may simply copy without fear of copy-
right penalties.3 
While intellectual property may be a young field, the intent 
to protect intellectual property rights is present in many historic 
legal documents. The United States Constitution contains lan-
guage which may be interpreted to protect intellectual property 
rights.4 Intellectual property rights are recognized worldwide by 
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”),5 and scientific produc-
tions are protected by the United Nations in its 1948 Declaration 
of Human Rights.6  However, many international documents also 
adopt positive rights, like the right to health care, food, shelter, 
and the benefits of scientific advancements.7 The United Nations 
has recognized the conflict between intellectual property rights 
and the promotion of human rights, particularly in light of the 
WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Property Rights 
(“TRIPS”).8 The UN’s response, described as “an antagonistic 
approach,”9 called for “the primacy of human rights obligations 
over economic policies and agreements.”10 
Some argue that for innovation in technology fields to even 
exist, one must protect the property right first, so that future 
profits remain as an incentive to innovate. Some economists 
point out that this argument is not persuasive because in many 
fields where there is no intellectual property protection, such as 
fashion, innovation continues.11 This argument may not hold as 
true in regards to the high cost of research and development for 
clean technology, however.12 Due to the investments necessary 
for innovation in clean technology, protecting intellectual prop-
erty rights may be imperative to ensure technological advances 
continue to be made, even if for some time the technology may 
not be transferred for others to use. To err on the side of caution, 
the protection of intellectual property rights should exist in all 
countries where clean technology is needed most, if even for a 
limited time under a patent system. 
Intellectual property rights and human rights can be recon-
ciled in a system that recognizes patent protection for a limited 
time. A limited period allowing for intellectual property protec-
tion provides incentive to innovate but still allows for the peo-
ple of the world to enjoy the benefits of these advancements. 
Although this still prevents some of the poorest people from 
having access to this technology for some time,13 the incen-
tive remains to produce the advancements at all and provides 
for incentive to make the product available to all in order to 
enjoy economies of scale. An international patent system may 
enhance clean tech transfer to less developed countries. Indeed, 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), a spe-
cialized agency of the UN, is working towards such a system by 
drafting a substantive patent law treaty.14 Although WIPO has 
not yet reached an agreement, the group’s existence is nonethe-
less indicative of a worldwide interest in protecting intellectual 
property rights. WIPO has worked with the UN’s Office of the 
Commissioner of Human Rights by hosting a panel discussion 
in 1998,15 and continued discussions between these two groups 
may help bring about a solution. As technology transfer in the 
past by willing companies in foreign direct investment led to 
more jobs in less developed countries,16 clean technology trans-
fer can help provide jobs, reduce dependence on carbon fuels, 
and advance in their own protection from the effects of climate 
change.17 In order to guarantee continued progress in the clean 
technology fields, intellectual property rights should be protected 
initially for the benefit of all. 
Endnotes: Intellectual Property Rights to Enhance International 
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InTroDucTIon
As the world prepares for the December 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, Parties are far from focused on any singular issue that will make or break the 
negotiations over a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. 
The U.S. role in international talks has been a topic of discussion 
for many years and the Obama administration’s reengagement 
on the issue has been an important development both domesti-
cally and internationally.1 The fate of the recently released dis-
cussion draft on domestic climate legislation will certainly have 
an ongoing impact on negotia-
tions taking place in preparation 
for Copenhagen.2 The discus-
sion draft incorporates a number 
of provisions that may impact 
U.S. positioning in the coming 
months. Of particular note are 
the international clean technol-
ogy and international adaptation 
provisions which are important 
because: (1) they reflect the 
principle of common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities that 
is essential to the existing inter-
national climate framework and 
(2) they are considered essen-
tial to balancing the continuing 
needs of developed countries 
with the growth and develop-
ment of emerging economies.3 
Together these two provisions 
offer a unique preview of the 
U.S. position on important 
issues as well as some insight into the U.S. posture on the gov-
ernance structure of the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (“UNFCCC”), the Kyoto Protocol, and the international 
climate discourse generally.
an emergIng paraDIgm For The unITeD sTaTes 
In posT-2012 clImaTe negoTIaTIons
On March 31, 2009, U.S. House Energy and Commerce 
Committee Chairman Henry Waxman and Energy and Environ-
ment Subcommittee Chairman Edward Markey released a dis-
cussion draft of the American Clean Energy and Security Act, 
frequently referred to as the U.S. climate bill.4 They touted the 
bill as “clean energy legislation that will create jobs, help end 
a Stop on the roaD to copenhagen: 
implicationS of a u.S. climate bill
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our dangerous dependence on foreign oil, and combat global 
warming.”5 Although the draft legislation may offer less con-
crete technology investment than previous climate bills or than 
the Obama administration has advocated,6 it is real a starting 
point for constructive U.S. engagement in both domestic and 
international climate debates.7 
In its 648 pages, the proposed bill includes two provisions 
which can provide insight into the U.S. position on the interna-
tional deployment of climate mitigation and adaptation technolo-
gies during post-Kyoto negotiations.8 First, the Exporting Clean 
Technology subtitle creates the 
International Clean Technology 
Fund (“ICTF”) which acknowl-
edges the importance of clean 
technology export for combat-
ing climate change. It provides 
“assistance to encourage wide-
spread deployment, in develop-
ing countries, of technologies 
that reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions”9 by funding projects that 
“achieve substantial reductions 
in greenhouse gas emissions 
through deployment of low- or 
zero-carbon technologies.”10 
Second, the Adapting to Cli-
mate Change subtitle includes 
an International Climate Change 
Adaptation Program (“ICCAP”). 
The ICCAP encourages and 
facilitates the “deployment of 
technologies that would help 
the most vulnerable developing 
countries respond to the destabilizing impacts of climate change 
and encourage the identification and adoption of appropriate 
renewable and efficient energy technologies that are beneficial 
in increasing community-level resilience to the impacts of global 
climate change in those countries.”11 
The requirements and objectives of the Clean Technology 
Fund and the Climate Adaptation Program shed some light on the 
potential U.S. position in the upcoming post-2012 negotiations 
which will likely include extensive discussion of international 
The most vulnerable 
developing countries  
will likely be the hardest 
hit by the impacts of 
climate change. The 
instability caused by the 
disproportionate impacts 
could potentially be a 
threat multiplier for  
global instability.
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adaptation, mitigation, and technology transfer. In this context, 
it is informative to consider the impacts of the discussion draft’s 
basic framework in terms of the existing UNFCCC governance 
structure and financial additionality requirements. This, in turn, 
may provide some insight into the discussion draft’s implicit 
statement on the successes and failures of the expiring Kyoto 
Protocol.
exploring the climate bill: exporting clean 
technology
The text of the discussion draft outlines the ICTF’s estab-
lishment, governance, country eligibility, funding, and report-
ing requirements.12 It would be administered by an interagency 
group including: the Secretary of State as chairperson, the Sec-
retaries of Energy and the Treasury, the Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency, and any other agency head 
or executive branch appointee that the President designates (the 
“interagency group”).13 Any project receiving money from the 
ICTF must serve an identified purpose, be in an eligible country, 
meet certain criteria, and funds must be distributed through a 
specific mechanism. Depending on the fund distribution mecha-
nism, the reporting and approval requirements are slightly dif-
ferent in form if not in function.14 
As noted, the Fund’s purpose is to encourage widespread 
deployment of GHG reducing technologies and assist that effort 
in a way that encourages countries to adopt their own measures 
to reduce emissions.15 Any funded project should “achieve 
substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions through 
the deployment of low- or zero-carbon technologies” and must 
be included in one of several categories.16 Those categories 
include: deploying carbon capture and sequestration technolo-
gies, deploying renewable electricity generation technologies, 
achieving increases in energy efficiency, or reducing transit sec-
tor emissions.17 The interagency group would develop project 
selection criteria that both achieve these goals and include cer-
tain required and preferred components.18 See Figure 1. 
Any country eligible to receive assistance from the Fund 
would first have to be identified as a developing country by the 
World Bank.19 It must then be included on a list of countries 
established by the President no later than January 1, 2012 based 
on criteria including that the country “has signed and ratified an 
international treaty or agreement that requires [it] to undertake 
nationally appropriate [GHG] mitigation activities [and] . . . has 
undertaken nationally appropriate mitigation activities that will 
achieve substantial reductions in [GHG] emissions, relative to 
business-as-usual levels, in a measurable, reportable, and verifi-
able manner.”20 
To achieve these goals, funding would be distributed by any 
one or a combination of the following three mechanisms: 
	 •	 Direct	assistance;	
	 •	 Agreements	with	the	World	Bank,	multilateral	development	
banks (“MDBs”), or international development institutions; 
and/or
	 •	 A	 UNFCCC	 fund	 or	 agreement	 negotiated	 under	 the	
Convention.21
If distributed directly, the Secretary of State would be autho-
rized to select projects and provide funding for eligible countries in 
the form of grants, loans, or other aid.22 However, for funding distrib-
uted either through a MDB or UNFCCC fund, a mechanism would 
be established that would apply and enforce the ICTF’s require-
ments including selection criteria.23 Regardless of who approves and 
funds the project, rigorous reporting requirements would begin with 
an initial report no later than March 1, 2012.24 Finally, it appears 
that the Secretary of State would have the ability to unilaterally sus-
pend funding for any project—funded by a domestic or international 
fund—through a yet to be determined process.25
exploring the climate bill: international climate 
change aDaptation 
The International Climate Change Adaptation Program is 
clearly written with a different purpose than the International 
Clean Technology Fund. Aside from the obvious distinctions 
between funding clean technology and adaptation programs, 
the underlying findings and purposes of the sections explicitly 
touch on different objectives and needs. The Adaptation Program 
is based on two general findings: (1) that the most vulnerable 
Figure 1. Criteria for CTF Project Selection.
Criteria for Project Selection: Clean Technology Fund
Required Criteria Preferred Criteria
substantial, measurable, reportable, verifiable reductions in 
GHG emissions relative to business as usual
maximize GHG emissions per dollar of assistance
no significant adverse effects on human health, safety, or  
welfare, the environment, or natural resources
promise to achieve large-scale GHG reductions at the sectoral or 
cross-sectoral level
the project owner/operator has demonstrated capacity to imple-
ment and maintain any technologies purchased or installed
have the potential to catalyze a shift within the host country towards 
widespread deployment of low- or zero-carbon energy technologies
the project will not cause any nret loss of U.S. jobs or  
displacement of U.S. production
the project meets other reuiremnts of the interagency group
the project will be co-financed by the host coutry government, 
private sector institutions, or a MBD
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developing countries will likely be the hardest hit by the impacts 
of climate change and (2) instability caused by these dispropor-
tionate impacts could potentially be a threat multiplier for global 
instability.26
More explicitly, the ICCAP finds that the most vulner-
able developing countries, with their lack of resource capac-
ity to adapt, may experience extreme increases in poverty and 
social and economic destabilization.27 Consequently, it is in the 
national security, economic, and environmental interests of the 
United States28 to assist these countries in developing resilience 
to impacts on “water availability, agricultural productivity, flood 
risk, coastal resources, timing of seasons, biodiversity, eco-
nomic livelihoods, health and diseases, and human migration.”29 
Furthermore, it is a U.S. obligation under the UNFCCC to pro-
vide funding that is “predictable, sustainable, and additional to 
international agreed levels of overseas development assistance” 
to aid in the cost of adaptation.30
Under the direction of the Administrator of the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (“USAID”)31 the Adaptation Pro-
gram would have two primary functions. One would be to engage 
in research and fund aid programs with the goal of carrying out 
adaptation programs in the most vulnerable developing coun-
tries.32 The second would be to mandate community engagement 
through full disclosure of information, public participation, a 
locally tailored consultation process, and, to the extent practicable, 
alignment with the recipient country’s broader development, pov-
erty alleviation, and natural resource management objectives.33 In 
executing these functions, the program would establish fairly sub-
stantial and immediate reporting requirements.34
Interestingly, these reporting requirements would apply not 
only to monies directly distributed by USAID but also to assis-
tance through international adaptation funds35 “created pursu-
ant to the [UNFCCC] . . . or an agreement negotiated under the 
Convention.”36 Any project eligibility requirements would also 
apply to a hypothetical UNFCCC fund. In order to comply, any 
fund would be required to: 
	 •	 Specify	the	terms	and	conditions	under	which	the	United	
Sates is to provide monies to the fund and under which the 
fund will disburse monies to recipient countries; 
	 •	 Ensure	that	U.S.	assistance	to	the	fund	and	the	fund’s	prin-
cipal and income are disbursed only for purposes adhering 
to those specified in the Adaptation Program; 
	 •	 Require	a	regular	meeting	of	the	fund’s	governing	body	that	
includes representation from the most vulnerable develop-
ing countries and provides full public access; 
	 •	 Require	that	local	communities	and	indigenous	peoples	in	
areas where activities or programs are planned are engaged 
through full disclosure of information, public participation, 
and consultation; 
	 •	 Spend	not	more	than	ten	percent	of	the	amounts	available	to	
the fund in any single country in any year; and 
	 •	 Require	the	international	fund	to	prepare	and	make	public	
an annual report adhering to specific requirements.37 
Examining the ICTF and ICCAP provides insight into pre-
Copenhagen U.S. positioning not only by simply highlighting 
priorities but also through an evaluation of the implicit criticisms 
of the existing framework’s governance structure and Party par-
ticipation. Whether or not a climate agreement moves forward 
this year, a frequent theme is present throughout both sections of 
the discussion draft: preparation for participation in a UNFCCC 
post-2012 climate negotiation and agreement.38
exIsTIng InTernaTIonal Framework:  
unFccc & The kyoTo proTocol
The UNFCCC creates “an institutional framework for the 
progressive development of the [climate] regime through proto-
cols or amendments.”39 The UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol, which 
sets emission reduction targets for developed country Parties,40 
expires in 2012. It has faced criticisms of its substance, enforce-
ability, and the impact of its key market and its flexibility mecha-
nisms, which include emissions trading, the Clean Development 
Mechanism, and Joint Implementation.41 
The UNFCCC “sets an overall framework for intergov-
ernmental efforts to tackle the challenge posed by climate 
change.”42 Its objective is to stabilize GHG “concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthro-
pogenic interference with the climate system.”43 In order to 
achieve this objective, Parties should protect the climate system 
“on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”44 The 
concept of equitable, global protection is reflected in the alloca-
tion of Parties’ voting rights. Unlike many other international 
instruments or funding mechanisms, the UNFCCC gives each 
Party to the Convention one vote—regardless of population or 
financial status.45
Consistent with the concept of common but differentiated 
responsibilities, the UNFCCC requires developed country Par-
ties to “provide new and additional financial resources to meet 
the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties in 
complying with their obligations.”46 This financial additional-
ity requirement should lead to increased support for technology 
development, transfer, and deployment from developed to devel-
oping countries.47 In fact, many developing countries expect that 
developed country Parties will increase their funding because of 
the “moral and practical claim that [they] bear a much larger share 
of the responsibility for historical and current greenhouse emis-
sions, and have greater financial and technical resources.”48
The Kyoto Protocol also allocates one vote to each Party49 
and requires “new and additional financial resources to meet the 
agreed costs incurred by developing country Parties.”50 How-
ever, Kyoto goes significantly beyond the UNFCCC by creat-
ing quantified emissions reductions. It creates mechanisms to 
achieve these goals, particularly the Clean Development Mecha-
nism (“CDM”), which is informative in this discussion since it 
represents a significant facet of the existing UNFCCC structure 
for expansion of clean technologies in developing countries.51
The CDM allows projects in developing countries to earn 
emission reductions credits that can then be traded in a carbon 
market.52 It also creates an alternative mechanism for developed 
countries to meet their obligations without directly reducing their 
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own emissions, which is arguably more economically efficient. 
Theoretically, this dual goal helps developed countries meet their 
GHG emission reduction targets while stimulating sustainable 
development and emission reductions in developing countries.53 
However, the relationship between CDM projects and sustainable 
development is frequently the subject of debate:54 does the CDM 
help developing countries achieve sustainable development or 
does it help developed countries 
create low-cost emission reduc-
tion credits?55 Criticisms have 
ranged from the actual impact of 
offsets to the cost of reductions, 
and from local environmental 
integrity and community involve-
ment to the CDM’s long term 
viability as a mechanism to pro-
mote sustainable development.56 
As the prelude to Copenhagen 
continues, developing countries 
are calling for more effective 
technology transfer than the 
CDM has yet achieved.57
The proposeD u.s. clean Technology FunD 
& InTernaTIonal clImaTe change aDapTaTIon 
plan: InTernaTIonal legal ImplIcaTIons
Clearly, the ICTF language was crafted considering the 
expiration of Kyoto. “Not later than January 1, 2012, and annu-
ally thereafter, the President shall determine and publish a list of 
countries eligible for assistance.”58 It goes on to require that an 
eligible country must have “signed and ratified an international 
treaty or agreement”59 and explicitly authorizes distribution of 
assistance through a fund created pursuant to the UNFCCC or 
agreement negotiated under the Convention.60 The Adaptation 
Fund was also drafted with the existing international climate 
structure in mind. It requires that 40–60% of its funding be dis-
tributed through an international fund created under the UNFCCC 
or agreement pursuant to the Convention.61 Furthermore, it notes 
that under the United States’ UNFCCC obligations, funding for 
adaptation programs must be predictable, sustainable, and addi-
tional to existing overseas development aid.62 
the international clean technology funD
The ICTF presents several issues when considering how it 
might fit into a UNFCCC framework. First and foremost, since 
the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, and CDM all have additional-
ity requirements,63 which is an extremely important point for 
developing country Parties, it is safe to assume that a similar 
requirement will be included in any future agreement.64 How-
ever, the ICTF includes no financial additionality language. This 
is particularly significant since the ICCAP includes explicit ref-
erence to the UNFCCC additionality requirement.65 The differ-
ence may imply that it was intentionally excluded from the ICTF 
subtitle. Further, the absence of additionality language leaves 
some ambiguity as to whether or how it could fulfill any addi-
tionality requirements in a future protocol. Although it is clearly 
new funding today, it may be difficult differentiate it from exist-
ing overseas development aid, which is ineligible to fulfill the 
UNFCCC’s “new and additional” requirement.66 
The ICTF could also create potential conflicts in terms of non-
financial requirements and governance mechanisms. For example, 
regardless of how or where monies are distributed, all projects 
must conform to the Fund’s extensive selection criteria and report-
ing requirements.67 Thus, if funds 
are to be distributed through an 
agreement to be negotiated under 
the UNFCCC there would be two 
options for compliance. First, the 
agreement would have to incor-
porate the explicit requirements 
included in the U.S. legislation. 
Or second, the agreement would 
have to incorporate a mechanism 
by which Parties could specifi-
cally approve and enforce unique, 
individual requirements. On top 
of the obligation to comply with 
U.S. requirements, the discussion 
draft incorporates a component 
which may preclude any ICTF-funded project from incorporation 
into an international fund: it appears to give the U.S. Secretary of 
State the authority to unilaterally suspend or terminate assistance if 
a facet of a project does not operate in compliance with its origi-
nal approval.68 Not only does this appear to be an impracticable 
demand to incorporate, but it also conflicts with the UNFCCC’s 
themes of equity and the concepts of fostering sustainable develop-
ment as defined by the host-country and encouraging local control 
of internationally financed projects. 
Finally, the ICTF’s requirements for identifying eligible coun-
tries could decrease the feasibility of distributing funds through an 
international mechanism. It defines eligible country as a develop-
ing country that has already taken measures towards considerable 
overall improvements and mitigation activities “that will achieve 
substantial reductions [in GHG emissions]. . . relative to business-
as-usual levels.”69 While this may make environmental sense, it 
does not reflect the standards under which the UNFCCC, Kyoto 
Protocol, or CDM programs should operate.70 The Convention 
does not explicitly include guidance regarding the contributions 
of developing countries to technology development,71 but the 
recent Bali Action Plan recognizes the importance of developed 
countries’ role in assisting developing countries with technology 
finance and “taking into account social and economic conditions 
[of a developing country] and other relevant factors.”72 Inflexibly 
requiring a developing country to “prove itself” before becom-
ing eligible for funding does not reflect a program created on the 
“basis of equity and in accordance with . . . common but differen-
tiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”73 
the international climate change aDaptation plan
The ICCAP is more explicitly written to reflect current UNFCCC 
and future protocol obligations. It includes specific reference to 
Clean technology transfer 
and climate adaptation are 
among the most important 
topics to be discussed 
in upcoming UNFCCC 
negotiations.
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UNFCCC additionality requirements and requires a percentage of 
assistance to go through a hypothetical UNFCCC or future protocol 
fund. It does not include, however, specific language explaining how 
or when its funding should be considered new and additional. The 
inclusion of language in domestic legislation specifying an intention 
that overseas development funding is new and additional pursuant to 
the UNFCCC requirements is by no means required. But given the 
longstanding confusion regarding how to determine exactly what is 
new and additional and the requirement that donor countries “clarify 
how they have determined that [resources are] . . . new and addi-
tional,”74 it would be good practice for a donor country to be explicit 
about its intention upon creation of new funding.
The Plan’s requirements also invoke language of sustainable 
development and community engagement.75 Although the goals 
of adaptation programs and the CDM are certainly not analogous, 
the language here appears to be aimed at addressing some of the 
contentious issues identified in CDM implementation—issues 
that inherently arise when developed countries fulfill international 
obligations within the boundaries of developing countries. For 
example, it requires quantifiable performance goals, the creation 
of specific performance indicators, extensive, country-specific 
community engagement, and alignment with each country’s 
development goals.76 While these are laudable inclusions, there 
currently are not mechanisms identified to further develop, define, 
and implement these goals at an international level. 
Much like the ICTF, the ICCAP subtitle would impose its 
own to be established requirements, enforcement, and reporting 
mechanisms equally on any project funded through an interna-
tional fund. The ICCAP even goes a step further by outlining spe-
cific requirements for an eligible fund which include reporting, 
governing body meeting, and eligibility standards. This is a bold 
prerequisite for a hypothetical funding mechanism and has the 
potential to create substantial ambiguities and enforcement chal-
lenges, as well as conflicts between negotiators, funding partners, 
and the developing countries where the projects ultimately occur. 
Finally, creating a haze over all of its requirements, the ICCAP 
would have two overarching purposes. In addition to aiding the most 
vulnerable developing countries in adapting to climate impacts, its 
second stated purpose is protecting U.S. security interests.77 This 
significantly changes the UNFCCC climate discourse and empha-
sizes the U.S.-centric focus of the entire legislation.78 While national 
security may have become part of the global climate discourse, it 
certainly not part of the existing legal framework. Focusing on U.S. 
security interests will help a bill pass in the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, but focusing on global political stability and its contribu-
tion to peace will be more significant at the international level, and 
these things, arguably, are not too different.
The proposeD u.s. clean Technology 
FunD & clImaTe change aDapTaTIon plan: 
InTernaTIonal polIcy ImplIcaTIons 
Despite the potential conflicts between the U.S. climate bill 
and the existing international legal infrastructure and discourse, 
it is important to acknowledge that the proposed legislation is 
simply a discussion draft. As the United States re-engages in 
the international climate debate,79 the discussion draft’s value 
may be its insight into how and why these provisions strengthen 
and clarify the U.S. position. In order for the 2009 Copenhagen 
negotiations to be successful in creating a post-2012 agreement 
many experts agree that “the United States must lead at home.”80 
To achieve this, comprehensive domestic legislation to reduce 
emissions is essential, particularly legislation that includes sup-
port for developing countries.81 By discussing this bill in the 
U.S. Congress, the United States is beginning to indicate the 
level of support it may be prepared to give developing countries 
in the global fight against climate change. This bill could be read 
as a first step towards to putting “a concrete and comprehensive 
offer on the table.”82 
In preparation for international negotiations, any domes-
tic legislation must include international technology diffusion 
and development which are increasingly considered essential 
to combating climate change.83 This is particularly true where 
international policy structures do not have full international par-
ticipation.84 Including international technology provisions in 
domestic legislation may be a signal that the United States is 
prepared to go forward with negotiations even without full or 
substantially equal international participation, a longtime road-
block to U.S. involvement.
conclusIon
Experts continue to identify countless “essential” points 
to a successful Copenhagen outcome.85 Two recurring themes 
are “actions by developing countries [and] finance for mitiga-
tion and adaptation.”86 The international technology provisions 
of the discussion draft address those two concerns directly and 
signal a potential shift in the U.S. policy outlook. While domes-
tic legislation outlining technology and adaptation priorities is 
important, it is equally important not to unilaterally impose U.S. 
will upon the world. How the proposed provisions will func-
tion domestically must be more thoroughly developed. Perhaps 
more importantly, how these policies will be incorporated into a 
post-Kyoto agreement must continue to be a vital part of the dis-
course, since clean technology transfer and climate adaptation 
are among the most important topics to be discussed in upcom-
ing UNFCCC negotiations. 
1  Juliet Eilperin, Top Emissions Negotiator an Expert on Political Climate, 
Too, waSh. poSt., Apr. 15, 2009, at C01, available at http://www.washington-
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/14/AR2009041403444.html.
2  Cheryl Hogue, A Climate of Change, chem. & eng’g newS, Apr. 6, 2009, 
http://pubs.acs.org/cen/government/87/8714gov2.html.
Endnotes: A Stop on the Road to Copenhagen
3  Posting of Michael Wriglesworth to UN Climate Change Conference Blog, 
http://en.cop15.dk/blogs/view+blog?blogid=1017 (Apr. 10, 2009, 14:20). 
4  See Press Release, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Chairmen Wax-
man, Markey Release Discussion Draft of New Clean Energy Legislation (Mar. 
Endnotes: A Stop on the Road to Copenhagen continued on page 70
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The nexus between poverty and environmental degra-dation—or framed more positively, between poverty alleviation and environmental protection—is too often 
ignored. For some, the two are seen as mutually exclusive and 
contradictory goals. For others, they are so closely tied as to 
be taken for granted. The Role of the Environment in Poverty 
Alleviation speaks to both audiences through illustrations of the 
myriad ways in which environment and development are linked.1 
Tackling such a broad area, the book’s editor Paolo Galizzi does 
an admirable job of organizing the collection of essays themati-
cally and alternating among a variety of viewpoints, from theo-
retical debates to case studies of natural disasters and cutting 
edge projects in social entrepreneurship.
This book is the result of a partnership between Fordham 
University, The Nature Conservancy, and the United Nations 
Development Programme (“UNDP”), which began a lecture 
series on People and the Environment in 2005. The collection of 
essays comes from the first in the lecture series, and draws from 
a multitude of fields: international environmental law and devel-
opment policy, natural disaster relief and planning, microfinance 
and housing strategies, and legal empowerment of the poor. The 
project—both the lecture and book series—fits the times, as both 
poverty alleviation and the environment are explicitly listed in 
the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”), 
which the United Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”) 
and the UNDP have been working together to implement. 
Although some of the essays are limited in scope to efforts by 
particular organizations or projects, they provide interesting case 
studies of successful linking of environment and development.
Fittingly, the first section of the book, entitled Poverty 
Reduction and the Environment are not Opposing Goals, con-
tains a sound critique of one prevailing view that incorporating 
environmental protection into development will slow growth 
and perpetuate poverty in developing countries. The late envi-
ronmental economist, David Pearce, looks at the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve (“EKC”) hypothesis, which asserts that countries 
cannot protect their environment without sacrificing economic 
book review
the role of the environment in poverty  
alleviation
Edited by Paolo Galizzi
Reviewed by Melissa Blue Sky & Megan Chapman*
*Melissa Blue Sky and Megan Chapman are J.D. candidates, May 2011, at Ameri-
can University, Washington College of Law.
growth. Pearce contends that in concluding environmental 
protection is a “luxury good,” EKC ignores negative impacts 
on human health caused by environmental degradation, which 
in turn decrease long-range growth. Moreover, EKC does not 
acknowledge that some damage to the environment may be 
irreparable or that alternative models incorporating environmen-
tal objectives into plans for development exist.
For Pearce, wealth includes human, social, and environ-
mental capital, and using this measure, he suggests that while 
per capita incomes are increasing in some developing countries, 
per capita wealth in these countries is decreasing. This growth in 
income paired with loss of wealth may be an indicator of unsus-
tainable development, due in part to resource exploitation and 
environmental contamination. Because the rural poor are dispro-
portionately dependent on the ecosystem for their livelihoods, 
they are likely to be driven into even deeper poverty as a result 
of environmental degradation. To link environmental manage-
ment with development gains, Pearce argues, environmental 
policy and investment in environmental assets such as water and 
sanitation, wetlands, and fisheries must incorporate the goals of 
long-term local management of the natural environment.
While the first section broadly addresses why poverty reduc-
tion and the environment are not opposing goals, the subsequent 
essays are organized around somewhat narrower themes: natural 
disasters, information and education, and legal empowerment. 
Of these, the first ties most closely to the book’s overall the-
sis: that poverty alleviation and environmental goals are inter-
related and must be tackled together. Most interesting is the brief 
study of the impact of the December 2004 tsunami in Southeast 
Asia. After illustrating how the tsunami’s effect was felt dispro-
portionately by the poorest populations, author Annie Maxwell 
identifies the disaster’s environmental causes and consequences. 
Where coral reefs, natural dunes, and mangroves were intact, 
they served as natural buffers and communities suffered less. 
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For example, in Sri Lanka, an intact coral reef made the dif-
ference between the tsunami coming inland 1.5 kilometers ver-
sus fifty meters, and killing 1,700 people versus no one. On the 
other end of the spectrum, Maxwell argues, the recognition that 
environmental impact should be part of disaster relief planning 
came too late. For example, in the Aceh region of Indonesia, 
over 120,000 homes were destroyed and needed to be rebuilt. 
This tremendous demand for an immediate supply of lumber led 
to illegal logging of one of the area’s few remaining rain for-
ests. Similarly, poor coordination between relief groups led to a 
huge surplus of small fishing boats to replace those destroyed in 
Sri Lanka—without enough larger multi-daytrip fishing boats—
leading rapidly to overfishing of shallow waters.
As with many interdisciplinary topics, the breadth of the 
issues and the overlapping cycles of cause and effect could over-
whelm the reader if not for a few refreshingly pragmatic essays 
and inspiring case studies. One that stands out is an essay by 
three professionals involved in the World Conservation Union on 
knowledge necessary to meet poverty alleviation. It focuses on 
the process of “knowledge to action,” or methods that can help 
to translate knowledge generated by academics and research-
ers into useful information for those who can put it into action 
in developing countries, and promote information exchange 
between practitioners. 
Another essay offers a much-needed glimmer of hope: a 
case study of social entrepreneurship by International Develop-
ment Enterprises India (“IDEI”). IDEI adapted the drip irriga-
tion system used on large commercial farms to be suitable to the 
small farms common among subsistence farmers in India. The 
modified product prioritizes affordability such that a poor, risk-
averse farmer may see net benefits of his investment within one 
growing season, and serves both poverty alleviation—increasing 
crop yields and thus profits—and environmental benefits—by 
reducing water consumption. While poverty and environmen-
tal degradation are often two components in a vicious cycle, the 
IDEI case study and others offered in this book remind us that 
creative approaches to development and environmental protec-
tion can and should yield positive outcomes on both fronts. 
1  the role of the environment in poverty alleviation (Paolo Galizzi & 
Alena Herklotz eds., 2008).
Endnotes: Book Review
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enDnoTes: aquaponicS & lanDfill methane uSe continued from page 11
enDnoTes: borDer aDJuStment meaSureS in propoSeD u.S. climate change legiSlation continued from page 19
1  See generally Aquaponics.com, Information—Aquaponics Overview, http://
www.aquaponics.com/InfoAquaponics.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2009) [herein-
after Overview] (noting that aquaponics is in its commercial infancy despite the 
existence of fish farming and soilless plant culture in combination for thousands 
of years). 
2  See PracticalEnvironmentalist.com, What the Heck is Aquaponics?, http://
www.practicalenvironmentalist.com/gardening/what-the-heck-is-aquaponics.
htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
3  See Department of energy, lanDfill gaS to energy for feDeral facili-
tieS: fact Sheet, available at http://www.epa.gov/lmop/res/pdf/bio-alt.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2009) (placing the birth of landfill gas capture for energy use in 
the late 1970s).
4  See generally Overview, supra note 1 (describing how the problem of 
removing nutrient rich water from an aquaculture system satisfies the need 
for nutrient rich water in a hydroponic system); Energy Information Admin-
istration, Landfill Gas, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/solar.renewables/page/
landfillgas/landfillgas.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2009) (providing official energy 
statistics compiled by the U.S. Government and stating that the landfill methane 
that is captured and burned for fuel is prevented from leaching into the  
atmosphere).
5  E.g., Eco-sphere.com, The Inside Story, http://www.eco-sphere.com/
aboutecosphere.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2009) (advertising a closed,  
interdependent ecological system as an educational tool for young people;  
the system was first developed by NASA scientists as they attempted to create 
self-contained communities for astronauts).
6  Steve Diver, national SuStainable agriculture information Service, 
aquaponicS: integration of hyDroponicS with aquaculture 1-2 (2000), avail-
able at http://www.attra.org/attra-pub/PDF/aquaponic.pdf (enumerating the 
benefits of aquaculture’s use of wastes to fertilize plants situated above fish 
tanks).
7  See id. at 1 (pointing out that “[g]reenhouse growers view aquaponics as a 
way to introduce organic hydroponic produce into the marketplace, since the 
only fertility input is fish feed and all of the nutrients pass through a biological 
process”).
8  See What the Heck is Aquaponics?, supra note 2 (distinguishing deep water 
aquaponics from reciprocating aquaponics by describing the differing plant 
placement and comparing aquaponics to conventional agriculture and conclud-
ing that “. . . aquaponics is a huge water saver.”).
9  E.g., Overview, supra note 1 (proffering that a miniature ecosystem is cre-
ated that benefits both the fish and the plants).
10  center for innovative fooD technology, alternative ag ventureS – 
aquaponicS 1, available at http://www.eisc.org/attach/aquaponics.pdf (articu-
lating that farmers can profit from their hydroponic vegetables grown on less 
than one acre of land).
11  See Rosamond L. Naylor et al., Effect of Aquaculture on World Fish Sup-
plies, 405 nature 1017, 1018 (2000) [hereinafter Effect of Aquaculture] (pre-
senting the pros and cons of fish farming and noting that tilapia can displace the 
catches of some wild species such as cod, hake, haddock, and pollock).
12  Overview, supra note 1.
13  See UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, GHG Data from 
UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/items/4146.php (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2009).
14  Environmental Protection Agency, Landfill Methane Outreach Program, 
http://www.epa.gov/lmop/overview.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2009) [hereinafter 
LMOP] (asserting that there are over 500 landfills that are good candidates for 
methane capture and energy use).
15  See ScienceDaily.com, Greenhouse Gases, Carbon Dioxide and Methane, 
Rise Sharply In 2007 (Apr. 24, 2008), available at http://www.sciencedaily.
com/releases/2008/04/080423181652.htm.
16  See, e.g., GHGonline.org, Sources of Methane – Landfill, http://www.
ghgonline.org/methanelandfill.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2009) (observing that up 
to fifty percent of landfill methane emissions can be reduced through methane 
recovery systems, including methane capture for energy production).
17  See LMOP, supra note 14 (clarifying that a small amount of non-methane 
organic compounds are released in the decomposition process).
18  Id.
19  E.g., Chicago Climate Exchange, Landfill Methane Emissions Offsets, 
http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/content.jsf?id=222 (last visited Apr. 3, 2009) 
(recognizing the offset potential of “[m]ethane collection projects that include 
electricity generation,” which may qualify “based on displaced emissions”).
20  See, e.g., Diver, supra note 6, at 1 (lauding the benefits of aquaculture in 
large part because of the symbiotic use of fish effluent and the bio-filtration that 
the plant roots perform). 
21  See Effect of Aquaculture, supra note 11, at 1019 (warning that tilapia fish 
feeds often exceed the percentage requirement for the level of fish meal used 
and that fish meal is produced from wild caught fish). 
22  See LMOP, supra note 14.
10  The Boxer Amendment died in a 48-36 vote against cloture on June 2, 
2008. No further action has been reported on the Boxer Amendment to date. 
An article published one day before the cloture vote on the Boxer Amendment 
stated that “several senators are questioning why they are being asked to vote 
on a lengthy substitute version of the bill that Boxer and her allies just intro-
duced a week and a half ago.” Juliet Eilperin and Steven Mufson, Climate Bill 
Underlines Obstacles to Capping Greenhouse Gases, waShington poSt, June 
1, 2008, at A12, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/05/31/AR2008053102471.html.
11  See Boxer Amendment to S.3036, 110th Cong. Title XIII, Subtitle A and 
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, Discussion Draft, 111th 
Cong. Title IV, Subtitle A, Part 2. It should be noted that the Waxman-Markey 
bill utilizes the border adjustment measure as a “backstop” to a more compre-
hensive free allowance mechanism for trade-sensitive, energy-intensive indus-
tries. In other words, under this bill, free allowances would first be provided to 
such industries to ensure their global competitiveness. Should these allowances 
not meet this stated goal, border adjustment measures would then be used.
12  See, pew center on global climate change, reSponSe of the pew center 
on global climate change to the committee on energy anD commerce anD 
itS Subcommittee on energy anD air quality, u.S. houSe of repreSentativeS, 
on the climate change legiSlation DeSign white paper: competitiveneSS 
concernS/engaging Developing countrieS 2 (2008), available at http://www.
pewclimate.org/docUploads/Pew%20Center%20on%20Competitiveness-
Developing%20Countries-FINAL.pdf. 
13  nigel purviS, reS. for the future, minD the gap: the caSe for climate 
anD competitiveneSS protection authority 2 (2008), available at http://www.
rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-IB-08-03.pdf.
14  See elliot Diringer, pew ctr. on global climate change, the u.S. 
election anD proSpectS for a new climate agreement 4 (2008), available at 
http://www.boell.de/climate-transatlantic/index-117.html. (“There is now an 
emerging consensus in Washington that the United States should proceed with 
mandatory action at home, with or without developing country commitments, 
provided the legislation includes trade provisions to protect U.S. industry from 
competitive harm by imposing like costs on energy-intensive imports from 
countries like China.”).
15  Staff of h.r. committee on energy anD commerce, 110th cong., climate 
change legiSlation DeSign white paper: competitiveneSS concernS/engag-
ing Developing countrieS 1 (Comm. Print 2008) (“If the U.S. were to cap its 
own GHG emissions without corresponding action by developing nations that 
compete in global trade markets, the cost of producing some American products 
would increase relative to those manufactured in countries without emissions 
limits. As a result, U.S. industry might relocate to (or expand operations in) 
countries that do not limit the emissions of their industries, causing both the 
environment and the U.S. economy to suffer.”). 
16  Id. at 2, 8.
17  Id. at 12.
18  Issues in Designing a Cap-and-Trade Program for Carbon Dioxide Emis-
sions, Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. 16 (2008) (state-
ment of Peter R. Orzag, Director, Congressional Budget Office), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/110/orszag.pdf.
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19  Id.
20  See Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Con-
cerns: The Limits and Options of International Trade Law 4 (Nicholas Inst., 
Working Paper no. 07-02, 2007), available at http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/
institute/internationaltradelaw.pdf.
21  A “covered good” is defined as: 
[A] good that (as identified by the EPA Administrator by rule  
(A) is a primary product or manufactured item for consumption;  
(B) generates, in the course of the manufacture of the good, a sub-
stantial quantity of direct greenhouse gas emissions and indirect 
greenhouse gas emissions; and (C) is closely related to a good the 
cost of production of which in the United States is affected by a 
requirement of [the Boxer Amendment]. 
Boxer Amendment to S.3036, 110th Cong. § 1311(7). In § 1311(16), “primary 
product” is defined as:
(A) iron, steel, steel mill products (including pipe and tube), alumi-
num, cement, glass (including flat, container, and specialty glass, 
and fiberglass), pulp, paper, chemicals, or industrial ceramics; or 
(B) any other manufactured product that—(i) is sold in bulk for pur-
poses of further manufacture or inclusion in a finished product; and 
(ii) generates, in the course of the manufacture of the product, direct 
greenhouse gas emissions or indirect greenhouse gas emissions that 
are comparable (on an emissions-per-output basis) to emissions 
generated in the manufacture of products by covered entities in the 
industrial sector.
Id. § 1311(16).
22  “Comparable action” is defined in the Boxer Amendment as “greenhouse 
gas regulatory programs, requirements and other measures adopted by a foreign 
country that, in combination, are comparable in effect to actions carried out 
by the United States through federal, state and local measures to limit green-
house gas emissions, as determined by the Commission.” The determination of 
whether a country has taken comparable action will be based on the following 
requirements, in compliance with applicable international agreements: 
(i) A foreign country is deemed to have taken comparable action 
if the Commission determines that (I) the percentage change in 
greenhouse gas emissions in the foreign country during the relevant 
period is equal to, or better than, (II) the percentage change in green-
house gas emissions in the United States during the same period. 
The Commission will develop rules for taking into account net 
transfers to and from the United States and other foreign countries 
of greenhouseńgas allowances and other emission credits. 
(ii) If a foreign country it not deemed to have taken comparable 
action under clause (i), the Commission will take into consideration, 
the extent to which all of the following actions that have the effect 
of limiting greenhouseńgas emissions in the foreign country have 
been taken during the relevant period, and that these actions have 
been fully implemented, verified and enforced: (I) the deployment 
and use of stateńofńtheńart technologies in industrial processes, equip-
ment manufacturing facilities, power generation and other energy 
facilities, consumer goods (such as automobiles and appliances) and 
implementation of other techniques or actions that have the effect of 
limiting greenhouse gas emissions in the foreign country during the 
relevant period; and (II) any regulatory programs, requirements, and 
other measures that the foreign country has implemented to limit 
greenhouse gas emissions during the relevant period.
Id. § 1311(4).
23  Id. § 1314.
24  Exemptions include foreign countries (i) that have been classified as a 
least-developed developing country by the United Nations, or (ii) whose share 
of total global greenhouse gas emissions is below the de minimis percentage 
defined in the Boxer Amendment as “0.5% of total global greenhouse gas emis-
sions for the most recent calendar year for which relevant data is available, 
taking into consideration the annual average deforestation rate during a repre-
sentative period for a developing foreign country.” Id. § 1316(b)(2).
25  Id. § 1316(b)(2).
26  Id. § 1316(b)(3).
27  Boxer Amendment to S.3036, 110th Cong. § 1314. 
28  Id. §§ 1314(d)(1)-(2).
29  Id. § 1316(a)(3).
30  The “general formula” is defined as:
[T]he international reserve allowance requirement, as described in 
paragraph (1), for a compliance year is equal to the product obtained 
by multiplying (A) the national greenhouse gas intensity rate for 
each category of covered goods of each covered foreign country for 
the compliance year, as determined by the Administrator under para-
graph (3); by (B) the allowance adjustment factor for the industry 
sector in the foreign country that manufactured the covered goods 
entered into the United States, as determined by the Administrator 
under paragraph (4); by (C) the economic adjustment ratio for the 
foreign country, as determined by the Commission under paragraph (5). 
Id. § 1316(d)(2).
The “national greenhouse gas intensity rate” is calculated by the Administrator:
[F]or a particular foreign country under subparagraph (2)(A), on a 
per unit basis, in an amount equal to the quotient obtained by divid-
ing (A) the total amount of direct greenhouse gas emissions and 
indirect greenhouseńgas emissions that are attributable to a category 
of covered goods of a covered foreign country during the most cal-
endar year (as adjusted to exclude those emissions that would not be 
subject to the allowance submission requirements of section 202 for 
the category of covered goods if manufactured in the United States); 
by (B) total number of units of the particular covered good that are 
produced in the covered foreign country during the same calendar 
year. 
Id.
The “allowance adjustment factor” is calculated by the Administrator: 
[F]or a particular foreign country under subparagraph (2)(B) in 
an amount that is equal to 1 minus the ratio that (i) the number of 
allowances, as determined by the Administrator under subparagraph 
(4)(B), that an entire industry sector in the foreign country would 
have received at no cost if such allowances were allocated in the 
same manner that allowances are allocated at no cost under Titles V 
through XI to the same industry sector in the United States; bears to 
(ii) the total amount of direct greenhouse gas emissions and indirect 
greenhouseńgas emissions that are attributable to a category of cov-
ered goods of a covered foreign country during a particular compli-
ance year.
Id.
“Allowances allocated at no cost” are calculated by the Administrator:
[I]n an amount equal to the product obtained by multiplying—(i) the 
baseline emissions level that the Commission has attributed to a cat-
egory of covered goods of a foreign country; by (ii) the ratio that—
(I) the quantity of allowances that are allocated at no cost under 
Titles V through XI to entities within the industry sector that manu-
factures the covered goods for the compliance year during which the 
covered goods were entered into the United States; bears to (II) the 
total amount of direct greenhouse gas emissions and indirect green-
house gas emissions of that sector during the same compliance year.
Finally:
[T]he Administrator shall apply an economic adjustment ratio of 1 
for a particular foreign country under subparagraph (2)(C) unless 
the Commission makes an affirmative decision to lower the ratio 
in order to take into account all of the following actions that the 
foreign country has taken during the relevant period, and that these 
actions have been fully implemented, verified, and enforced—(A) 
the deployment and use of state of the art technologies in industrial 
processes, equipment manufacturing facilities, power generation and 
other energy facilities, consumer goods (such as automobiles and 
appliances) and implementation of other techniques or actions that 
have the effect of limiting greenhouse gas emissions in the foreign 
country during the relevant period; and (B) any regulatory programs, 
requirements, and other measures that the foreign country has imple-
mented to limit greenhouse gas emissions during the relevant period.
Boxer Amendment to S.3036, 110th Cong. § 1316(d)(2).
31  Id. § 1316(d)(1)(B). 
32  Under this methodology, each importer would (i) determine for each cov-
ered foreign country the number of allowances that apply to the category of 
covered goods manufactured and processed entirely in that covered foreign 
country for that compliance year; and (ii) of the allowance requirements identi-
fied for particular covered foreign countries, apply the requirement that imposes 
the highest number of allowances for the category of covered goods. The 
Administrator may allow importers to apply an alternate method for establish-
ing this requirement, but only if the importer demonstrates in an administrative 
hearing by a preponderance of evidence that the alternate method will establish 
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an international reserve allowance requirement that is more representative than 
the applicable requirement. Id. § 1316(d)(8).
33  Such programs represent a “comparable action” if the Administrator certi-
fies that the program (i) places a quantitative limitation on the total quantity of 
greenhouse gas emissions of the covered foreign country in terms of tons emit-
ted per year and achieves that limitation through an allowance trading system; 
(ii) satisfies criteria established by the Administrator for requirements relating 
to the enforceability of the cap and trade program, including requirements for 
monitoring, reporting, verification procedures, and allowance tracking; and (iii) 
is a comparable action.  Id. § 1316(e)(1).
34  Id. § 1316(e)(2).
35  Id. § 1316(e)(2)(A).
36  American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, Discussion Draft, 111th 
Cong. § 414(b) [hereinafter American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009]. 
Furthermore, a country will be determined to have: 
[C]ommensurate greenhouse gas regulation if (1) the country’s 
annual greenhouse gas intensity or energy intensity (as described 
in section 403(b)) for a sector or sub-sector is equal to or less than 
the greenhouse gas intensity or energy intensity for such sector or 
sub-sector in the United States in the most recent calendar year for 
which reliable data are available; or (2) the country has implemented 
policies, including sectoral caps, export tariffs, or production fees, 
that individually or collectively place a price on greenhouse gas 
emissions from a sector or sub-sector that is at least 60 percent of 
the cost of complying with title VII of the Clean Air Act in the 
United States for such sector or sub-sector, averaged over a two-year 
period.
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, § 405(b)(2).
37  Id. § 414(a).
38  Id. § 416(a).
39  Id. § 415.
40  Id. § 416(a)(1)(C).
41  Id. § 416(a)(2).
42  American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, supra note 36, § 411(1). 
This section specifies “iron, steel, steel mill products (including pipe and tube), 
aluminum, cement, glass (including flat, container, and specialty glass and 
fiberglass), pulp, paper, chemicals, and industrial ceramics” as “primary prod-
ucts.” It also provides a “catch-all” sub-provision covering 
[A]ny other manufactured product that (i) is sold in bulk for pur-
poses of further manufacture or inclusion in a finished product; and 
(ii) generates, in the course of the manufacture of the product, direct 
greenhouse gas emissions or indirect greenhouse gas emissions that 
are comparable (on an emissions-per-output basis) to emissions gen-
erated in the manufacture of products [that were specifically listed 
earlier].
Id. 
43  Id. § 402(b)(1). Carbon leakage is defined as “any substantial increase (as 
determined by the Administrator) in [GHG] emissions by manufacturing enti-
ties located in countries without commensurate [GHG] regulation, provided 
that such increase is caused by an incremental cost of production increase in the 
United States resulting from the implementation of title VII of the Clean Air 
Act.”
44  Id. § 403(a).
45  Id. § 403(b).
46  Id. § 403(c). The direct compliance factor is equal to the “product of (i) the 
output of the covered entity; and (ii) 85 percent of the average [GHG] emis-
sions (expressed in tons of carbon dioxide equivalent) per unit of output for all 
covered entities in the sector or sub-sector, as determined by the Administrator 
based on reports provided under subparagraph (C).” The “indirect carbon fac-
tor for an entity for a calendar year is the product obtained by multiplying the 
output of the covered entity by both the emissions intensity factor determined 
pursuant to clause (i) and the electricity efficiency factor determined pursuant to 
clause (ii) for the year concerned.” The “emissions intensity factor” in a regu-
lated electricity market is “the average [GHG] emissions (expressed in tons of 
carbon dioxide equivalents) per kilowatt hour of the electricity purchased by the 
covered entity, as determined by the Administrator based on reports provided 
under subparagraph (D).” “In a wholesale competitive electricity market, the 
emissions intensity factor is the average [GHG] emissions (expressed in tons of 
carbon dioxide equivalents) per kilowatt hour of the marginal source of supply 
of electricity purchased by the covered entity, as determined by the Admin-
istrator `based on reports provided under subparagraph (D).” “The electricity 
efficiency factor is 85 percent of the average amount of electricity (in kilowatt 
hours) used per unit of output for all covered entities in the relevant sector or 
sub-sector, as determined by the Administrator based on reports provided under 
subparagraph (C).”
47  American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, supra note 36, § 405(b).
48  See id. Titles I and IV.
49  Also known as H.R. 1862, the bill was introduced on April 1, 2009 and was 
referred to the Committees on Ways and Means and Energy and Commerce. 
H.R. 1862, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
50  Id. § 2.
51  Id.
52  Id.
53  Id.
54  S.3036, 110th Cong. § 6006 (2008). An important difference between the 
Boxer Amendment and S.3036 is that the requirement for U.S. importers to 
submit emissions allowances for the covered goods imported would have gone 
into effect from January 1, 2020 under S.3036, meaning that there would have 
been an eight-year delay between requiring emissions allowances from domes-
tic manufacturers (which would commence in 2012) and from importers. In 
contrast, the Boxer Amendment incorporates only a two-year delay between 
domestic and international requirements, requiring importers to purchase and 
produce emissions allowances beginning from January 1, 2014. A further 
difference concerns how key terms in the border adjustment measures are 
defined, thus having an impact on how these measures will be implemented 
and enforced. Baseline emissions level used to calculate emissions attributable 
to covered goods, and to determine whether comparable actions have been 
taken, would be calculated as of 2005 levels in the Boxer Amendment, but as 
of the period from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2014 under S.3036. While 
the Boxer Amendment specifically addresses the calculation of allowances for 
goods from multiple covered countries, S.3036 does not. Further, under the 
Boxer Amendment, the definitions of comparable action and the formulas to 
be used by the EPA are far more developed and fully conceptualized than in 
S.3036. For example, in contrast to the methodology described above in the 
section on the Boxer Amendment, the methodology for calculating the interna-
tional allowance requirements under S.3036 only covers the initial compliance 
year, and is defined as “for each category of covered goods of each covered 
foreign country” it is “equal to the quotient obtained by dividing (i) the excess, 
if any, of the total emissions from the covered foreign country that are attribut-
able to the category of covered goods produced during the most recent year for 
which data are available, over the baseline emission level of the covered foreign 
country for that category; and (ii) the total quantity of the covered good pro-
duced in the covered foreign country during the most recent calendar year.” Id. 
§ 6006(d)(2)(A). The legislation is designed so that the allowance requirements 
would be adjusted later:
(i) in accordance with the ratio that (I) the quantity of allowances 
that were allocated at no cost to entities within the industry sector 
manufacturing the covered goods fro the compliance year during 
which the covered goods were imported into the United States, bears 
to (II) the greenhouse gas emissions of that industry sectors; and  
(ii) to take into account the level of economic development of the 
covered foreign country in which the covered goods were produced. 
Id. § 6006(d)(2)(B). While the Boxer Amendment’s methodology is more 
detailed and complex, its basic principles are roughly the same as in S.3036.
55  H.R.6186 was introduced in the House of Representatives on June 4, 2008, 
and referred to the House Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment on 
June 12, 2008. No further action has been taken on this bill. H.R. 6186, 110th 
Cong. (2d Sess. 2008).
56  H.R.6316 was introduced into the House of Representatives on June 19, 
2008 and referred to the House Subcommittee on Conservation, Credit, Energy 
and Research on November 19, 2008. No further action has been taken on this 
bill. H.R. 6316, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008).
57  However, there are some significant differences between the Boxer Amend-
ment and H.R.6316 that are worth noting. Perhaps the most significant differ-
ence between the two is that, unlike the Boxer Amendment, which requires 
imports from any foreign country not on the exempted list to submit emissions 
allowances, H.R.6316 applies only to countries that are members, or observant 
governments of, the WTO, defined in the bill as “WTO participants.” Imports 
from countries that are not WTO participants are not regulated under this 
legislation, and therefore efforts to limit GHG emissions and spread the cost 
of regulation among nations do not extend to countries outside of the WTO. 
Another significant difference is H.R.6316’s inclusion of provisions for nego-
tiating agreements with WTO participants who are developing countries to 
secure comparable action on GHG emissions, including offering countries will-
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ing to negotiate such agreements preferential access to the domestic U.S. car-
bon market. H.R.6316 § 115(b)(1). The preferential agreements could include 
incentives such as the ability of the WTO participant to choose its base year or 
its maximum GHG emissions limits for its system, rather than requiring it to 
match the U.S. limitations in order to access the U.S. carbon market. Id. The 
negotiated agreements would only be available on a “first-come, first-served” 
basis, and would not be negotiated in a way that would breech this emissions 
budget. Id. Finally, the requirement for importers to provide emissions allow-
ances on imports from covered countries would begin from January 1, 2015 
under H.R.6316, rather than on January 1, 2014 under the Boxer Amendment. 
Therefore, H.R.6316 allows for a three-year implementation gap before imple-
menting the border adjustment measure, rather than a two-year gap indicated 
under the Boxer Amendment. H.R.6316. § 111(d)(1).
58  The GATT is incorporated into the set of agreements known collectively as 
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, which 
entered into effect on January 1, 2005. 
59  For instance, one line of cases suggests that the definition of “like” is 
broader under Article III.4 than it is under Article III.2. See World Trade Orga-
nization, Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (“EC – Asbestos”), ¶¶ 87-154, 
WT/DS135/AB/R (March 12, 2001). 
60  The Mercado Común del Sur (“MERCUSOR”), is a regional trade agree-
ment in South America.
61  World Trade Organization, Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures 
Affecting Imports of Retreated Tyres (“Brazil – Tyres”), ¶ 232, WT/DS332/
AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007).
62  World Trade Organization, Appellate Body Report, United States – Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (“U.S. – Shrimp”), ¶¶ 
122-24, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 22, 2001).
63  Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Dec. 15, 1993, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. (1994) [hereinafter 
TBT Agreement].
64  See e.g., Statement of Joost Pauwelyn, “Testimony Before the Subcommit-
tee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means,” March 24, 2009. 
On page 13 of his written statement, Professor Pauwelyn refers to “a carbon 
assessment on a product-specific basis by, for example, allowing an importer 
to demonstrate the actual carbon-footprint of a specific batch of imports.” 
(Emphasis in the original.)
65  TBT Agreement, supra note 63, art. 2.1.
66  Id. art. 2.2.
67  Id. art. 2.4.
68  Id. art. 12.
69  The Emission Migration Prevention with Long-term Output Yields Act 
(“H.R. 1759”), introduced by Representatives Jay Inslee and Mike Doyle on 
March 26, 2009, provides an example of the adoption of technical standards 
in legislation designed to address GHG emissions. H.R. 1759, 111th Cong. 
(2009). Although this legislation does not apply to imported goods, it does 
apply to domestic industries in a way intended to defend against carbon leak-
age. Under the proposal, emission allowances would be distributed to industries 
vulnerable to external competition as a result of the imposition of a cap-and-
trade program. The allowances would be subject to a declining cap, which 
would force industries either to adopt clean technologies and become more effi-
cient, or, alternatively, to move operations offshore to avoid U.S. restrictions. 
Given that the adoption of such technical standards to determine distribution of 
emissions allowances could force less efficient manufacturers to relocate opera-
tions offshore, rather than adopt expensive, cleaner technologies, it is possible 
that eventually, only the most efficient operators would remain in the United 
States. The most efficient operators then would have to both increase expenses 
to maintain efficiency and defend against competition from manufacturers who 
have moved offshore and are able to produce at lower cost. In short, technical 
standards, when not carefully applied, can have unintended consequences, and 
when applied to imported goods they can trigger a TBT Agreement challenge. 
70  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Dec. 15, 1993, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. (1994) [hereinafter 
SCM Agreement].
71  The SCM Agreement permits WTO Members to take action against foreign 
governments’ subsidies in two distinct ways. The first method is through direct 
challenges that WTO Members may pursue before WTO dispute settlement 
panels pursuant to Part III of the SCM Agreement, which may, if successful, 
result in a WTO ruling requiring that the subsidizing WTO Member terminate 
the subsidy program. Id. pt. III. The second method, authorized in Part V of the 
SCM Agreement, is through the imposition of countervailing duties (“CVDs”) 
on imported products benefiting from alleged subsidies. Id. pt. V.  
72  Such a theory of subsidization would posit that the system norm is the gov-
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http://www.worldwatch.org/node/5369 (indicating that China’s participation 
is essential); Videotape Transcript: UNFCCC chief de Boer discusses U.S. 
role in Copenhagen talks (OnPoint, Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/
tv/transcript/958 (identifying four political essentials for moving forward at 
Copenhagen: clarity on how much industrialized countries willing to reduce 
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their emissions, clarity on how much major developing countries like China and 
India are willing to limit their emissions growth of their emissions; clarity on 
finance will be essential to help engage developing countries in reducing emis-
sions and adapting to impacts of climate change; and decisions on how money 
will be managed).
86  See Roadmap from Poznan to Copenhagen – Preconditions for Success: 
Hearing before the H. Select Comm. on Energy Independence and Global 
Warming, 111th Cong. 4 (2009) (written statement of Ambassador John Bru-
ton, Ambassador to the Delegation of the European Commission to the USA) 
available at http://globalwarming.house.gov/tools/3q08materials/files/0100.
pdf; see also Conference of European Churches, CSC Briefing on the Com-
mission Proposal for Post-Kyoto Negotiations (2009), http://www.cec-kek.org/
pdf/EuropeUpdate23PostKyoto.pdf; anDrew keeler & alexanDer thomp-
Son, inDuStrializeD country mitigation policy anD reSource tranSferS to 
Developing countrieS: improving anD expanDing greenhouSe gaS offSetS 11, 
16 (The Harvard Project on Int’l Agreements, Discussion Paper 08-05, 2008), 
available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/KeelerWeb4.pdf.
upDaTe
The following language should be added to the article 
by Jacqueline Peel and Lee Godden in SDLP’s 2009 Cli-
mate Law Reporter. This is an update to the Walker case 
which was discussed in detail in that article. See Jacqueline 
Peel & Lee Godden, Planning for Adaptation to Climate 
Change: Landmark Cases from Australia, SuStainable 
Dev. l. & pol’y, Winter 2009, at 37, 39. 
The New South Wales Court of Appeal,1 later over-
turned the decision of Justice Biscoe on a technicality, 
finding that whilst the ‘public interest’ was an implied 
mandatory consideration, the ESD principles were not. 
The Court held that, although the Minister did not consider 
ESD principles, that oversight only had relevance for the 
inadequacy of a ‘public interest’ consideration, which was 
a merits-based matter. The merits approach was to be con-
trasted to an overarching failure to consider the public inter-
est at all, which would be susceptible to judicial review.2 
Nonetheless, the majority of the Court stressed, ‘the prin-
ciples of ESD are likely to come to be seen as so plainly an 
element of the public interest, in relation to most if not all 
decisions, that failure to consider them will become strong 
evidence of failure to consider the public interest and/or to 
act bona fide in the exercise of powers granted to the Minis-
ter, and thus become capable of avoiding decisions.’3 Thus 
while the majority judgment set a steep threshold test for 
declaring decision-making invalid, it does not preclude 
ESD principles as a relevant consideration in determining 
the public interest in climate change contexts.
Endnotes:
1 Minister for Planning v. Walker (2008) 161 LGERA 423; [2008] 
NSWCA 224.
2 Id. at 40, 41, 44.
3 Id. at 56.
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from academia, the private sector, the public sector, 
multilateral organizations, and others. 
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